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Traditional products in many industries recently experienced servicification. This phe-
nomenon, that has already been described by Vargo and Lusch in 2004, describes
changes in society and markets that foster a shift towards a service-centered view. In
this vein, the focus of trade is on services while the importance of goods decreases. The
emergence of advanced Web technologies leverages the provisioning and consumption
of services over the Internet. Additionally, the presence of the Internet and the availabil-
ity of Web-related technologies has influenced the offering and provisioning of services.
The existence of platforms like Google’s AppExchange or Amazon’s Web Services man-
ifest this trend. The legal framework for service outsourcing and thus, service provi-
sioning and consumption is stipulated in service level agreements (SLAs). SLAs deter-
mine the objectives for service quality through service level objectives (SLOs), contain
a price for service provisioning and a penalty in case of SLA violation. This way, SLAs
set incentives for providers to adhere to SLAs. The provisioning of services underlies
an inherent risk of service failure caused for instance by power outages, hardware mal-
function or human failures, which leads to uncertainty concerning SLA violations that
manifest in due penalties. Consequently, for a service provider it is of major interest,
which SLAs should be established in order to minimize the risk of SLA violation.
This thesis presents a novel approach that enables service providers to select a par-
ticular combination of SLAs that minimizes the risk of SLA violation. Furthermore,
the approach takes constraints on expected profit and available resources into account.
This problem is addressed by applying methodologies from decision theory and ap-
proaches for measuring risk. In particular, the concept of portfolio selection by Harry
Markowitz is adapted and extended in order to formulate the objective function of a ser-
vice provider’s decision for SLA establishment. In order to capture a decision maker’s
attitude towards risk, utility theory and the concept of risk aversion are employed to
express a decision maker’s preferences.
In this thesis, the risk of SLA violation is calculated from monitoring data of SLAs that
were established in the past that comprises information on the degree of violation of
an SLA. Therefore, the methods that solve the decision problem of SLA establishment
are evaluated with respect to the amount of past observations that is required for cal-
culating the risk of SLA violation. The results of the evaluation imply that between 10
and 100 observations suffice, depending on the employed method. This low number
showcases the applicability of the approaches presented in this thesis for real-world




The completion of a work like this is only possible with the support of and collabora-
tion with many people. Foremost I would like to thank my advisor, Prof. Dr. Christof
Weinhardt, who gave me the great chance to gain a lot of experience in the ValueGrids
project and the manyfold tasks at the Institute of Information Systems and Management
(IISM) and the Karlsruhe Service Research Insitute (KSRI). He gave me the freedom to
pursue this research and encouraged me in my ideas. I would like to show my grati-
tude to my co-advisor Prof. Dr. Rudi Studer for his guidance and fruitful discussions
especially on the semantic aspects and possible extensions to this work. I would partic-
ularly like to thank the other members of the committee, Prof. Dr. Orestis Terzidis for
the interesting discussions on practical implications of my thesis and Prof. Dr. Andreas
Geyer-Schulz for the discussions on statistical aspects.
My sincere thanks go the teams of IISM and KSRI who improved my work through
constant discussions and ensured a vivid social life with a large variety of social events.
It is a pleasure to thank Dr. Simon Caton for his guidance, help, long discussions and
for making me look beyond my own nose. Additionally, I want to thank Dr. Lilia
Filipova-Neumann who has made available her support in numerous ways. I would
like to express my gratitude to Dr. Sudhir Agarwal, Dr. Arun Anandasivam, Dr. Tobias
Conte, Christian Haas, Rico Knapper, Jochen Martin, Thomas Meinl and Dr. Frank
Schulz for proof-reading this thesis and for giving valuable comments that improved
this work a lot. It is a pleasure to thank Annette Bannwarth, Christian Haas and Mercè
Müller-Gorchs for their time and comments that helped to improve the presentation of
this work.
I am also very grateful to Dr. Yudistira Dwi Wardhana Asnar of the University of Trento
and to Dr. Patrick Hung of the University of Ontario Institute of Technology. They gave
me the opportunity to shed light on new aspects of my work and included in me in their
research groups. I gratefully acknowledge that the research stay was supported by a
scholarship of the Karlsruhe House of Young Scientists (KHYS).
Finally, I would like to thank those who have affected me most. I owe my deepest grat-
itude to my parents, Karin and Detlev Michalk, for their support and unconditioned
love, to my brother, Eike Felix Michalk, for reminding me that there is life beyond work
and to Cornelius for his love, support and his caring encouragement. Without you, this




I Foundations & Preliminaries 1
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Research Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Research Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Identifying Drivers for Service Level Agreement Establishment 17
2.1 Service Concepts and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.2 Service Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.1.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Governing Service Provision and Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.2 Service Level Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3 Service Provider Types & Agreement Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3.1 Definition & Related Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3.2 Service Provider Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.3 Formalizing Agreement Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.4 Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3 Economic Foundations 43
3.1 Decision Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.1.1 Decisions in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.1.2 Decisions under Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.1.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Implementation of Decisions under Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2.1 Measuring Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2.2 The Semi-Variance as a Proxy for Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.3 Utility Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3 Existing Work on SLA Decisions and its Implications: A Critical Analysis 57
v
Contents
II Towards an Optimal Choice of Contracts 65
4 Service Provider Decisions 67
4.1 Provider’s Constrained Minimization of SLA Violation Risk . . . . . . . 70
4.1.1 Measuring the Risk of SLA Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1.2 Formulating Resource and Profit Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.1.3 Provider’s Risk-Minimizing Decision about SLA Establishment . 81
4.1.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2 Provider’s Maximization of Expected Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.1 Expressing a Provider’s Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2.2 Provider’s Utility-maximizing Decision Model . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 Complexity Considerations and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5 Intermediary Decisions 97
5.1 Intermediary’s Constrained Minimization of SLA Violation Risk . . . . . 99
5.1.1 Risk of Violating SLAs with Customers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.1.2 Risk of Provider SLA Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.1.3 Intermediary’s Risk-Minimizing Decision about SLA Establishment108
5.1.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2 Intermediary’s Maximization of Expected Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.2.1 Intermediary’s Utility from Providing Services . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.2.2 Intermediary’s Utility from Procuring Services . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.2.3 Intermediary’s Utility-Maximizing Decision on SLA Establishment 122
5.2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
III Evaluation and Application 129
6 Risk-minimizing Decisions in SaaS Provisioning 131
6.1 ValueGrids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.2 Risk Analysis Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.3 Design and implementation of the Dependency Analyzer . . . . . . . . . 137
7 Simulation-Based Evaluation 141
7.1 Evaluation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
7.1.1 Required Amount of Monitoring Observations . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.1.2 Impact of Dispersion of Observations on the Required Amount of
Monitoring Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.2 Provider Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.2.1 Simulation Specification and Selection of the Benchmark Portfolio 149
7.2.2 Required Amount of Monitoring Observations for Provider’s De-
cision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.2.3 Impact of Dispersion of Observations on the Required Amount of
Monitoring Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.3 Intermediary Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.3.1 Simulation Specification and Selection of the Benchmark Portfolio 158
vi
Contents
7.3.2 Required Amount of Monitoring Observations for an Intermedi-
ary’s Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.3.3 Impact of Dispersion of Observations on the Required Amount of
Monitoring Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
IV Finale 173
8 Conclusions 175
8.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
8.2 Open Research Questions and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
8.2.1 Existence of Monitoring Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
8.2.2 Seperation of SLA Portfolio Selection From Pricing Decisions . . 183
8.2.3 Simulation-based Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
8.2.4 Consumer Behaviour and Long-term SLA Design . . . . . . . . . 185
8.3 Complementary Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
A Simulation Results I
A.1 Evaluation for Provider’s Decision Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I
A.1.1 Minimization of Semi-Variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I
A.1.2 Maximization of Expected Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII
A.2 Evaluation of Intermediary’s Decision Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . XIV
A.2.1 Minimization of Semi-Variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIV
A.2.2 Maximization of Expected Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XX
B List of Symbols and Abbreviations XXIX
B.1 List of Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXX






1.1 Structure of this Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1 The Interrelation of Service Preparation, Provisioning, and Consumption 20
2.2 Service Categories and their Interrelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3 Agreement Network Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 AN: Co-location of trading infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5 AN: Co-location of trading infrastructure - general case . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1 Example Agreement Network - Focus on Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Risk-minimizing Portfolio Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3 Utility-maximizing Portfolio Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.1 Example Agreement Network - Focus on Intermediary . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.2 Intermediary’s Risk-minimizing Portfolio Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.3 Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Portfolio Selection . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.1 ValueGrids Case Study Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.2 ValueGrids Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.3 Dependency Analyzer Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.4 Dependency Analyzer Class UML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.1 Simulation Setup for Creation of Artificial Monitoring Observations . . . 149
7.2 Fraction of Correct Choices for Provider’s semi-variance -minimizing
Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
7.3 Fraction of Correct Choices for Provider’s Certainty Equivalent-
maximizing Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.4 Simulation Setup for Creation of Artificial Monitoring Observations for
Intermediary’s Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.5 Fraction of Correct Choices for Intermediary’s semi-variance-
minimizing Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.6 Fraction of Correct Choices for Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision165
8.1 Service States according to WS Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188





2.1 Criteria of Service Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 Critical Evaluation of Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.1 Extract of Service Provider’s Failure Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.1 Extract of ι’s partner monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.1 Simulation Parameters for Evaluation of Provider’s Decision . . . . . . . 149
7.2 Evaluation of provider’s risk-minimizing decision: Fraction of Correct
Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
7.3 Evaluation of provider’s utility-maximizing decision: Fraction of Correct
Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
7.4 Impact of Variance on Required Amount of Observations for Provider’s
Risk-minimizing Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.5 Impact of Variance on Required Amount of Observations for Provider’s
Utility-maximizing Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.6 Simulation Parameters for Evaluation of Intermediary’s Decision . . . . 159
7.7 Evaluation of intermediary’s risk-minimizing decision: Fraction of Cor-
rect Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.8 Evaluation of intermediary’s utility-based decision: Fraction of Correct
Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.9 Impact of Variance on Required Amount of Observations for Intermedi-
ary’s Risk-minimizing Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.10 Ordinal Regression: Impact of Variance on Required Amount of Obser-
vations for Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision . . . . . . . . . . 167
A.1 Evaluation of Provider’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Mean Difference in
Ranks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I
A.2 Evaluation of Provider’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Maximum Variance
in Portfolio and Required Amount of Observations . . . . . . . . . . IV
A.3 Evaluation of Provider’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Mean Difference
in Ranks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII
A.4 Evaluation of Provider’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Variance and Re-
quired Amount of Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI
A.5 Evaluation of Intermediary’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Mean Differ-
ence in Ranks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIV
A.6 Evaluation of Intermediary’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Maximum Vari-
ance in Portfolio and Required Amount of Observations . . . . . . . XVII
xi
List of Tables
A.7 Evaluation of Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Mean Differ-
ence in Ranks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XX
A.8 Evaluation of Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Maximum







“International trade in services is growing in importance both among OECD countries and
with the rest of the world. Traditional services - transport, insurance on merchandise trade, and
travel - account for about half of total international trade in services, but trade in newer types
of services, particularly those that can be conducted via the Internet, is growing rapidly.”
(OECD 2010)
W ITHOUT doubts, services have become a major driver of value creation in thelast decades (OECD 2010). This manifests itself in official statistics showing that
services make up the largest part of the gross domestic product (GDP) in industrialized
countries. In 2010, the share of the GDP within the European Union amounted to 73.2%
and in the United States to 76.7%1 increasing steadily over last years. The increasing
share that service provisioning makes up of the GDP demonstrates a shift of focus away
from value creation by producing goods towards revenue generation through service
provisioning. According to Vargo and Lusch (2004b), goods are merely considered ve-
hicles for the transportation of value that was created by service provisioning and the
dominant logic that underlies economies experienced a servicification. Consider the case
of a person that wants to build a house for their family. In accordance with Vargo and
Lusch (2004b), the person procures the service of building the house rather than the
accomplished house. More precisely, value is generated by the process of building the
house and is carried by the tangible output, the house.
1https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2012.
html last accessed: October 8, 2011
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Chapter 1 Introduction
The kind of services and their way of provisioning is manifold. Traditional types of ser-
vice include for instance logistics, that is efficient transportation and storage of people
or goods, healthcare, that is in- or outpatient services, ambulances, supply of medica-
tion, and many more, or the provision of a large variation of insurances (OECD 2010).
Newer types of services have emerged with the Internet since the end of the 1990s es-
pecially in the software branch. Software was traditionally developed as a monolithic
product tailored to a customer’s needs. However, after the delivery to the customer
and installation on the customer’s infrastructure, the software was out of the software
developer’s control and the customer could use the software as often and intensely as
they wished. The rise of the Internet and the emergence of new (Web) technologies
brought a change to the software industry.
The availability of the Internet enabled software developers to run software on their
own infrastructure and to allow customers to access the software over the Internet.
This new type of accessing software was leveraged by the emergence of technologies
like SOAP, JSON (Crockford 2006), WSDL and RESTful architectures (Fielding 2000),
which specified and standardized the access and communication to software services.
This way, software was no longer required to be installed on customer’s infrastructure,
which lead to enormous reductions in hardware costs for the customer. Additionally,
by running the software on the software developer’s resources the control over usage
duration and intensity of the software was back in the developer’s hands. Awareness
of the intensity and duration of usage by particular users enables the software producer
to change software pricing. The installation on the customer’s infrastructure and with
it, the lack of control about usage, only allowed the selling of a perpetual-use license to
the customer. With the knowledge about intensity and duration of usage, software that
is run on the producer’s infrastructure is eligible for price discrimination. Nowadays,
usage- and subscription-based pricing models can be observed, which offer a monetary
advantage to the customer (Choudhary 2007; Dubey and Wagle 2007). The customer is
now able to request software as a service (SaaS) from a service provider, which reduces
licensing and infrastructure costs as the customer is only billed for the actual consumed
usage of the software and is not required to procure hardware.
Besides this change in pricing, the provisioning of software as a Service via the Internet
brought about changes in the scope of software functionality. In order to enable the
access to software services flexibly and instantly, providers offer standardized service
modules, which provide a certain functionality but are not tailored to specific customer
demands. Furthermore, by offering standardized services, the variety of application
scenarios and with it, the potential number of customers, increases. Addressing po-
tential customers experienced a shift in recent years. Before the advent of the Internet,
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service providers and producers of goods reached potential customers by advertizing
in local newspapers, radio-broadcasting or television. Additionally, personal recom-
mendations by former customers played an important role. By offering services via the
Internet, a provider of specialized services is able to reach more customers and hence, is
able to exploit even the small parts of overall demand, the so called Long Tail of demand
(Anderson 2006). Being aware of this property of trading on the Internet, a provider is
able to focus on their core-competencies and increase their demand.
However, offering standardized service modules brought about a change for cus-
tomers. As software was no longer offered tailored to a customer’s needs, customers
are required to combine service modules in order to reach the required functionality.
As service providers focus on their competencies service modules are provided by a
diverse pool of service providers.
Analogously to contracts of purchase, which regulate the kind and specification of de-
livered goods, agreements about the delivered services are stipulated among service
providers. Agreements serve to ensure a proper provisioning of services according to
the customer’s needs and the providers’ abilities. These agreements are employed for
specifying the functionality of the provided services, as well as non-functional aspects
of service provisioning that specify aspects of the service that are not quality-related,
for example the provision of temperature information in degrees Celsius for a weather
forecast service. Additionally, quality aspects of the service are determined. Quality as-
pects specify how the service is provided, e. g. the percentaged availability of a weather
forecast service. Furthermore, a price for service execution is agreed on. In order to
enforce the adherence to the agreement, a penalty is stipulated, which is applied in the
case of a violation of one or more of the quality goals. The penalty itself can take mul-
tiple forms, e. g. direct monetary payments, or a credit for the customer’s next service
request. It serves to reimburse the customer for the inaccurate provisioning of service
and the resulting loss in utility and to incentivize providers to stick to the agreement
(Becker et al. 2008).
For the joint provisioning of services, different aspects have to be considered. On the
one hand, the technical composition of services is carried out with the help of common
interfaces and protocols. On the other hand, aspects of service provisioning like qual-
ity, price and penalties are defined in service level agreements (SLAs). Especially in
the context of on-demand provisioning and composition of services, a (semi-) automa-
tion of establishing SLAs is required. An approach, which defines a common struc-




However, the composition of software service modules is only one example of joint
service provisioning. Examples like Amazon Web Services (AWS) demonstrate that
besides software, infrastructure like storage space2, databases3 and computational en-
tities4 are offered via the Internet. Furthermore, development platforms provide devel-
opment tools for particular development languages to users in a flexible way without
a need for the user to procure hardware and to install development software on their
own infrastructure.5 In the context of Cloud computing, the flexible provisioning of in-
frastructure, platforms and software is described by a layered model (Baun et al. 2009),
which comprises infrastructure as a service (IaaS) as the downmost layer, platform as a
service (PaaS) as middle layer and software as a service (SaaS) as topmost layer. Besides
the flexible and instant provisioning of services, a major driver of Cloud computing is
the virtualization of physical resources, which promises nearly unlimited scalability of
the offered services (Baun et al. 2009). In this context, services can be composed hori-
zontally, that is, on the same layer (Baun et al. 2009, p. 28), or vertically, that is, across
layers. All of the above mentioned trends lead to the fact that services, which can be
provided via the Internet have experienced an increasing momentum (OECD 2010).
Obviously, joint provisioning of services by a multitude of service providers is not only
required in the case of services that are provided via the Internet. For the building of
a house, numerous different services have to be carried out including the actual build-
ing of the walls, adding the roof and windows, tiling, and many more. Consequently,
the cooperation and joint service provisioning and with it, SLAs are required for non-
Internet services as well. However, according to the Long Tail phenomenon (Anderson
2006) the number of services that are requested from a provider via the Internet and
with it, the number of SLAs that can be established exceed the demand for physical
services by far. Thus, the decision on the establishment of SLAs for services that are
provided via the Internet has to cope with a higher number of alternatives and conse-
quently is more complex.
There are many aspects of joint service provisioning that have been subject to research
in recent years. In analogy to the multi-step production of a good under participation
of a multitude of producers, joint service provisioning was described in service sup-
ply chains (Prasad and Kalai Selvan 2009). In this context, traditional services like fi-
nancial, healthcare, postal and courier, retail, entertainment and tourism services were
examined and the difference of service supply chains from goods supply chains was
2http://aws.amazon.com/s3/ last accessed: October 8, 2011
3http://aws.amazon.com/simpledb/ last accessed: October 8, 2011
4http://aws.amazon.com/de/ec2/ last accessed: October 8, 2011
5http://www.salesforce.com last accessed: October 8, 2011
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elaborated. However, the decision about providing services or not and the inherently
coupled decision about the establishment of SLAs was not covered explicitely. Fur-
thermore, the impact that the rise of the Internet has on SLA establishment was not
considered.
The technological aspects of joint service provisioning via the Internet gained enormous
research interest. Approaches for service engineering, service description, service dis-
covery and the description of service level agreements were and still are investigated
(Scheithauer et al. 2009; Barros and Dumas 2006; Christensen et al. 2001; Toch et al.
2007; Küster et al. 2007; Andrieux et al. 2007). However, these works lack specific eco-
nomic considerations of joint service provisioning like provider’s preferences towards
profit or the utility resulting from service provisioning. Nevertheless, economic aspects
of joint service provisioning were in the focus of researchers. For instance, approaches
that maximize total welfare that consists of a customer’s and providers’ utility by se-
lecting service offers from a set of available alternatives were developped (Blau 2009;
Conte 2010). Whereas these approaches consider technical requirements that arise with
the provisioning of services via the Internet, the focus of the methods that are provided
lays on the joint provision of a single service and the development of a method for
the efficient choice of service modules for this particular complex service. However,
the decision that a provider makes about the establishment of SLAs in the context of
joint service provisioning of a multitude of different complex services has not yet been
investigated.
The decision about the establishment of SLAs is the focus of this thesis. The following
section derives Research Questions that enable the modeling of the scenario for decision
making, the definition of a method for solving the decision problem and the evaluation
of the method.
1.1 Research Outline
The core research activity in this thesis is dedicated to the decision on the establishment
of SLAs. In order to develop and evaluate a method for decision making about the
establishment of SLAs, a thorough understanding of the situation in which the decision
is made and the factors that influence the decision maker is required. Therefore, the
first research question of this thesis addresses the stipulation of Service Level Agreements.
In more detail, it explores the terms that regulate service provisioning in an SLA and
which resources that are available to the provider of a service along with economic
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expectations impact a provider in their decision about the establishment of an SLA.
RESEARCH QUESTION 1 ≺STIPULATION OF SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENTS. What
aspects of service provisioning do a provider and a customer of a service stipulate in a Service
Level Agreement and which technical properties and economic preferences of a service provider
influence the decision about establishing an SLA?
Different aspects of joint service provisioning via the Internet were due to research in
the recent time. From a technical perspective, the description of services (Mika et al.
2004; Oberle et al. 2009; Speiser et al. 2008) as well as the (semantic) discovery of ser-
vices (Küster et al. 2007; Toch et al. 2007) have been well-discussed and described in
literature. Together with the emergence of (semantically annotated) service repositories
(Junghans et al. 2010), the composition of (Web) services becomes feasible for service
providers from a technical point of view. The decision for a particular service offer in-
cludes functional aspects, non-functional properties of service provisioning that specify
aspects of the service that are not quality-related like the provision of temperature infor-
mation in degrees Celsius for a weather forecast service and quality aspects of service
provisioning. Methods that include the aforementioned factors have been subject to
research, which focuses on the customer’s preferences by means of policies (Lamparter
2007), or on the maximization of the overall welfare (Blau 2009), or on increasing the
variety of alternatives of available services (Conte 2010).
However, in the existing literature, the aspects of decision making on the establish-
ment of SLAs are not considered abstracted from single complex services, nor is the
risk of violating SLAs and the resulting implications on profit taken into considera-
tion. For this reason, Research Question 1 is addressed from a broad viewpoint on joint
service provisioning without focusing on single complex services, thereby considering
joint service provisioning by investigating the establishment of SLAs between single
service providers. Therefore, in a first step, the trading object service is defined and
an interdisciplinary delineation among types of services is given. The description and
formalization of an SLA, which is established between the provider and the customer
of a service are discussed in the next step. Constraints and characteristics, which influ-
ence service providers in the decision making process about the establishment of SLAs,
are illustrated in the third step. These characteristics are split up into technical prop-
erties of the service provider and economic preferences. Two different types of service
providers are distinguished, service providers that provide all requested functionality
by themselves and a particular instantiation of a provider, a service intermediary that
needs to procure service functionality from providers other than themselves. With the
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joint provisioning of services and under consideration of the different types of service
providers, a networked structure of SLAs arises. This structure is denoted by agree-
ment networks (ANs) in the remainder of this thesis. Thus, in a final step a formal
description of an agreement network is given in order to model the scenario in which
decisions on the establishment of SLAs are made.
The solution to Research Question 1 lays the foundation for defining the decision prob-
lems of two types of service provider in the newly arising, highly interconnected field of
co-opetitive service provisioning, which is regulated by SLAs. With the establishment
of SLAs, service providers and intermediaries experience uncertainty about future SLA
violations. Such uncertainty translates into a risk for the decision maker, which has
to be considered in the SLA establishment decision making process. There are well-
established definitions and measures for risk (Markowitz 1959; Arrow 1971), which
are applied in most distinctive domains (Bonini 1975; Filipova 2009; Kauffman and
Sougstad 2010; Buhl and Fridgen 2011). However, there has been no approach, which
applies risk measures in the context of SLA violations and which takes account of risk
in the decision about SLA establishment.
This gap in current research directly leads to Research Questions 2 and 3, which are con-
cerned with the development of a method for decision making for the establishment of
SLAs from the perspective of a service provider and the special case of an intermediary.
Classic measures of risk stem from the finance or insurance sectors (Markowitz 1959;
Lintner 1965; Sharpe 1964; Jorion 2007) and illustrate uncertainty about expected profit,
which plays an important role in service provisioning via the Internet (Berger 2005). In
order exploit the Long Tail phenomenon for the maximization of the market share and
with it profit, service providers and intermediaries exploit the possibilities of offering
and providing services via the Internet. However, with a growing number of requests
for service provisioning, the number of SLAs increases and with it, the complexity of
the decision about SLA establishment.
Besides the sheer number of requests for service provisioning, there are particular
factors that a service provider needs to consider in their decision on SLA establish-
ment. For instance power outages, breaking hardware, human failure could impact
the performance of a service in a way that leads to a violation of the corresponding
SLA. Each of these causes for SLA violation is not under direct control of the service
provider but lead to a loss of profit. So, even if a provider knows about this risk of SLA
violation they cannot directly influence it.
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RESEARCH QUESTION 2 ≺PROVIDER’S RISK-MINIMIZING DECISION. How can a
provider select the SLAs that minimize the risk of SLA violation while taking their technical
properties and economic preferences into account?
This question will be addressed by reviewing the technical properties and economic
preferences of a service provider that were identified in context with Research Ques-
tion 1. The decision problem about the establishment of a set of SLAs is determined and
constraints, which influence the decision, are formulated and included in the decision
problem. In order to include the risk of SLA violation in the service provider’s decision
problem, a suitable measure of risk is identified. In analogy to the selection of an effi-
cient portfolio of shares, the theory of porfolio selection (Markowitz 1959; Markowitz
1991) is reviewed and adapted to the case of the selection of an SLA portfolio. This mea-
sure of risk allows the provider to select the portfolio of SLAs which bears the lowest
possible risk of violation while achieving a given profit. In this context, past observa-
tions of SLA violations serve as a proxy for future SLA violations and thus enable the
expression of the risk of SLA violation.
In a second step, the decision problem is extended in order to explicitly include the
provider’s attitude towards risk in the sense of uncertainy of profit. This is achieved
by applying the theory of risk-aversion (Arrow 1971; Pratt 1964), where the decision
maker’s preferences disclose the amount of money which the decision maker requires
for an additional marginal unit of uncertainty of profit. Applying the theory of risk-
aversion to the decision problem enables the provider to express their degree of risk-
aversion directly and to consider a trade-off between profit and uncertainty of SLA
violation in their decision. As before, the uncertainty of future SLA violations is ap-
proximated with the help of past observations of SLA violations.
As not all service providers can provide all the requested functionality by themselves,
service intermediaries were identified to play an important role in joint service provi-
sioning. Service intermediaries offer services to customers that are complex and value-
enhanced and comprise of functionality that is provided by service providers other than
the intermediary. Thus, the decision on the establishment of SLAs that an intermediary
faces concerns SLAs with customers as well as providers.
RESEARCH QUESTION 3 ≺INTERMEDIARY’S RISK-MINIMIZING DECISION. How
can an intermediary select the SLAs with customers and supplying providers that minimize




The intermediary’s decision problem is approached similarly to the provider’s deci-
sion problem. In a first step, the technical properties and economic preferences that
were identified in conjunction with Research Question 1 are reviewed and the impact
of the procurement of service functionality from other providers is highlighted. Based
on the results, the decision problem is specified. Analogously to the risk-minimizing
decision of the provider, the measure of SLA violation risk is adapted from the theory
of portfolio selection (Markowitz 1991). In order to account for the risk of SLA violation
by supplying providers, an extension of the model that was presented in the context of
Research Question 2 is provided.
In order to allow the intermediary to express their preferences by means of a trade-off
between expected profit and risk of SLA violation, the decision problem is extended in
a second step. Similar to the case of the provider’s decision about the establishment of a
portfolio of SLAs, the theory of risk-aversion is applied to the intermediary’s selection
of SLAs with customers and supplying providers.
Yet, the specification of methods that provide solutions to the decision problems of ser-
vice providers and intermediaries does not suffice for completing this work. In order
to show the applicability in real-world agreement networks, it is crucial to evaluate the
presented methods. As the risk of SLA violations is calculated from past monitoring
observations, the most intriguing question for providers as well as intermediaries con-
cerns the number of observations needed for an optimal decision. This leads to Research
Question 4:
RESEARCH QUESTION 4 ≺REQUIRED AMOUNT OF MONITORING DATA FOR DECI-
SION MAKING. How many monitoring observations are required for the calculation of SLA
violation risk in a) a provider’s and b) an intermediary’s decision on SLA establishment?
The monitoring of services has been well discussed and described in theory (Baresi
et al. 2006; Ghezzi and Guinea 2007) and practice (Barth 2008; Badger 2008) with the
aim of achieving performance traceability. With the help of a monitoring system, it is
possible to determine if an SLA was adhered to or violated in the case that its state is
determinable. Consequently, service providers are able to discover problems in service
execution and solve them. Furthermore, a monitoring system can assist a customer
to claim penalties. On top of monitoring systems, business analytics systems are em-
ployed to generate reports on the observed adherence or violation to the terms that are
stipulated in SLAs. These reports contain information about violations in different de-
scriptions that range from textual descriptions to boolean values that state if a term was
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adhered to or not. In order to express future risk of SLA violation, past observations
of SLA violations are required to be numerical. This requirement is not met by current
business analytics systems and thus, no real-world data is available for the evaluation
of the method for solving the risk-minimizing decision problem.
Consequently, Research Question 4 is addressed by a simulation-based evaluation, in
which monitoring observations are created artificially from known probability distribu-
tions. The knowledge of distributions allows the application of the method for solving
the provider’s decision problem to the most precise specification of the distribution of
SLA violations and thus, to identify the risk-minimizing choice. By comparing this
choice to the choices that result from increasing numbers of observations facilitates the
identification of the number of observations that the model requires for making the
actually risk-minimizing choice.
1.2 Structure
The research outline that was presented in the previous section reflects the structure of
this thesis, which is divided into four parts. Part I lays the foundations for the decision
problems, which are introduced in Part II. The evaluation of the methods that solve the
decision problems is described in Part III. Part IV concludes the thesis and highlights
future research directions.
A high-level illustration of this work’s structure is shown in Figure 1.1. Chapter 1
gave an insight into joint service provisioning and the agreements, SLAs, that are es-
tablished in order to regulate cooperation among providers and intermediaries. From
the identified research gaps, research questions were deduced. Chapter 2 lays the foun-
dations for the following sections by giving definitions of services and service level
agreements. The joint provision of services fosters the rise of a networked structure
of SLAs. This structure is defined and formalized in order to define the scenario in
which decisions on the establishment of SLAs are made. Additionally, the difference
between service providers and intermediaries is highlighted. Chapter 3 highlights the
economic foundations, which are the basis for the decision problems in the main part
of this work. Concepts of decision theory (Section 3.1), implementations of decisions
under uncertainty (Section 3.2) by measuring risk (Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2) and utility
theory (Section 3.2.3) are discussed in order to lay the groundwork for the following
sections. Current literature on joint service provisioning and decision making about
SLAs is discussed in Section 3.3 in order to highlight the challenges that are addressed
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These foundations lead in to Section 4, which focuses on the decision problem of a
provider on the establishment of SLAs. The foundations from Part I are merged and
a method for solving the decision problem is derived that copes with technical and
economic constraints of a provider’s decision. In a second part, the model is extended
in order to account directly for the provider’s degree of risk-aversion and to allow for
a decision that is based on a trade-off between profit and risk.
In Chapter 5, the viewpoint of an intermediary is taken, which extends the provider’s
decision problem. In contrast to a provider’s decision problem, which is concerned
with the selection of a portfolio of SLAs with customers, an intermediary needs to de-
cide about the portfolio of SLAs, which will be established with supplying providers,
additionally. Analogously to Chapter 4, a risk-based decision model is defined, which
is extended in a second step in order to allow for a trade-off between profit and risk.
Chapter 6 emphasizes the applicability of the introduced models by illustrating the
implementation in the project ValueGrids in the area of software as a service (SaaS)
composition. In Chapter 7 the introduced approaches are evaluated by means of a
simulation-based evaluation. Chapter 8 summarizes the key contributions of this work
and points to future research, limitations, and complementary topics.
1.3 Research Development
Excerpts of this work have been accepted for publication and presentation at european
and international conferences. Additionally, parts have been published as journal arti-
cles. This section serves to give an overview which parts have been published in which
research community. Furthermore, this section highlights the development of the work
at hand by means of focusing on the steps of refinement and extension.
The basic principals of the provider’s decision process that takes the risk of SLA viola-
tion into account was presented at the 43rd Hawaii International Conference on System
Sciences (HICSS ’43) (Michalk et al. 2010). This work was adapted due to applicabil-
ity reasons in order to account for service monitoring rather than resource monitoring
and extended by an objective function, which allows for a trade-off between risk and
profit. This revised and extended version was published in the Journal of Service Sci-
ence (Michalk et al. 2011) and corresponds to the work presented in Chapter 4.
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As an extension to the provider’s decision process, a first version of the intermediary’s
decision problem that is based on the risk of SLA violation was published in the Journal
of Information Systems and e-Business Management (ISeBM) (Michalk and Blau 2010).
This publication serves as groundwork for the decision process that is presented in
Section 5.1.
First evaluation results about the required number of monitoring observations were
been presented at the European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS 2011)
(Michalk 2011), along with the latest version of the provider’s risk-based decision prob-
lem. This work corresponds to the results in Section 7.2.
In addition, between 2009 and 2011, research in the context of service level manage-
ment and risk-based decisions was contributed to the ValueGrids6 project funded by
the German Federal Ministry of Research and Education. In the context of this project,
the overall project goal of a holistic SLA management along service value chains and
across different levels of service composition was published at the Cracow Grid Work-
shop (CGW 2009) (Schulz et al. 2010). The design and conceptualization of the Val-
ueGrids component is described in Section 6. It facilitates risk-based decisions in the
context of service composition, was presented at the annual meeting of the Gesellschaft
für Informatik (Informatik 2010) (Michalk and Caton 2010).





Identifying Drivers for Service Level
Agreement Establishment
“In a distributed service-oriented computing environment, service consumers like to obtain
guarantees related to services they use, often related to quality of a service.”
(Andrieux, Czajkowski, and Keahey 2007)
THE goal of this chapter is to illustrate the concept of service level agreements(SLAs) and the factors that drive their establishment from a decision maker’s
point of view. Furthermore, agreement networks (ANs) are introduced, which are the
application scenario of this thesis and form the environment for the decision problems
that are the main concern of this work. As preparational steps, first the concept of a
service is introduced in Section 2.1 in order to specify the trading object under consid-
eration. Therefore, an extensive literature review gives insight into definitions that are
employed in different research disciplines. This enables a definition of service to be
identified, which captures the information systems (IS) perspective, yet is rich enough
to also account for the increasing IT (Information Technology) orientation in the service
sector. It is set into the context of Cloud Computing.
In Section 2.2, the emergence of, and need for, SLAs in business contexts is discussed.
The building blocks of SLAs are introduced and a formal description is given that serves
as a basis for the decision problems that will be introduced in Sections 4 and 5. In the
context of joint service provisioning that is regulated by means of SLAs, two types
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of providers are distinguished and the drivers that influence their decision on SLA
establishment are identified. The network of providers and consumers of services that
arises with the establishment of SLAs is discussed and set into context with related
concepts like business networks and service value networks in Section 2.3. Besides a
formal description of ANs and the definition of roles that exist in ANs in Section 2.3, a
hands-on example is given to illustrate the scenario in Section 2.3.4.
This Section is dedicated to address Research Question 1 from Section 1.1:
RESEARCH QUESTION 1 ≺STIPULATION OF SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENTS. What
aspects of service provisioning do a provider and a customer of a service stipulate in a Service
Level Agreement and which technical properties and economic preferences of a service provider
influence the decision about establishing an SLA?
2.1 Service Concepts and Definitions
In accordance with Vargo and Lusch (2004b), changes in society and markets yield the
major shift towards a service-centered view that leads to an exchange of services rather
than goods (see Section 1). This manifests across industries, where traditional manufac-
turers tend to integrate services in their core offerings. This service-orientation is often
motivated by a change in customer demand towards a higher degree of customiza-
tion. The servicification in the software industry is leveraged by ubiquituous advanced
Web service technologies and leads to a fundamental change in company strategies and
business models: software vendors become service providers (Dubey and Wagle 2007)
(see Section 1). The increasing momentum of on-demand applications that is driven by
the availability of the Internet and technologies that facilitate service provisioning via
the Internet is underpinned by a series of Gartner studies (Mertz et al. 2007; Mertz et al.
2008).
The goal of Section 2.1 is to review service concepts from disciplines that are con-
cerned with decision making about service provisioning and the impact of technolog-
ical changes on service provisioning. Therefore, service concepts from business eco-
nomics, economics, both for decision making, and computer science, for the technolog-
ical impact, are explored in order to identify a definition that is suitable for research
on the intersection of these disciplines in the discipline of IS. This lays the groundwork
for the following sections by defining services in general and delineating electronic ser-
vices and Web services as well as explaining the connection to the as-a-service paradigm
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highlighting the increasing impact of the Internet and related technologies for service
provisioning. This definition is essential to properly describe SLAs and the building
parts that influence the decision about their establishment.
2.1.1 Related Work
To date, a magnitude of different definitions of a service exist. This is because each
discipline concerned with a particular aspect of a service determined a definition that
best suited its needs. In the area of computer science a service is defined based on
the requirements that arise in the context of practical implementations with a focus on
technical properties of a service. Contrarily, business economists consider the general
properties of a service, the prerequisites for service provisioning and the value creation.
To understand decisions in service-oriented economies, it is not sufficient to focus on
just one discipline. A definition is required that allows for a systemic view on services
that includes technical as well as business and economic properties.
The following sections introduce different types of definitions and give an overview on
business-related and technical service definitions.
Business-related Service Definitions
The number of contributions in the context of service is enormous and in equal measure
heterogeneous. There is no common definition of a service. The large variety of ex-
isting definitions reflects the application of different approaches and even completely
different views on ecosystems.
Most business economic definitions of service have one element in common: a focus
on value creation. According to Engelhardt et al. (1993), there are three perspectives
on value creation: potential-, process-, and outcome-orientation. Potential-orientation is
concerned with the preparation of service provisioning, that is, the allocation of produc-
tion factors. Since the allocation of factors is necessary in almost any value creation
activity, a potential-oriented definition of service is not sufficiently distinctive for the
definition of a service. The activation and integration of allocated resources is consid-
ered in process-orientation, where services are described by activities that employ re-
sources through either the customer and the provider. Outcome-orientation denotes a
view that directly relates to the result of this process. Outcome-orientation concentrates
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on the nature of the outcome being material or immaterial and hence, cannot describe
the nature of service adequately. It is rather the delivery phase, that is, in the words
of Engelhardt et al. (1993), the process-oriented definitions, that define the heart of a
service by adequately and equally awarding importance to both, the service provider
and the service consumer. Consequently, the process of providing a service and the
corresponding activities are considered in detail in the following.
The preparation of a service as a first step, followed by its delivery need to be considered
seperately (Engelhardt et al. 1993). Provider and consumer set up readiness for service
provisioning in the first step. In the case of a hair cutting service, such preparation
would include, for instance, the education or hiring of staff, procurement of equip-
ment, leasing of a premise, and so forth. For a Web-based service, the preparation
phase would, inter alia, include programming efforts and the allocation of sufficient
computational resources.
After the general preparation as described above, additional individual preparation is
required in order to provide the tailored service that meets the customer’s demand.
Before commencing the service provisioning, an agreement is stipulated between cus-
tomer and provider that regulates the terms of service provisioning. Provisioning and
simulataneous consumption of the service are included in the delivery phase. While
the preparation phase is universal, i.e. represents the basis for every concrete service
delivery, the outcome relates to a distinct delivery process. Figure 2.1 illustrates the
phases of service provisioning.
FIGURE 2.1: The Interrelation of Service Preparation, Provisioning, and Consumption
Besides taking the phases of service preparation and delivery into account, definitions
of service in the literature focus on characteristics of service as compared to goods.
These are intangibility, heterogeneity, inseparability of production and consumption
and perishability (IHIP criteria) (Edgett and Parkinson 1993; Rathmell 1966; Regan
1963; Shostack 1977; Zeithaml et al. 1985).
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Flipo (1988) as well as Kotler and Connor Jr (1977) describe a service as intangible, that
is, it cannot be perceived before it is bought. This property is perceived as the major
delineating factor between products and services by a majority of scholars (Shostack
1977). The large variety in provided services that results from an ever changing de-
mand from customers is described by heterogeneity (Zeithaml et al. 1985). The uno actu
principle states the simulatenous consumption and delivery of services is captured in
the inseperability property (Regan 1963; Wyckham et al. 1975) (cp. also last part of the
delivery phase in Fig. 2.1). Finally, the fact that services cannot be stored or trans-
ported is described by perishability (Donnelly Jr 1976; Rathmell 1966; Zeithaml et al.
1985). In relation with the IHIP criteria, Lovelock et al. (1999) defines services as an
act or performance offered by one party to another. In summary, the definition of a
service that is provided is rather vague and the identified criteria, the IHIP criteria,
and their applicability have been subject to discussion (e.g. Edvardsson et al. (2005),
Lovelock and Gummesson (2004), Vargo and Lusch (2004a)). While recognizing that
there are numerous services which take some form of tangible representation (e.g. car
repair, programming, taking photos, etc.) services cannot be defined to be completely
intangible. Analogously, there are products which are highly adapted to customers’
requests (e.g. Dell notebooks) and hence cannot be differentiated from goods by their
heterogeneity.
Based on many possible exceptions that arise from the IHIP criteria, continuum-based
approaches like the product-service-continuum gained momentum (Shostack 1977). In
these approaches of which most stem from marketing research, dimensions are defined
which characterize services. For example services are characterized along their “de-
gree of intangibility” (outcome-orientation) and “degree of customer integration” (En-
gelhardt et al. 1993), “degree of individuality”. This enables a distinction between
individualized and standardized services (Meffert and Bruhn 2008), or simply a differ-
entiation between tangible- and intangible-dominant entities (Shostack 1977). A major
implication of these approaches is the neglection of a dichotomy between products and
services. Specifying a service along different shades of dimensions does not allow for a
clear-cut separation between services and products. This results in the emergence of a
continuum, where pure products resemble one end and pure services the other (Berry
and Pasuraman 2004; Chase 1981; Shostack 1977).
Defining a service by identifying features that enable the distinction from a product
does not prevent an ambiguous solution, as discussed above. Even the application of
continuum-based approaches does not allow for a unique definition of what a service
is. A different view on services is taken in Vargo and Lusch (2004b). In context with
the service dominant logic (Vargo and Lusch 2004b), a good can be seen as an appli-
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ance, or medium, for service delivery. Vargo and Lusch (2004b) postulate a philoso-
phy rather than a service definition, which states that there is a major shift towards a
service-centered view that is driven by changes in society and markets that leads to the
exchange of services rather than goods. According to Vargo and Lusch (2004b), a ser-
vice is “the application of specialized competencies (knowledge and skills) through deeds, pro-
cesses, and performances for the benefit of another entity or the entity itself ”. This paradigm
is underpinned by a service prosumer that co-creates value with a service provider or
service producer by “applying specialized skills and knowledge”. This specification of
a service subsumes a large variety of concepts.
A definition of a service that is more specific was introduced by Hill (1977). In this
notation, a service denotes an activity that is performed by an economic unit B for an
economic unit A, where the result of this activity is the change in condition of an eco-
nomic unit C that either is or belongs to economic unit A. Note that the prior agreement
of economic unit A is required. Hill (1977) defines that it is not the readiness for service
provisioning, but rather the “production of a service” that constitutes value creation,
where “production” refers to the aforementioned activity. With respect to Figure 2.1,
the definition provided in Hill (1977) is concerned with the delivery phase.
The formalization of a service according to Hill (1977) specifies standard services like
hair-cutting, car repairs, or post shipment very accurately. However, the definition does
not allow for a distinction of services performed on electronic data or provided via elec-
tronic networks which is required for an interdisciplinary understanding of services
that allows for the impact that the Internet and related technologies have on provision-
ing. Gadrey (2000) formulated several extensions to the definition provided by Hill
(1977). Three necessary extensions are defined in order to include assistance and in-
tervention, provision of technical capacities, and live performances in Hill’s definition.
However, the definitions of Hill (1977) and Gadrey (2000) do not include the concept of
value co-creation by consumer and provider.
Hence, currently there is no approach that enables an unambiguous definition of service
for IS research and that captures the impact that the Internet and related technologies
have on service provisioning.
Information and Communications Technology View on Services
Value creation has been identified as one of the major properties of service provisioning
from a business economic viewpoint. Nevertheless, the definition of a service that is
22
2.1 Service Concepts and Definitions
provided by ITIL (IT Infrastructure Library) includes this aspect of a service by defining
it as “a means of delivering value to customers by facilitating outcomes customers want to
achieve without the ownership of specific costs and risks” (Bon 2005). Thus, ITIL offers a
high-level definition of service that abstracts from potential- and process-orientation
but focuses on the outcome, i.e. value creation. Furthermore, the cost and risk of a
service are considered to be essential characteristics.
With the advent of service-oriented computing (SOC), Web services have been estab-
lished as technical services that do not only affect persons or goods, but may also affect
other electronic resources such as addressable data sets. From a technology viewpoint,
Web services cater for an abstraction layer over different network protocols, operating
systems and programming languages. Thus, Web services provide possibilities to ex-
pose the functionality of an application system by means of Web technologies (Alonso
et al. 2004).
Similar to the field of business economics, there is a variety of contributions and apart
from the very vague definition above, there is no commonly applied definition of ser-
vices in computer science.
A Web service, however, is specified as “a software system designed to support interopera-
ble machine-to-machine interaction over a network. It has an interface described in a machine-
processable format (specifically WSDL). Other systems interact with the Web service in a man-
ner prescribed by its description using SOAP-messages, typically conveyed using HTTP with
an XML serialization in conjunction with other Web-related standards" (W3C 2004). In Pa-
pazoglou (2008) two kinds of topological Web service are distinguished: informational
and complex Web services. While the former simply supports request/response pat-
terns, the latter implements coordination functionality.
The description of a service by means of WSDL or SOAP-messages is a very common
approach, which allows for the specification of interfaces and communication proto-
cols. Nevertheless, it lacks the ability to describe service functionality. In order to in-
clude common wording that induces a broad understanding, semantic annotations can
be, and typically are, employed.
One approach that allows the specification of a service in an understandable way is
provided in O’Sullivan et al. (2002) by listing non-functional properties of a service that
form constraints on the service functionality. A service is defined along the following
characteristics: activities performed by one entity for another, inherent value that is transfered
from provider to customer, service composition or aggregation.
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The definitions sketched above are tailored to computer scientists’ needs, but do not in-
clude important economic aspects of a service like participants in service provisioning,
the change of state, and in most parts: value creation.
System View on Services
Both, Business and ICT (Information and Communication Technology) views on ser-
vices suggest definitions of service that meet the respective discipline’s requirements. A
definition that unites the diverse approaches and suggests a systemic view that consid-
ers (business) economic and computer science related aspects of service provisioning is
missing.
A first approach to define a view on a service world as a system is given in Spohrer et al.
(2008) and Maglio and Spohrer (2008). In their definition, service systems revolve as
“dynamic value co-creation configuration of resources, including people, organizations, shared
information, and technology, all connected internally and externally to other service systems
by value propositions”. This view provides insights on concerned parties, resources and
the aim of service provisioning and consequently highlights the environment of service
provisioning rather than a definition of the process of service provisioning.
Even though the definitions provided by Vargo and Lusch (2004b), Spohrer et al. (2008),
Maglio and Spohrer (2008) are very vague and do not provide a means to describe a
service unambiguously and consequently are not suitable for application in IS research,
they provide a basis for further steps.
Rather than providing a service definition, Baida et al. (2004) presents an empirical
analysis of the application of the term service. In this work, three major terms were
identified: services, e-services and Web services. All of these terms are applied in all of
the examined disciplines with differing meanings. Therefore, an interpretation of each
of the terms is suggested. Services are defined in accordance with business science, as
business activities which create value, mostly in intangible forms. E-services are inter-
preted as services that are delivered over the Internet, accoring to information science.
Computer science regards Web services as software with certain technical properties
that realizes e-services.
In the following Section, a definition of service is given that represents the essence of
the discussed service definitions while coping with the requirements in IS research.
Furthermore, a distinction of service types along criteria is suggested that allows for
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the impact of the Internet and related technologies.
2.1.2 Service Definition
This section serves to give a definition of service that fuses the technical service defini-
tions, which focus on exchanged messages, protocols, and interfaces and business eco-
nomic specifications with a focus on value creation. The given definition is designed
to be applicable in interdisciplinary research like IS research. First, a generic service
definition is given in accordance with Blau (2009) and Conte (2010). This definition is
then specialized analogously to Baida et al. (2004) in order to account for electronic and
Web services. Based on the service definition by Hill (1977) and its extension by Gadrey
(2000), a service is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Service). A service is a set of activities that are performed and intended to
bring about a change of state to either an entity that is owned or used by a consumer or to the
consumer itself. The set of activities is performed by a provider or jointly by the provider and
consumer. The outcome or resulting change of state is based upon a prior agreement between
the consumer and provider, which aims at the co-creation of value.
In contrast to service as defined in Vargo and Lusch (2004b), the above definition em-
phasizes the intention to change the state of an entity, e.g cut hair or increase the degree
of information of students. Furthermore, it requires a prior agreement on the provision
of the service in order to exclude unrequested provisioning. By co-creation of value,
contribution of both parties, consumer and provider, is understood. The consumer’s
contribution may range from the provisioning of the entity that is changed through
contributing to the execution of the set of activities. The provider mainly contributes
by performing the activities.
Building on this basic definition of service, properties are identified and specific service
types are derived. With the rise of information and communication technology and
rapid growth of the Internet, the environment of service provision changed completely.
In this context, a special kind of service emerged that is defined as Electronic Service.
Definition 2.2 (Electronic Service). An electronic service (e-Service) is a service where the
input and outcome are provided via an electronic network.
In more detail, a service can be characterized as an electronic service, in the case that
the input provided to the service and/or the outcome of the service are distributed by
means of an electronic network like the telecommunication network or the Internet.
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The ongoing paradigm shift in service provision is constituted most evidently by the
growing importance of providers like Amazon Web Services1 and Salesforce2. There,
offers comprise services that are interoperable and hence may be composed to meet
consumers’ special demand. This specific kind of e-Service is denoted as a Web ser-
vice.
Definition 2.3 (Web Service). A Web service is an e-service identified by a URI (Uniform
Resource Identifier) that exposes a public, well-defined interface. The input and output are
provided via a Web protocol.
There are two attributes that allow to specify a service as a Web service. First, the exis-
tence of a URI that discloses a public, well-defined interface to the service is required.
Second, a Web service involves the communication by means of a special Web proto-
col (such as HTTP). Both of these aspects can be regarded as key enablers of automatic
service composition, and hence, cooperation among service providers, which is the
driving factor for the application scenario of this thesis.
The criteria for discriminating the service types are presented in Table 2.1. From this
disambiguation, the typology as depicted in Figure 2.2 is derived.
Real-world examples for Web services include i. e. Google’s search service, which ex-
poses a public interface, and can be composed with other services. But additionally, ser-
vices like salesforce.com’s Sales Cloud or Amazon Web services are comprised that in-
clude for instance customer relationship management (CRM) systems, databases, com-
puting instances or storage space. All of these services are hosted on the provider’s re-
sources and can be requested and used on-demand without the need for the customer
to procure infrastructure or install monolithic software systems. The provisioning of
these services is influenced by a technology that emerged in the context of service pro-
visioning via the Internet and gained momentum in recent years. With the help of vir-
tualization techniques it is possible to provide a magnitude of types of Cloud services
(Baun et al. 2009) comprising infrastructure services, e. g. Amazon’s Elastic Compute
Cloud (EC2), platform services like salesforce.com’s Sales Cloud, and software as a ser-
vice like Google’s AppExchange. Therefore, Cloud services denote a further type of
service that is influenced by the availability of the Internet and related technologies.
1http://aws.amazon.com last accessed: October 8,2011
2http://www.salesforce.com/ last accessed: October 8, 2011
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TABLE 2.1: Criteria of Service Categories


















FIGURE 2.2: Service Categories and their Interrelation
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2.1.3 Conclusion
This section served to give a comprehensive definition of a service that is relevant and
fitting for the context of this thesis. Therefore, literature was reviewed that defines
services from different research disciplines by applying different approaches and even
different philosophies. In accordance with Blau (2009) and Conte (2010), a service def-
inition that can be applied in information systems research was presented. Properties
were identified that allow the differentiation of e-services and Web services.
These properties can be found in Table 2.1. An electronic service is distinguished from
a service by the transmission of input and outcome. Analogously, a Web service is an
e-service with a well-defined interface and to which communication is performed via a
Web protocol. In a final step, Cloud services were presented as a special kind of services
that are provided by means of virtualization techniques.
Thus, this section served to establish a common understanding of the trading object
service and to provide a definition that considers aspects for (business) economic deci-
sion making as well as technological properties of service provisioning. This definition
denotes the starting point for further investigations on joint service provisioning of dif-
ferent kinds of service. The agreements that are stipulated between the provider and a
consumer of a service and that serve to regulate service provisioning and consumption
are explored in the following section.
2.2 Governing Service Provision and Consumption
The joint provisioning of services is facilitated by a multitude of service providers (Blau
et al. 2009). Similar to contracts of purchase, which rule properties and condition of the
procured good, a concept of agreements exists that regulates the provisioning and con-
sumption of a service. Especially in business-related scenarios, SLAs gain increasing
momentum. SLAs define functional as well as non-functional aspects of service provi-
sion, along with duties and rights of the concerned parties. This section serves to give
an introduction to the building parts and representation of SLAs.
In a first step, literature on SLAs is reviewed and discussed. A definition of what an
SLA is and what it contains is introduced and special charachteristics of SLAs for Web
services are identified. A representation of SLAs is given that illustrates the building
parts of an SLA which are relevant to the decision problems in Chapters 4 and 5.
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2.2.1 Related Literature
In recent years, scholars paid much attention to SLAs. This results in an enormous body
of definitions of what the goal of an SLA is and what it should comprise. Most of the
existing definitions are based on a similar essence but exhibit slightly different aspects.
Nevertheless, there is no commonly agreed definition of what an SLA represents. This
section serves to give an overview on a share of SLA definitions that emerged in the
area of IT-related services.
According to Berger (2005), an SLA is an agreement that stipulates levels and standards
of a service. This statement does directly reflect the components of an SLA: the service,
its level and the agreement on them. Hence, this definition states the core essence of what
an SLA comprises.
The concerned parties of an SLA are highlighted in the definition provided by Hiles
(2002), where an SLA is defined as “an agreement between the computing service provider
and the user” which quantifies the minimum acceptable service to the user. Hence, be-
sides the definition by Berger (2005), the aspect of particpating actors is added in Hiles
(2002).
The aim of an SLA is considered to materialize in incentives that are set to providers as
well as customers. While providers are encouraged to adhere to the agreed acceptable
level(s) of service, that is, quality of service (QoS) by a monetary reward and a penalty
in case of SLA violation that are stipulated in the SLA, consumers can reduce the un-
certainty of the outcome of service provisioning by the liabilities that are defined in the
SLA (Brandic et al. 2008; Lewis and Ray 1999). This way, providers and customers
are incentivized to adhere to their duties. Having identified expectations about service
provisioning and by specifying actions that need to be taken in specific circumstances,
i. e. service failure, provider and customer of a service have a clear means of commu-
nication and action (Karten 2001; Lewis and Ray 1999). In order to reach this goal, an
SLA is required to comprise the business partners, a desription of provided services,
their parameters and acceptable service levels in addition to liabilities (Lewis and Ray
1999).
With the advent of Web service technologies as already stated in Chapter 1 and Section
2.1, SLA definitions with a special focus on Web services are required. Besides being
able to cope with electronic interactions, which are inherent to Web services, and hence,
being able to bear descriptions of Web services, SLAs need to reflect QoS attributes of
Web services (Keller and Ludwig 2003). A special challenge in this respect is that the
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agreement still needs to be understood by the concerned parties, that is, customers and
providers, without requiring specific knowledge about the provider (Czajkowski et al.
2002). Consequently, an SLA for Web services needs to specify one or more service
level objectives (SLOs) in order to identify requirements on the service quality of the
customer and to stipulate guarantees by the provider (Andrieux et al. 2007).
These goals do not differ significantly from the aim of general SLAs. However, it is
inherently important that SLAs for Web services take a form that is comprehensible but
at the same time machine-readible. Furthermore, SLAs need to reflect the customer’s
requirements and the provider’s guarantees towards service quality and to allow for
a specificity that is measurable and can be monitored. SLAs for Web services are re-
quired to follow a specification that allows for (semi-)automatic instantiation in order
to cope with the requirements of Web service composition. In order to consider these
requirements, the following section provides a general definition of an SLA and derives
a special kind of SLA that is suitable for Web services. Finally, a formal notation of SLAs
that suits as a basis for the decision problems in Sections 4 and 5 is given.
2.2.2 Service Level Agreements
The goal of this section is to provide a definition of what an SLA is by means of specify-
ing its purpose and its required constituents. Therefore, existing definitions are merged
and their essence is presented. In a second step, a definition of an SLA that is particu-
larly suitable for Web services is given as an extension of the general definition.
Based on the definitions of Lewis and Ray (1999), Hiles (2002), Brandic et al. (2008), an
SLA is defined as follows:
Definition 2.4 (Service Level Agreement). A service level agreement is an agreement be-
tween a provider and a customer of a service that identifies the business partners, the func-
tionality of the provided service, the non-functional and quality parameters for the service and
corresponding service levels, as well as a monetary reward for service provisioning and liabilities
when service levels are not met.
This definition does not only include the parties that stipulate the agreement and the
service that is provided. Besides the functionaliy that is provided, non-functional as-
pects of the service that do not relate to quality are defined as well as requirements
that a customer has towards the provided service and the guarantees that the provider
agrees to. These guarantees are specified by means of assertions to service attributes.
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In other words, in the agreement, target values for quality paramaters, so called key
performance indicators (KPIs), are determined in order to establish QoS objectives, ser-
vice level objectives (SLOs). Additionally, the monetary incentives that are stipulated
in order to foster the adherence to the agreement are considered by means of a mone-
tary reward, that is the price for service provisioning and liabilities for the case of SLA
violation that are commonly called penalties.
Generally, penalties enforce the adherence to SLAs by means of a credible threat (Becker
et al. 2008). In the case of the violation of an SLA, a penalty is applied by means
of a monetary amount on behalf of the provider or a credit for the customer. One
example of a penalty is a direct monetary payment from the provider to the customer
or the reduction of the agreed price to pay for service execution. Another example for a
penalty is exerted by Amazon and Google Apps Engine, where the customer is credited
free usage time or service credits if the service is not provided as agreed upon. Other
examples are implicite impacts on future agreements or the enforced re-execution of
the service after failure (Rana et al. 2008). However, no matter which approach might
be applied, it is possible to translate the penalty to a monetary amount. Therefore, in
the remainder of this work, a monetary amount will denote the penalty.
The rise of information and communication technology and especially the increasing
application of Web service technologies require matching SLAs that consider special
characteristics of Web services. Based on the definition of an SLA that is provided
above, a Web service agreement is defined as follows:
Definition 2.5 (Web service Agreement). A Web service Agreement is an SLA, in which
the provisioning of a Web service is agreed. Web service Agreements expose a machine readible
representation that does allow for human understanding.
Following this definition, an SLA is of the special type Web service Agreement if the
service about which the agreement is stipulated is a Web service and can be described
by description languages like WSDL (Christensen et al. 2001), JSON (Crockford 2006) or
SOAP (Fielding 2000). Additionally, the SLA is required to expose a machine readible
representation that can be achieved, for instance, by applying SNAP (Czajkowski et al.
2002), WSLA (Keller and Ludwig 2003) or WS Agreement (Andrieux et al. 2007). In this
work, the SLA specification is chosen according to WS Agreement due to its degree of
distribution and its status as a recommendation of OGF3.
According to WS Agreement, an SLA basically contains three parts: its identifier, the
3http://www.gridforum.org/ last accessed: October 8, 2011
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context and the terms. Where the context comprises of information about the agreement
initiator, that is, who requested to establish the agreement, the agreement responder,
and which role the service provider takes. Additionally, a validity period for the SLA
is given along with information about the template on which the SLA was built. In
conclusion, the context contains information about the concerned parties, provider and
customer, as well as the validity period and emergence of the SLA.
The last big building part of an SLA, the terms, consists of service terms and guarantee
terms. Service terms contain either a service description or a reference to a service
endpoint, that is, a URL where the Web service can be contacted. In the guarantee
terms, the assurance on service quality is specified in terms of SLOs, that is, KPIs and
target values, along with a reward, the price for service provisioning and a penalty in
case of SLA violation.
In order to provide a formal representation of SLAs that can be used in the following
chapters, an SLA can be summarized to contain an identifier for provider, customer
and service as well as a set of SLOs, a price for service provisioning and a penalty in
case of SLA violation. Consequently, an SLA α can be formalized as
α = (p, s,θ, Lα, fα(s),µα) ,
where p denotes the provider, θ the customer and s the service. Additionally, Lα de-
scribes the set of SLOs that is stipulated in the SLA, fα(s) is the price for service provi-
sioning and µα is the agreed penalty.
2.2.3 Conclusion
The aim of this section was to give a general definition of the scope and goal of an SLA
as well as its constituents. Therefore, existing definitions from literature were reviewed
and condensed and a general definition of an SLA was derived from Lewis and Ray
(1999), Hiles (2002), Brandic et al. (2008). In a second step, the definition was specified
in order to account for a particular type of service in the SLA, Web services, as defined in
Section 2.1. By considering these Web services along with exhibiting a machine-readible
representation, Web service agreements were defined as a special type of SLA.
SLAs of each of the above specified types form the basis of cooperation among
providers and consequently, joint value creation. Especially in the context of services
that are provided via the Internet, the demand for customized services increases and
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with it the need for cooperation among service providers. This cooperation fosters the
emergence of different types of service providers and networks of agreements. This
phenomenon is discussed in detail in Section 2.3.
2.3 Service Provider Types & Agreement Networks
Ever since industrialization revolutionized the creation of goods, a focus of manufac-
turers on their core competencies could be observed. Production was tailored to create
standardized goods in order to reduce costs and producers learnt to cooperate in or-
der to leverage economies of scale. The same phenomenon has been observed in the
services sector for several years now (Prasad and Kalai Selvan 2009). Whereas the for-
mation of business networks for the joint provisioning of services has been subject to
a large variety of research, a special focus on Web service networks emerged recently
(Blau et al. 2009). However, existing views on Web service networks focus on the (effi-
cient) composition of Web services in order to create a particular complex service (Blau
2009; Conte 2010) rather than the network of agreements and cooperations that arises
between providers and customers.
This section serves to establish a common understanding for Agreement Networks.
Therefore, in a first step, a thorough literature review discusses existing perceptions of
networks that arise with the joint provisioning of services. In a constructive approach,
ANs are differentiated from existing approaches and a definition is given in Section
2.3.1. From this definition, different types of service providers are identified and de-
fined. Furthermore, a formal specification of ANs is given in Section 2.3.3 that can be
applied in the following, and the scenario under consideration is illustrated (Section
2.3.4).
2.3.1 Definition & Related Concepts
This section serves to give an overview on existing perceptions of networks that fa-
cilitate business cooperation. Besides providing a brief insight into concepts that are
related to ANs, this section sketches the development of business cooperation with an
increasing degree of IT application.
The most general description of cooperation among different firms or other legal enti-
ties that is motivated by economic reasons is given by the term business networks (Holm
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et al. 1996; Steiner 2004; Tapscott et al. 2000; Zerdick et al. 2000). A collective reward
is regarded to be an incentive for participation in a network that yields joint value
creation. Network partners in business networks can be of either homogeneous (i. e.
competing) and heterogeneous (i. e. complemetary) nature that cooperate in a tempo-
rary manner in project-driven or goal-oriented partnerships (Bengtsson and Kock 2000).
However, agreements in general are not considered explicitly in business networks.
With the increasing momentum of information and communication technology (ICT),
business networks evolved to a new generation that is called smart business networks
(SBNs). In this kind of network, cooperation is facilitated by the application of emerg-
ing technologies. The increasing effectiveness and corresponding advantage that is
achieved by the use of ICT lead to appending the characteristic smart (Van Heck and
Vervest 2009). ICT is also seen as an enabler of network agility, i.e. the network’s ability
to “rapidly pick, plug, and play” business processes (Heck and Vervest 2007). The trend
from “mass customization” to “mass individualization” is tightly coupled with SBNs
that allow for dynamic on-demand adaptation to customers’ needs and requirements
(Busquets et al. 2009).
The focus of business networks and SBNs lies on the cooperation aspect of joint value
creation. However, SLAs and agreements in general are not considered explicitly. Be-
sides focusing on the area of Web services, service value networks (SVNs) highlight the
dynamic and on-demand composition of service modules (Blau et al. 2009). Service
value networks are considered to reflect a specialization of SBNs, in which value is cre-
ated by the on-demand composition of services that are provided in a steady but open
pool of complementary as well as substitutive Web service modules. This perspec-
tive concentrates on a single complex service, the added value that is created by it and
the efficient selection of service modules for the formation of the complex service. In a
broader view, service providers offer their services in a multitude of SVNs and take part
in a large variety of value creation processes. This view on joint value creation across
the boundaries of a diversity of complex services is not comprised in SVNs. Therefore,
a definition is required that allows for a focus on the network of agreements that arises
with joint service provisioning.
Definition 2.6 (Agreement Network). Agreement networks are business networks that pro-
vide added value by facilitating the dynamic cooperation of service providers with the help of
SLAs in order to foster joint service provisioning.
In more detail, an AN is characterized by the dynamic cooperation of service providers,
which is facilitated by agreements about service provisioning, SLAs, as defined in Sec-
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tion 2.2. Furthermore, if emerging technologies are employed for service provisioning,
ANs form a specialization of SBNs. This reflects the impact of ICT in the field of ser-
vice provisioning, which leads to on-demand customization of services that requires
a dynamic cooperation among parties. In order to facilitate joint service provisioning,
different types of service providers are required. These are defined and differentiated
in the following section.
2.3.2 Service Provider Types
Cooperation among service providers is required if a customer requests particular func-
tionality that cannot be provided by one provider alone. In order to meet the customer’s
request, the provider needs to cooperate with other providers. This in turn leads to the
emergence of different types of service providers, which are introduced below.
First, consider a provider that is able to provide the requested functionality.
Definition 2.7 (Service Provider). A service provider offers stand-alone services along with
corresponding SLAs. A service provider is characterized by their services and their resource
constraints as well as an amount of profit that they want to gain.
According to this definition, a service provider can provide all the requested function-
ality by themselves. A service provider is constrained in service provisioning, and
consequently the establishment of SLAs, by the their available resources and economic
preferences. Whenever the provider stipulates an SLA, they agree on SLOs that deter-
mine the quality of the delivered service (see Section 2.2). SLOs can be translated to the
provider’s resources, like available bandwidth or storage space. Furthermore, in each
SLA, a price for service provisioning and a penalty for the case of SLA violation are
determined (see Section 2.2), which influence the expected profit of the provider. Con-
sequently, these are the factors that need to be considered in the provider’s decision on
SLA establishment.
Consider the case where a provider cannot deliver all the requested functionality by
themselves. In this case, the provider needs to cooperate with other providers in order
to deliver the requested service. This fosters the rise of a special type of service provider,
the intermediary.
Definition 2.8 (Intermediary). An intermediary is a service provider that provides a combi-
nation or composition of services from a multitude of providers to a customer. An intermediary
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is characterized by the functionality that they can provide by themselves, the functionality that
they can provide jointly with others, resource constraints and the amount of profit that the in-
termediary wants to achieve. Intermediaries establish SLAs with customers and other providers.
This way, the intermediary is a special kind of service provider that fosters joint service
provisioning by contracting with other providers. The intermediary’s decision prob-
lem concerning the establishment of SLAs is constrained by resource and economic
constraints like the provider’s problem. However, the intermediary is required to con-
currently consider SLAs that are established with customers as well as SLAs that are
established with other providers.
2.3.3 Formalizing Agreement Networks
The creation of value that is enabled by joint service provisioning fosters the rise of
agreement networks. In order to enter an SLA, the customer has to be able to discover
available SLAs from providers. Therefore, a customer is assumed to operate or have
access to a service and SLA repository that can be queried for specific service function-
ality as well as corresponding SLAs. With respect to an AN, customers θ ∈ Θ denote
the headnode(s) of the AN.
Providers. The set of nodes p ∈ P denotes the set of service providers that take part
in the AN, either actively by providing a service or passively by offering services and
SLAs. Service providers are characterized by their supply of services offers (s ∈ S)
as well as their resource constraints Lp that denote the maximum amount of available
technical resources such as disk space, bandwidth or availability. Service providers,
according to Definition 2.7, constitute leaf nodes in an AN, as their exclusive aim is to
provide services. Intermediaries, which are a special type of service provider, according
to Definition 2.8, resemble internal nodes that exhibit connections between customer
and providers.
Service level agreements. An edge αi(p,θ) ∈ A denotes an SLA between a provider
p and a customer θ. An SLA is specified according to Section 2.2 and comprises of a
provider p, the consumer θ, the service s as well as multiple Service Level Objectives
(SLOs) lα ∈ Lα. Furthermore, an SLA α comprises of a price fα(s) and a penalty µα.
The SLA can take the states inactive, as long as there is knowledge about its existence,
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FIGURE 2.3: Agreement Network Model
pending if a request for service provisioning has been issued and observed if the SLA was
established (see Andrieux et al. (2007)).
The formalized agreement network. From the above notation, a specific AN can be
formalized as follows: G := (P, A(P)).
Figure 2.3 displays an exemplary formalization of an agreement network with three
providers, two intermediaries and one customer. There are pending SLAs between
the customer, intermediary ι2 and the provider p2 as well as observed SLAs between
the customer, intermediary ι1 and the provider p1. The following section illustrates an
example AN in order to highlight the scenario, in which the decision problems that will
be introduced in Sections 4 and 5 arise.
2.3.4 Scenario
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the scenario of the thesis. Therefore, in a
first step an example for the emergence of an agreement network is given. Second, the
viewpoints of an intermediary and a provider are highlighted and the decisions each of
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them has to face are derived along with the important assumptions required for reasons
of feasibility.
Scenario. Assume that a bank wants to achieve ‘better’ prices in institutional trad-
ing on stock markets. The prices that have to be paid on the market depend on
network latency (Wagener and Riordan 2009) giving rise to so called proximity
services.4 Proximity services enable the procurement of complete systems that are
co-located with a stock market and therefore result in extremely low latency. In the
example, these services are offered by a provider that is called “Stock Market”.
Additionally, the bank could opt for the installation of the exchange software on
Cloud instances and connect those via an extreme low-latency connection to the
stock market. In the example, the provider of Cloud instances is embodied by “Ama-
zon Web Services” with their offer that is called “Elastic Compute Cloud”5 by which
infrastructure can be used on-demand. The low-latency conncection is offered by
“Cisco Systems”6, a provider of high-performance network connections. A third
possibility would result in a combination of co-locating the access point to the stock
market, and procure the IT infrastructure by means of a Cloud instance with in-
stalled exchange software.
Now, assume that the bank additionally wants to outsource backoffice processes like
accounting and data storage in order to reduce costs. This can be facilitated by em-
ploying an accounting software, e. g. “SAP”7, on infrastructure in the Cloud, that
is in this case embodied by “CBTS”8. The resulting agreement network is depicted
in Figure 2.4.
The scenario outlined above illustrates the emergence of an agreement network. In a
real-world scenario, analogously to the bank, each of the participants of the AN is not
only confronted with this small amount of inactive SLAs but rather faces a big variety
of possible cooperations with other providers. The provision of services via the Internet
leverages the amount of available alternatives for joint service provisioning. In Figure
2.5, this is indicated by inactive SLAs that the participants face. For simplicity reasons
and without loss of generality, the corresponding business partners were omitted.
As already mentioned, to facilitate the emergence of an AN, customers as well as inter-
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FIGURE 2.4: AN: Co-location of trading infrastructure
FIGURE 2.5: AN: Co-location of trading infrastructure - general case
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service providers are able to offer their services in a magnitude of versions with respect
to their delivered quality of service. For the customer (or an intermediary that wants to
procure a service module), this would lead to a high complexity of choosing the correct
service and corresponding SLA. Therefore, for the remainder of this thesis, providers
and intermediaries face certain constraints.
Assumption 1 (Pre-defined set of SLAs). Providers and intermediaries offer a pre-defined
set of SLAs for each service. This allows to constrain the number of available SLAs, that is
quality classes, for a service.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, one SLA is assumed to relate to exactly
one service, as SLA representations can include multiple services within a single docu-
ment.
Assumption 2 (Relationship of SLAs and services). Each SLA regulates the provisioning
of one service.
The role of a provider according to Definition 2.7 in an AN implies the decision prob-
lem that arises for the provider. As providers (Definition 2.7) constitute the leaf nodes
in ANs, it is obvious that their role does exclusively include the provisioning of ser-
vices and with it, the decision about the establishment of SLAs with customers. Conse-
quently, the provider’s decision problem can be formulated as follows:
Which SLA(s) with customers should be active in the next period?
As there is a multitude of possible agreements for the provider (see Figure 2.5), the
provider has to decide for a set of SLAs or in other words, a portfolio of SLAs that they
want to activate in the following period. This translates into the decision for a provider
that divides all known SLAs into a set of inactive, pending and observed SLAs. This
is necessary when the provider is confronted with a request for service provisioning.
They need to decide whether to enter pending SLAs or not and on continuing observed
SLAs. Consequently, the provider decides about the set or portfolio γ of SLAs α ∈ A
that will be active in the following period.
Analogously, the intermediary’s decision is:
services.htm last accessed: October 8, 2011
5http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/ last accessed: October 8, 2011
6http://www.cisco.com/ last accessed: October 8, 2011
7http://www.sap.com/ last accessed: October 8, 2011
8http://cbts.cinbell.com/ last accessed: October 8,2011
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2.4 Summary
Which SLA(s) with customers and supplying providers should be active in the next period?
Again as for the provider’s case, the intermediary faces a large variety of possible coop-
erations. As the intermediary does provide services and procure service modules, their
decision about active sets, or portfolios, of SLAs is twofold. They need to decide which
combinations of two SLA portfolios will be active in the following period: the portfo-
lio γ of SLAs offered to customers and the portfolio δ of SLAs β ∈ B with supplying
providers.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, the first research question of this thesis, that deals with the emergence
of agreement networks and their definition and participants, was addressed in detail.
A definition of service was provided and a delineation of service types that emerged
with the availability of the Internet and related technologies was introduced. With the
growing momentum of services in business environments, customers require guaran-
tees on the provided quality of service. This leads to an increasing number of existing
service level agreements. In order to establish a common understanding of what an
SLA is, what it comprises of and what its aim is, a general definition of SLA was given
and a special kind of Web service agreements was derived that is applied to regulating
the provisioning of Web services.
The joint provisioning of services is leveraged by establishing SLAs. With this trend, a
network of agreements emerges among different types of service providers: agreement
networks. A definition of ANs was given and backed up by a real-world example
that constitutes the scenario of this work. This way, in this section the groundwork
was laid for the decision problems of providers and intermediaries that form the main
contribution of this thesis.
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“ ‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?’ ‘That depends a good deal on
where you want to get to,’ said the Cat.”
(Carroll 1865)
JOINT service provisioning that manifests in the emergence of agreement networkswas introduced in the previous section.
While it is a networked structure that arises with an increasing degree of joint service
provisioning, entering SLAs and providing services still remains the decision of the
concerned parties, that is provider and customer of a service. Therefore, this thesis
focuses on providers’ and intermediaries’ roles and responsibilities rather than on the
network perspective. The foundations for the decisions of providers and intermediaries
that are presented in Section 4 and 5 and their evaluation in Section 7 are laid in this
Section.
In Section 3.1, an introduction to decision theory is given. The concepts of normative
and descriptive decision theory are differentiated and the general concept of decisions is
illustrated in Section 3.1.1. In a further step, the impact of incomplete information on
decision making is highlighted in Section 3.1.2.
As was introduced in Section 2.2, one of the building parts of SLAs is a penalty that rep-
resents a liability that becomes active in case of an SLA violation in order to reimburse
the customer for perceived service failure. In conjunction with uncertainty about fu-
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ture SLA violations, the payment of penalties becomes an inherent risk for the decision
maker. In Section 3.2, foundations for the measurement of risk are laid and different
concepts of risk perception are introduced. In Section 3.2.1, approaches for the expres-
sion of risk are introduced and the special case of the semi-variance of a portfolio is
discussed in Section 3.2.2. Section 3.2.3 introduces utility theory, that enables to express
a trade-off between risk and expected profit.
After having introduced the foundations that are relevant to decisions about the estab-
lishment of SLAs in which the risk of SLA violation is minimized, current litetature in
the area of decisions about SLAs is presented and discussed. Research gaps are identi-
fied that highlight the challenges that will be addressed by this thesis.
3.1 Decision Theory
The matter of making decisions has been the subject of many research disciplines in
the past. Mathematics, philosophy, logic and especially economics paid special interest
in decision making (Resnik 1987). Consequently, a collection of theories exists in the
context of decisions, comprising utility theory, social choice theory, and relating to game
theory, just to name a few.
In order to shed light on the different areas and topics of decision theory, this section
first introduces the types of decisions that exist. Generally, decisions can be classified
into group decisions and individual decisions. Considering the scenario at hand, where
the joint provisioning of services fosters the emergence of ANs, a certain cooperative
element in the decisions cannot be neglected. Without an agreement on the content
and terms of a service provision, no SLA could be established. Consequently, the joint
provisioning of a service would be the result of a group decision of the participating
providers and intermediaries. Nevertheless, the decision about the establishment of
SLAs that is to be made by individuals, providers and customers, is not part of a joint
decision, like in elections (Black 1948; DeSanctis and Gallupe 1987). It is rather the
decision on bilateral cooperation with one business partner respectively. Therefore, the
decision is considered to be an individual one.
Furthermore, decision theory exhibits different directions of research that can be dis-
tinguished by their aim. On the one hand, descriptive decision theory investigates the
question of decision making from an observational point of view (Resnik 1987), that is,
it answers the question:
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“How are decisions made?”
With respect to decisions in agreement networks descriptive decision theory would
observe service providers and intermediaries in reality with the aim to explain how de-
cisions are made and what the determinants of decisions are. In this respect, aspects of
empirical economic research and experimental economics offer a toolset for the inves-
tigation of making decisions (Kagel and Roth 1995).
A different goal is pursued by normative and prescriptive decision theory (Resnik
1987). Under the assumption of rational decision makers that seek to come to an opti-
mal decision, advice is sought for answering the question:
“How should decisions be made?”
In the case of service providers and intermediaries in ANs, support for the decision on
whether to enter SLAs (or not) is required. In order to provide this support, the de-
cision problem needs to be formulated while considering the constraints of providers
and intermediaries as introduced in Section 2.3.4. The decision problem considers the
guarantee terms of SLAs, agreed prices and penalties as well as the provider’s (or in-
termediary’s) constraints on available resources and expectations towards profit. In
addition, the chance of violating SLAs is of importance to the decision maker as it has a
major impact on profit, or in the case of the intermediary, on performance. The follow-
ing section introduces the general concept of fomulating decisions and illustrates the
aspects of the provider’s and intermediary’s decision that are covered. The aspect of
uncertainty about future SLA violations is introduced in Section 3.1.2 with the concept
of decisions under uncertainty.
3.1.1 Decisions in General
A decision involves the choice for one of two or more alternatives (Laux 2005; Resnik
1987). This choice or act by the decision maker produces an outcome, that is, the re-
sult of the act and its impact. Translated to the case of agreement networks, providers
choose from a set of SLAs that can be entered. The provider chooses to enter these
SLAs and to provide the corresponding services. This way, the provider incurs costs
for service provisioning and gains a reward, the agreed price.
As an extension to the general setting of selecting an act and perceiving its outcome,
decisions need to account for different states of nature (Laux 2005; Resnik 1987) or ob-
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servable properties that influence the outcome of the decision. Consider the example
in the following case: a person starts their car and the check-engine light flashes. Now,
they’ve got two options to act: first, leave the car and call the repair service or sec-
ond, drive regardless. If the person doesn’t enter the car, no negative outcome can be
expected. On the other hand, if the person starts to drive, there are several potential
states of nature and resulting outcomes. First, the engine is heavily damaged which
causes a severe accident and the person is injured badly. Second, the engine is defect
and an accident happens, the car is broken but the person isn’t injured and last, nothing
happens at all. In case of perfect information, the person decides on their action (start
driving or not) depending on the event that impacts the outcome.
In the case of a provider’s decision on establishing SLAs the problem is sketched as fol-
lows. The provider decides either to enter SLAs or not. In the case that they enter SLAs,
costs for providing the respective services arise and prices for service provisioning are
collected. Additionally, depending on the degree of SLA violation by the provider, they
may have to pay a penalty to the customer. Consequently, the provider includes the de-
gree of SLA violation and resulting penalty in the decision about entering SLAs as this
influences the profit from service provisioning. This decision process is only applicable
if there is perfect information about the events that influence the outcome. In the case of
a service provider and the degree of SLA violation, the information about future SLA
violations is not available, therefore a different approach has to be applied, which is
presented in the following section.
3.1.2 Decisions under Uncertainty
There are many situations, in which decisions have to be made without complete in-
formation about the possible states of nature or events that influence the outcome of a
decision. Consider again the example from the previous section about starting to drive
the car or not. The person that has to decide about driving most likely does not know
the actual severity of the damage of the engine when the decision is made.
Analogously, a provider in an AN that has to decide about the active portfolio of SLAs
for the next period has to consider achieved prices, costs for service provisioning, re-
source constraints and penalties that have to be paid in case of SLA violation. The
degree of SLA violation for each of the SLAs is subject to the effort that the provider
exerts in order to avoid SLA violations like providing redundant systems or service
personnel. However, there are factors that the provider cannot influence like hardware
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failures, power outages, or human error. Therefore, there is uncertainty with respect to
the degree of SLA violations in the future.
Decisions under uncertainty can be classified into decisions for which there is a be-
lief for the probability distributions for events and those, for which there is no such
distribution available (Laux 2005; Resnik 1987). For service providers according to Def-
initions 2.7 and 2.8 that decide on the establishment of SLAs, there is no information
about the likelihood of realizations of degrees of violation in the future. A common
approach to solve this problem is to approximate the probability distribution from past
observations, e. g. monitoring observations of SLAs that were established in the past
and corresponding degrees of violation. An application of this approach is applied in
Chapters 4 and 5. This allows a provider to include the probability for a particular de-
gree of violation with the resulting penalty in their decision about the portfolio of SLAs
that is to be active in the following period.
3.1.3 Conclusion
This section briefly introduced decision theory as a research method for economic deci-
sion making. Different branches of decision theory were introduced and the approach
of a prescriptive model for individual decisions was identified as the method of choice
for the scenario that was presented in Section 2.3.
The basic building parts of a decision were identified as acts, states, and outcome, where
each of the states can be known or unknown ex ante. Decisions under uncertainty, in
which a probability distribution for the states is known in advance, are presented as
a potential solution to the decision problems that arise in the scenario of the work at
hand.
Having presented the basic methodology with which the decision problem is going to
be solved, a means to evaluate the outcome of each decision that is taken is required.
Therefore, the following sections introduce measures of risk that lay the basis for the
inclusion of the risk of SLA violation in the provider’s and intermediary’s decision
about future active SLAs.
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3.2 Implementation of Decisions under Uncertainty
The previous section described decisions under uncertainty as a method that allows
choices to be made among alternatives even if there is uncertainty about the state of
nature that influences the outcome of a choice. In this context, the concept of risk plays
an important role, where risk is understood as the uncertainty of a future event.
The decision for one of the available alternatives includes the outcome as well as its
probability of occurence. In order to be able to choose the optimal alternative, the un-
certainty of the occurence of an event, that is the risk, needs to be formulated. In this
respect, decision support often includes the formulation of an objective function (Laux
2005) that is to be optimized, that is, minimized or maximized with respect to the se-
mantic meaning of the objective function.
Formulating an objective function as a means to decide for one of the available alterna-
tives includes the specification of risk. In the case of a provider’s choice for a portfolio of
active SLAs in the next period, the risk of SLA violation has to be formulated. A proba-
bility for a particular degree of SLA violation is also required to express the penalty that
can be expected. The resulting function that expresses the risk of SLA violation has to
be minimized. This is the objective function, by which the desirable portfolio of SLAs is
identified. The following sections introduce several established measures of risk from
different research directions and discuss their applicability in an objective function for
a provider’s and an intermediary’s decision problem. In a further step, the concept of
utility functions is introduced in order to include multiple objectives like maximizing
profit and minimizing the risk of SLA violation in the objective function.
3.2.1 Measuring Risk
The concept of risk affects a variety of research disciplines like finance, insurance, and
business administration, but does as well affect completely different areas like tech-
nology acceptance (Pavlou 2003) or research in nuclear power. Consequently, many
different approaches for measuring risk exist. This section serves to introduce the most
common methods to measure risk and discuss their applicability.
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Stochastic Dominance
In order to select one of the available alternatives, an ordering has to be established
among the options. Stochastic dominance is a concept that allows the sorting of alter-
native outcomes that underly an uncertainty of occuring by means of their probability
distributions.
Below, the ordering according to first and second order stochastic dominance is ex-
plained. Assume that there are two random variables, X and Y, which have the same
domain. X is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function (CDF) F and
Y’s CDF is G. With respect to first order stochastic dominance (FSD), F dominates G if
the following holds (Levy 1992):
(3.1) F(x) ≤ G(x), ∀x.
This implies that distributions with a more homogeneous slope are preferred to those
with a rather unstable slope. The heterogeneity of the slope is therefore perceived as
more risky and hence, the riskier alternative is rejected. The sorting of alternatives
according to FSD is only possible, if one of the CDFs dominates the other one in the
whole domain. As soon as equation (3.1) does not hold for all x, no ordering is possi-
ble. Therefore, the concept of second order stochastic dominance (SSD) was introduced
(Hadar and Russell 1969; Hanoch and Levy 1969; Hanoch and Levy 1970; Rothschild




G(t)− F(t)dt ≥ 0, ∀x
holds. Equation (3.2) implies that F does not need to be more stable over all of the
domain. However, SSD requires that in total, F is less risky than G by means of the
amount of instability in the distribution. In order to evaluate available alternatives
with respect to SSD, the left-hand-side of Equation (3.2) is not permitted a change of
sign. As soon as there is a change of sign, no ordering among alternatives F and G is
possible.
The application of stochastic dominance to decision theory has been a matter of research
for many decades (Allais 1953; Fishburn 1964). In order to apply stochastic dominance
to the provider’s and intermediary’s decision, the CDFs of the degrees of SLA violation
in conjunction with the resulting penalties would be compared according to Equations
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(3.1) and (3.2) and sorted with respect to the outcome of dominance. However, with a
growing number of alternatives, the pairwise comparison of each alternative with each
other that is required to achieve a ranking among all alternatives, becomes increasingly
infeasible. Even more, if neither FSD nor SSD can be shown, no ordering is possible
among alternatives and consequently, no choice for one alternative is possible. There-
fore, stochastic dominance is not feasible as a measure of risk in the scenario of the
work at hand.
Value at Risk
Measuring the risk of a loss that a particular portfolio of securities incurs gained much
attention in financial mathematics and financial risk management in recent years. A
concept that is frequently employed is Value at Risk (VaR) which is defined as a thresh-
old value that is not exceeded with a certain probability in a specific period. More
detailed, if a portfolio exhibits a 2.5% VaR of 100,000 e for one day, then there is a 2.5%
probability that the portfolio will incur a 100,000 e loss within the next day.
According to Jorion (2007) the VaR of a portfolio is defined as “the worst loss over a target
horizon such that there is a low, prespecified probability that the actual loss will be larger”. In
order to calculate it, define ψ as the confidence level and Loss as the loss, which leads
to
(3.3) Prob(Loss > VaR) ≤ 1− ψ.
The VaR is found by identifying the smallest value for which Equation (3.3) holds. For
example, if ψ = 0.99, then VaR is the smallest value for which the probability of incuring
a higher loss is smaller than 1%. In order to include the period of time for which the
decision is made, and to explicitly calculate the amount of money that could potentially
be lost, VaR is expressed as follows (Jorion 2007):
(3.4) VaR = MV(γ) · σ(γ) · tdisc · φ(ψ),
where MV(γ) denotes the current market value of the portfolio γ, σ(γ) is the standard
deviation of profits of γ in the past, tdisc states the disconted period of time relative to
the trading year and φ(ψ) resembles the absolute confidence interval that results from
the confidence level ψ under the assumption of a normal distribution of profits.
By applying VaR as a measure of risk, a decision maker is able to estimate the loss
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that will not be exceeded with high probability, which depends on the chosen confi-
dence level. VaR is applied in many decisions on the financial market, especially in
institutional trading (Holton 2003). In the context of decision making in ANs, service
providers and intermediaries would be able to calculate the loss of a portfolio that will
not be exceeded with a certain probability if VaR was applied as measure of risk. The
portfolios would then be sorted according to the amount of money that results from
VaR calculations. Even though this approach exhibits a basic feasibility for the applica-
tion in ANs, there are some drawbacks that prevent its application. First, VaR focuses
on the tails of the distributions and ignores the center of distributions. This leads to
the neglection of the big mass of losses each of which might be lower than the amount
that is identified by VaR but accumulates a higher probability of occurence (Einhorn
and Brown 2008). Second, VaR does only point to an amount of loss that will not be
exceeded in a particular period of time, that is, it highlights merely a worst case and
hence could provide false confidence (Taleb 1997). Therefore, VaR is not feasible for the
application of the scenario that was introduced in Section 2.3.4.
GINI’s mean difference
is also known as absolute mean difference. It describes an overall degree of dispersion
of a random variable. For a discrete random variable, GINI’s mean difference is based
on the absolute deviation of every pair of realizations of the random variable (Shalit
and Yitzhaki 1984; Yitzhaki 1982). For a continuous random variable X with probability








|xi − xj| · g(xi) · g(xj)dxi dxj,
where xi and xj denote realizations of the random variable X, and a and b denote the
limits of the domain of the probability distribution. GINI’s mean difference is bounded
from above by X − a. The lower bound is zero. Values closer to zero constitute a low
degree of dispersion and hence, low risk, whereas values closer to X − a denote a high
degree of dispersion. Due to the fact that a uniform distribution does not expose any
dispersion, GINI’s mean difference for a uniform distribution is equal to zero. Conse-
quently, GINI’s mean difference can as well be interpreted as a proxy for the deviation
from a uniform distribution.
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In order to include GINI’s mean difference in the objective function in the provider’s
and intermediary’s decision in an AN, the absolute deviations of each observed degree
of failure including the resulting penalty would have to be calculated. By calculating
GINI’s mean difference for each portfolio, an ordering of portfolios according to their
degree of dispersion and hence, risk, is possible. One value of GINI’s mean difference
can relate to a large variety of distributions. This is basically caused by the application
of the absolute difference between values that is taken into account in Equation (3.5).
This implies that GINI’s mean difference is only able to account for dispersion but not
for the quality of the unequal distribution. Employing GINI’s mean difference in ANs
would consequently only indicate unequal distributions of degrees of violation but not
in which area the center of the distribution, that is, the majority of violations lies. This
could lead to a situation in which two SLAs are rated equally with respect to GINI’s
mean difference, but one of the distributions exhibits the center in lower degrees of vi-
olation and one exhibits the center in higher degrees of violation. Consequently, GINI’s
mean difference can only give a hint on unequal distributions but does not differenti-
ate with respect to the severity of the violation. Consquently, it does not suffice as a
measure for risk.
Mean absolute deviation (MAD)
Similar to GINI’s mean difference, MAD is a measure for inequality, whereas MAD
employs the absolute deviations from the expected value of a distribution (Konno and
Yamazaki 1991). This way, MAD expresses risk as the deviation from a target value,








|xi − x| ,
where xi denotes the observations and x states their expected value. For security port-
folios, this translates to the sum of expected deviations from the expected profit of each
security. Translated to the case of the provider’s decision about the establishment of
SLAs, as a first step, the expected degree of SLA violation would be calculated. The
target value is retrieved by multiplying it with the corresponding penalty. In a second
step, for each observation, the absolute deviation from the expected penalty is calcu-
lated and the mean absolute deviation is computed. After calculating MAD for each
available portfolio, an ordering of portfolios is feasible.
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Similar to GINI’s mean difference, MAD resembles a proxy for dispersion. In contrast
to GINI’s mean difference, dispersion is expressed by the deviation from a target value
rather than from a uniform distribution. Nevertheless, applying MAD as a measure of
risk implies that all deviations are perceived equally bad by the decision maker. For a
service provider or intermediary this implies that deviations from the expected value
are considered risky, no matter if the deviation expresses less violation than expected
or more violation. Consequently, even though MAD exhibits properties that suggest
is as suitable for the application for a measure of risk it lacks the ability to evaluate
deviations with respect to their implication, that is, if the deviation indicates gain or
loss to the decision maker.
Lower Partial Moment (LPM)
Measuring risk by means of the deviation from a target value has already been intro-
duced in the case of MAD. Similar, LPM denotes a measure for risk in which only those
deviations are taken into account that are “worse” than a target value. This way, LPM
expresses the risk of shortfall (Bawa 1975; Libby and Fishburn 1977), which is calculated
as follows
(3.7) LPM = E((max{x− xi,0})k),
where xi are the observations and x their expected value as before, k expresses the order
of the LPM, and E(·) denotes the expected value.
According to Equation (3.7), a provider in an AN would resort to calculating the ex-
pected degree of SLA violation and multiply it by the corresponding penalty. This way,
the target value is retrieved. Having retrieved the target value, the deviations that are
“worse” than average need to be identified. In the case of a provider, loss by means of
penalties is considered rather than profit. Therefore, Equation (3.7) needs to be adapted
in order to account for the risk that higher penalties than expected incur:
(3.8) LPM′ = E((max{xi − x,0})k).
Consequently, by applying Equation (3.8), for each observed degree of violation, the
deviation from the target value can be calculated. For those observations that are higher
than the expected penalty, the deviation is taken to the kth power. This way, only those
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deviations from the expected degree of violation are taken into account that impose the
risk of loss to the decision maker. Furthermore, the factor k can increase the weight of
bigger deviations, implying that larger deviations from the expected value impose a
higher risk to the decision maker.
A special instance of the LPM is retrieved in the case of k = 2. This instance is also
known as the semi-variance , which is a special case of the variance in which only those
deviations that are “worse” than average are considered. A more detailed discussion of
the semi-variance is provided in the following section.
3.2.2 The Semi-Variance as a Proxy for Risk
As was argued at the beginning of Section 3.2, risk is understood as the uncertainty of
a future event. In agreement networks, service providers and intermediaries perceive
risk as the uncertainty of future SLA violations and the resulting penalties. In Section
3.2.1, different approaches for expressing risk have been introduced and discussed. As
a result, LPM has been identified as a feasible measure of risk in the context of ANs as it
accounts for deviations from the expected degree of SLA violation that are “worse” than
average and enables the weighting of deviations by means of the factor k (see Equation
(3.8)).
The semi-variance as a special instantiation of LPM has been employed in decisions in
finance since it has been suggested in Markowitz (1959) and is as follows:
(3.9) SV = E((max{x− xi,0})2),
where xi states the observed profits of the portfolio, x their mean, and E(·) the expected
value. In this regard, the semi-variance expresses risk as the deviation from expected
profit, where larger deviations are weighted a higher risk, which is achieved by squar-
ing the deviations. By employing the LPM methodology, the semi-variance manifests
itself as an adaptation of the variance (and with it, the standard deviation), which was
applied as a measure for risk in finance and especially, in evaluating the risk that is
incured by a share for a long time (Elton et al. 2003; Merton 1972). In current research,
computational properties of the semi-variance approach are investigated to evaluate
the performance of heuristics that approximate the semi-variance for the selection of
portfolios in order to improve the computational time that is required to identify the
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solution (Buhl and Fridgen 2011).
Besides its application in portfolio theory, semi-variance found applications in many
other branches. Exemplarily, the management of project portfolios, that is the selec-
tion of projects that promise success, can be facilitated by employing the semi-variance
(Hubbard 2007). Furthermore, areas that are completely unrelated to the selection of
stock portfolios were shown to be feasible application areas of the semi-variance. This
includes the modeling of labor force in the economy, which allows the investigation
into properties of the labor force like growth and variance (Chandra 2003). Portfolio
theory has been employed in psychology in order to express the stability of the “self-
concept”. In cases, in which the self-attributes, that comprise the self-concept, manifest in
a diversified portfolio, self-esteem is assumed to be more stable than in undiversified
cases (Chandra and Shadel 2007).
In order to apply the semi-variance as a proxy for the risk of SLA violation, an adapta-
tion of Equation (3.9) is required. Risk in the context of SLAs arises due to the uncer-
tainty of SLA violations. Consequently, the deviations that a service provider and an
intermediary perceive as “worse” than average are those, that are higher than expected.
Therefore, Equation (3.9) is adapted as follows
(3.10) SV ′ = E((max{xi − x,0})2),
where xi denotes the degree of violation and x the expected degree of violation. This
adaptation considers only observed SLA violations that are worse than average. The
formulation of the semi-variance in Equation (3.10) resembles a proxy for the risk of
SLA violation that can be employed in the objective function of the decisions about the
establishment of SLAs.
3.2.3 Utility Theory
The decision problem on the establishment of SLAs that a provider (according to Defi-
nitions 2.7 and 2.8) faces was described in Section 2.3. Besides the risk of SLA violation,
factors that constrain a provider’s decision about SLA establishment were identified.
Resources that are available to a provider constitute one of the constraints. The ex-
pected profit that can be achieved by service provisioning (and consumption) resembles
another driving factor.
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For each of the alternative SLA portfolios, a particular resource consumption, expected
profit and risk of SLA violation exists. Objective functions that employ one criterium
express the preference relation of the decision maker about this criterium. In the case
of a provider that makes decisions on SLA establishment, the minimization of SLA
violation risk constitutes the objective function that is evaluated subject to resource and
profit constraints. In order to include the expected profit in the objective function rather
than as a constraint and to be able to express the trade-off between risk and profit that
the provider is willing to accept, an objective function that includes multiple criteria
is required. For the ranking of available options in the presence of multiple criteria
different approaches exist.
First, approaches that do not formalize preference structures are available (Keeney and
Raiffa 1993). In this kind of approach, dominant alternatives are identified. This is
achieved by comparing each criterium of two alternatives, e. g. profit and risk of two
SLAs. One SLA dominates the other one, if it is equal or better in all criteria and better
in at least one criterium, that is, for instance, the expect profit is equal for both SLAs
but one SLA has a lower risk of SLA violation (Keeney and Raiffa 1993, p. 69). Employ-
ing this approach allows the identification of the efficient frontier among the available
options (Keeney and Raiffa 1993, p. 70), which denotes the set of options that is not
dominated by other options (Markowitz 1959). This approach does only lead to an un-
ambiguous ranking among alternatives, if dominant alternatives can be identified. As
there are situations, in which dominance is not given,1 decisions in which preference
structures are not formalized are not feasible for the application in the decision on SLA
establishment.
Second, there are approaches that formalize preference structures by determining a
trade-off between criteria. Therefore, for each criterium the respective valuation is de-
termined. These valuations are then associated with a weight in order to express relative
importance for the decision maker. For a provider that wants to decide between two
available SLAs, the valuations for the expected profit and risk of SLA violation are de-
termined and weighted. By adding the weighted valuations of profit and risk for each
of the SLAs, one value results for each SLA and the provider is able to select the SLA
with the higher valuation (Keeney and Raiffa 1993, p. 75).
An alternative approach that expresses a trade-off between risk and expected profit is
the definition of a utility function (Savage 1972), i.e., a decision maker’s attitude to-
wards risk is reflected in a utility function by illustrating the gain in utility from addi-
1For instance, if the expected profit of SLA α1 is higher than the profit of SLA α2 but the SLA violation
risk of SLA α1 is higher, and hence worse, than the SLA violation risk of SLA α2.
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tional marginal units of profit. In this context, risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving
individuals can be observed. Risk-averse individuals expose a decreasing marginal
utility, thereby stating that the additional gain from higher profit decreases the higher
the profit is. Risk-neutral individuals have a constant marginal utility, whereas risk-
loving individuals exhibit an increasing marginal utility (Friedman and Savage 1948).
In this context, risk-aversion states that the expected utility of a gamble is lower than
the utility of the expected value of the gamble. This implies that risk-averse individu-
als prefer safe payoffs that are lower to risky payoffs that might be higher. The lowest
amount of money that the risk-averse individual is willing to accept instead of decid-
ing for the gamble is called certainty equivalent (Keeney and Raiffa 1993). The more
risk-averse an individual is, the lower is the amount of money that the indivual is will-
ing to accept as a safe payment as opposed to a gamble. The degree of risk-aversion
manifests in the slope of the utility function2 (Von Neumann et al. 1947) and can be
expressed with the help of relative and absolute coefficients of risk-aversion (Arrow
1971; Pratt 1964). This means that an individual’s preferences can be expressed by
means of a utility function. The slope of the utility function provides information on
the individual’s attitude towards risk. By applying a utility function, a provider is able
to rank SLA portfolios with respect to the expected profit and the uncertainty (risk)
that the portfolios incur. After calculating the expected utility for each of the alternative
SLA portfolios, the provider selects the portfolio that maximizes expected utility, that
expresses a trade-off between profit and risk.
3.3 Existing Work on SLA Decisions and its Implications: A
Critical Analysis
Many aspects of joint service provisioning have recently been subject to research. Tech-
nical preliminaries that have to be coped with in order to facilitate the provisioning of
complex higher-valued services to a customer were investigated. Different approaches
that solve, for instance, the technical composition of Web service modules have been
suggested (Berardi et al. 2005; Rao and Su 2005; Zeng et al. 2003). The composition of
Web services by means of platforms like Salesforce’s composition platform force.com3
has gained momentum over recent years. The cases of SAP’s service marketplace4 or
2Risk-averse individuals exhibit a concave utility function.
3http://www.salesforce.com/platform/ last accessed: October 8, 2011
4https://service.sap.com last accessed: October 8, 2011
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IBM’s Cognos Mashup Service5 document the rise of branded service communities, or
service parks, where a provider of a core service attracts providers of add-ons. In ser-
vice parks (Petrie and Bussler 2008) the provider of a core service is the single point of
contact to the customer and selects the matching complementary services from supply-
ing providers, analogously to the intermediary’s decision that was introduced in Sec-
tion 2.3.4. For the joint provisioning of services, providers have to be aware of available
services and need to be able to discover services. To solve this challenge, service repos-
itories, which allow for the semantic querying of services by means of functionality
and quality aspects have been researched (Agarwal et al. 2008; Junghans and Agarwal
2010). This work is considered complementary to the work at hand and ensures the
availability of required information as input to the decision making process about the
establishment of SLAs.
First approaches towards a decision concerning the establishment of SLAs have been
described in Lang et al. (2008). A scenario, in which a service intermediary offers
services of which the intermediary is not able to provide all of the functionality by
themselves. Thus, an intermediary needs to procure services from other providers. In
analogy to the decision problem of an intermediary (see Definition 2.8), an intermediary
needs to decide which services will be procured. For this scenario, an optimization
model is introduced that allows a service intermediary to maximize profit by selecting
services on a functional level in a service oriented architecture (SOA). The profit can be
increased by offering functionality that exceeds the requested one. Quality aspects or
penalties in SLAs are not taken into account, nor is the risk of SLA violation.
Including the risk of SLA violation in the decision on SLA establishment is crucial for
a service provider. SLA violation results in the payment of penalties. Furthermore, a
provider’s reputation decreases if the violation of SLA becomes public, which may lead
to a lower future demand. A model that describes governance, risk and compliance for
service outsourcing is introduced in Asnar et al. (2010). Challenges in the context of
Service Oriented Architectures (SOAs) and service composition are highlighted and
the paradigm of compliance by control is applied for enforcing compliance based on
monitoring results. The model allows for the qualitative identification of risk, that is,
what the risk is, and the definition of counter-measures in a very technical way. How-
ever, a quantitative measurement of risk that defines how severe the impact of the risk
is, is not supported, nor is decision support that minimizes the risk of SLA violation.
In Asnar et al. (2007), a risk management model is introduced. The identification of
risk is possible, but quantitative risk measurement is not feasible with this approach.
5http://www-01.ibm.com/software/data/cognos/products/cognos-8-business-intelligence/
cognos-8-mashup-service.html last accessed: October 8, 2011
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Similarly, Kompella et al. (2010) introduce an approach for risk modeling for localiz-
ing fault in IP networks. Risk is applied for the analysis of monitoring data to identify
common failure patterns. By applying this approach error propagation along links in IP
networks can be detected and common risks can be identified. Analogously to Asnar
et al. (2007) and Asnar et al. (2010), a qualitative description of risk is given, but no
quantification or metric is introduced that would allow the evaluation of the severity
of a failure.
Recently, the joint provisioning of services and related economic considerations have
drawn the attention of researchers. There is a major body of work that concentrates on
the coordination of value creation in joint service provisioning. This includes setting
prices for the complex service and the single contributed services, and in the meantime
incentivizing service providers to provide services as agreed.
In Blau et al. (2008), an approach is introduced that identifies compatible service mod-
ules for the formation of a complex service that provides requested fucntionality. A
mechanism-design based approach allows the selection of the set of service offers that
fits the customer’s needs best and incentivizes providers to submit truthful bids with
respect to their costs. The approach is extended in Blau (2009) in order to account for
service failure by reducing a provider’s payoff in the case of service failure. This way,
the adherence to an agreed quality of service is taken into account in the payoff struc-
ture. However, the risk of violating an SLA is not considered in the selection of services.
Furthermore, the approach focuses on the efficient choice of services for the composi-
tion of one complex service. Decisions on the establishment of SLAs with a multitude of
customers and hence, the provisioning of more than one service, are not considered.
A similar approach for the selection of services is introduced in Conte et al. (2009).
This approach employs the same selection of service offers as (Blau 2009). However,
providers’ payoffs are determined to reward contribution to the variety of possible
compositions. This approach rewards a service provider in a service composition sce-
nario for holding their service ready and hence, increasing the possibilities of recovery
in case of service failure. Alike Blau (2009), Conte et al. (2009) focuses on the provi-
sioning of a single complex service to a single customer. A multitude of customers or
provided services and the resulting choices for SLAs in joint service provisioning are
not taken into account. Thus, strategic decisions are only possible for an intermediary
that selects services that are offered from providers. Providers’ decisions for offering
services are only considered by means of a bid price determination but not with respect
to offering a service and a corresponding SLA or not. Furthermore, the risk of SLA
violation by providers is not taken into account in the selection of services.
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An economic view on service composition and incentivation of participants is shown
in Filipova-Neumann et al. (2010). In this setting, an intermediary with complete mar-
ket power determines prices and penalties for customers, to which they offer complex
services. Additionally, the intermediary sets prices and penalties for services that they
procure from providers. The exact choice for a particular price and penalty incentivizes
service providers and customers to participate in the market. The intermediary is able
to set incentives for service providers to invest in the effort that they exert in order to
adhere to the established SLAs. In the decision making process on prices and penalties,
the uncertainty of future SLA violation is taken into account. However, the focus of the
approach lies on setting incentives to providers in a pre-defined set of SLAs by defining
prices and penalties. The selection of service providers to cooperate with or the corre-
sponding SLAs is not considered. An adaptation of the approach in Filipova-Neumann
et al. (2010) would allow a service intermediary to select a portfolio of SLAs and to set
prices and penalties in SLAs, in order to incentivize providers to adhere to the active
SLAs in a further step.
The tasks of an intermediary comprise of selling services to customers and buying ser-
vices from supplying providers. As was argued in Section 2.3.2, the profit of service
intermediaries is influenced by the establishment of SLAs. In this vein, an intermedi-
ary can be compared to a market maker in financial markets that buys and sells stocks
in order to make profit. Hart and Jaffee (1974) discuss the application of portfolio the-
ory as introduced by Markowitz (1952) to the behaviour of a depository financial in-
termediary that holds assets and liabilities. A unique solution for an intermediary’s
utility-maximization problem is retrieved that is determined by an intermediary’s atti-
tude towards risk. The approach allows for the selection of a combination of assets and
liabilities, whereas risk and profit can always be measured directly as profit resulting
from buying and selling stocks. In the decision of a service provider or an intermediary
on the establishment of SLAs, profit cannot be measured directly from selling goods or
shares. The profit of a service intermediary employs a definition of profit that reflects
the intermediary’s profit from providing services to customers and from procuring ser-
vices from supplying providers. Thus, the expected profit reflects the uncertainty of
SLA violations.
O’Hara and Oldfield (1986) examined the decisions of a risk-averse market maker in
stock markets. Alike Hart and Jaffee (1974), a situation is investigated where profit
directly results from buying and selling stocks.
In the context of decisions under uncertainty, measures of risk play an important role in
the formulation of the objective function that allows the selection of one of the available
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alternatives. As was already argued in Section 3.2, different measures of risk are em-
ployed in most diverse branches. Approaches for expressing risk by deviations from a
target value include the mean absolute deviation (MAD) (Konno and Yamazaki 1991),
Gini’s risk measure (GINI) (Shalit and Yitzhaki 1984; Yitzhaki 1982), and lower partial
moments (LPM) (Bawa 1975; Libby and Fishburn 1977).
In general, MAD states the expected deviations from an expected value. For security
portfolios, this translates to the absolute expected deviations from expected profits of
each security (Konno and Yamazaki 1991). Applying this measure of risk allows a de-
cision maker the determination of the dispersion of a set of observations. In the cal-
culation of MAD, all of the deviations from the expected value are included. MAD
considers a deviation from a target value as risk, no matter what the semantic meaning
of the deviation is. In the context of SLA violation uncertainty MAD would consider
each deviation from expected violation as a risk, no matter if the deviation corresponds
to better or worse performance than expected.
The GINI coefficient is a proxy for statistical dispersion like MAD. It can be considered
a proxy for the deviation from an equal distribution, whereas a coefficient of 0 denotes
an equal distribution and higher values of the GINI coefficient state a more unequally
distribution of values (Shalit and Yitzhaki 1984; Yitzhaki 1982). The optimization prob-
lem in this case would result in the minimization of the GINI coefficient while taking
constraints on expected profit into account. Analogously to MAD, GINI treats the un-
equality of the distribution of profit as a whole as risk. The separation of deviations
that are worse than expected from those that are better than expected is not possible.
LPM denotes a measure for the risk of shortfall, that is, only those deviations that are
“worse” than a reference point Z are taken into account (Bawa 1975; Libby and Fish-
burn 1977). In order to calculate the risk of shortfall, the expected value of a function
of those deviations is applied. One example for this function g(·) is g(·) = (·)2. In this
case, shortfall denotes the semi-variance of profits/penalties and enables to include the
semantic meaning of a deviation.
The decision on SLA establishment that considers the risk of SLA violation constitutes
a provider’s and an intermediary’s business concept. Defining the business concept
and with it the future strategy of an enterprise by means of the products that will be
offered as well as respective prices has been in the focus of marketing research and
specifically product portfolio management for many years. Product portfolio manage-
ment includes methods for the evaluation, selection, and priorization of new projects,
as well as the assessment of existing projects, which leads to their acceleration, depri-
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oritization or the end of the project. Finally, resources are allocated and reallocated to
the active projects. Cooper et al. (1999) gives an overview of current approaches for
product portfolio management, none of which is applicable to the determination of the
risk of Web service SLAs as concrete specifications of risk are missing. A method that
allows to apply product portfolio management to the establishment of SLAs especially
in the context of service provisioning over the Internet is still missing.
In summary, in current literature, there has been no approach that allows for all of
the challenges that arise in the context of decision making on SLA establishment for
the provisioning of services, especially via the Internet. The challenges that need to
be considered are the technical composition of services and the impact of the Internet
on service provisioning. Furthermore, provisioning of more than one service to more
than one customer is important for a provider’s decision on SLA establishment, as well
as the possibility of quantifying risk, thus measuring risk, and including risk in the
selection of SLAs to establish is. Table 3.1 summarizes the challenges that arise and
indicate which of the challenges are already considered in current literature, where  
denotes that a challenge is considered and # where it is not. From Table 3.1 it becomes
obvious that a decision support that considers all of the challenges is still missing.
This section served to give a thorough introduction to the economic foundations of this
thesis. As a first step, an overview over decision theory was given and a distinction of
decisions by the respective application scenario was given: decisions that are made by
individuals were differentated from group decisions and the degree of information was
introduced as a factor for identifying decisions under uncertainty. Due to the fact that
there is uncertainty in future SLA violations, providers and intermediaries in ANs are
confronted with decisions under uncertainty.
In order to facilitate decisions under uncertainty, the available alternatives, different
SLA portfolios, that can be active in the next period, need to be evaluated. Therefore,
a measure for the risk of SLA violation that can be employed in the objective function
of the decision problem is required. In Section 3.1, a multitude of different measures of
risk was introduced, explained and discussed. Finally, a special instantiation of LPM,
the semi-variance , was identified as the measure of risk that fits best to the case of
decision making in ANs as it enables the consideration of only those deviations from
a benchmark that are perceived as “worse” than expected. Additionally, a means to
express a trade-off between risk and expected profit with the help of utility functions is
introduced in Section 3.2.3.
Chapters 2 and 3 have jointly laid the foundations of this thesis. Whereas Section 2
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Chapter 3 Economic Foundations
introduced the environment in which decisions are made, Section 3 introduced and
discussed the means of decision making and measuring risk. Related work that has
been carried out recently in the area of joint service provisioning and decision making
about SLAs was presented and discussed and challenges that arise with respect to deci-
sions about SLA establishment were highlighted. The following sections are dedicated
to solving these challenges.
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“If the SaaS provider is not up and running 24x7x365, or if they’re not fully secure, they’re
out of business.”
(Business Finance Magazine 2010)
THIS chapter merges the foundations on joint service provisioning and SLA estab-lishment from Chapter 2 with the economic foundations from Chapter 3 in order
to solve the challenges in decision making for SLA establishment that were identified
in Section 3.3. A thorough literature review highlighted that currently no decision sup-
port for service providers exists that caters for the whole spectrum of requirements
that arises in SLA establishment decision making for all services (including e-Services,
Web services and Cloud services (see Section 2.1.2)). The decision problem of a service
provider on the establishment of SLAs is influenced by the changes in service pro-
visioning that result from the availability of the Internet. By offering and providing
services via the Internet a service provider is able to exploit the Long Tail phenomenon
(Anderson 2006), as was argued in Chapter 1. Even providers of niche services are able
to reach more customers. Consequently, the number of requests that are issued to the
provider (the demand) increases. For providers of standard services a high volume
of requests for service provisioning can be assumed to be issued, as well, according
to OECD (2010). With a high number of requests for service provision, the number of
SLAs for which the establishment needs to be decided is high, and consequently, the de-
cision problem of the service provider becomes more complex. This complexity has to
be considered when designing the method that facilitates the provider’s choice among
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different portfolios of SLAs. Along with the impact that the availability of the Internet
has on service provisioning, more aspects were identified in Section 3.3 that need to
be considered in the design of a decision support for SLA establishment. In total, the
aspects that require consideration are:
1. the impact of the availability of the Internet on service provisioning
2. the technical composition of services
3. potentially more than one customer
4. the risk of SLA violation and
5. the quantitative measurement of the risk of SLA violation.
This chapter’s aim is to consider these requirements in the development of decision
support for SLA establishment. More detailed, this chapter focuses on the decision
of a service provider as defined in Section 2.3.2, i.e. one is able to provide all of the
requested functionality by themself. As the provider is able to provide all functionality,
the decision on SLA establishment is concerned exclusively with customer SLAs, and
was formulated in Section 2.3.4 as follows:
Which SLA(s) with customers should be active in the next period?
The decision on SLA establishment with customers is illustrated with the help of the
scenario on IT outsourcing that was introduced in section 2.3.4. In this scenario, the
focus on a provider’s decision on SLA establishment is as follows:
Scenario. [Provider Decisions on SLA Establishment] Consider again the scenario
in which a bank wants to achieve “better” prices in institutional trading. Besides
choosing a co-location offer from a trading facility (see Section 2.3.4), the bank could
opt for installing the exchange software on a Cloud computing instance offered by
Amazon Web Services. Now, assume that the bank decides for the latter alternative.
In this case, Amazon receives a request for service provisioning from the bank. From
Amazon’s perspective, this request for service provisioning is only one of a multi-
tude of requests. The outsourcing scenario with a focus on Amazon’s situation is
depicted in Figure 4.1. In this view of the scenario, Amazon needs to decide which
of the service requests will be accepted and which will not.
In order to identify the SLAs that minimize the risk of SLA violation and hence, which
the provider should enter with customers, besides the aspects that were identified in
Section 3.3 and named above, the provider’s abilities have to be considered. On the
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one hand, these abilities comprise technical properties like resource availability. On the
other hand, the provider’s economic preferences of the provider regarding expectations
towards profit and risk-attititude need to be included. Consequently, the provider’s
decision problem on the establishment of SLAs is in the focus of Research Question 2,
that was formulated in Section 1.1:
RESEARCH QUESTION 2 ≺PROVIDER’S RISK-MINIMIZING DECISION. How can a
provider select the SLAs that minimize the risk of SLA violation while taking their technical
properties and economic preferences into account?
The following sections are dedicated to address Research Question 2. This is achieved
by applying the foundations about joint service provisioning and SLA establishment
from Chapter 2 along with the economic foundations about decisions under uncertainty
and measuring risk from Chapter 3. Therefore, in a first step a method is introduced
in Section 4.1 that minimizes the risk of SLA violation for a provider. This method in-
corporates an adaptation of portfolio selection by Markowitz (1959) and employs the
semi-variance as a measure of risk. This approach is especially feasible for services
that follow the Long Tail phenomenon, as it considers portfolios of SLAs. Furthermore,
the application of the semi-variance allows the quantification of downside risk as dis-
cussed in Section 3.2.2. Downside risk expresses risk as deviations from an expected
value, where only those deviations are taken into account that are worse than average.
This way, the semi-variance considers only deviations from the expected SLA violation
that are worse than expected. The exact specification of expected SLA violation is given
below. The minimization of SLA violation risk is carried out under constraints that
consider provider’s resource availability and profit expectations. In a second step, this
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approach is extended in order to allow a provider to express their attitude towards risk
explicitly. This is achieved by maximizing a provider’s expected utility, which takes
the trade-off between expected profit and the risk of SLA violation into account, which
is individually weighted by the provider’s coefficient of risk aversion. Section 4.2 pro-
vides a thorough introduction to the maximization of the provider’s expected utility
and discusses in which cases utility maximization is superior to risk minimization. Fi-
nally, the time complexity of the methods introduced in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 is analyzed
in Section 4.3.
4.1 Provider’s Constrained Minimization of SLA Violation
Risk
This section introduces a method that addresses a provider’s decision problem on the
establishment of SLAs from Research Question 2. The method that is presented in this
section considers the challenges identified in Section 3.3 regarding the expression of
risk and the impact of the availability of the Internet as well as a provider’s technical
properties and economic preferences that were identified in Section 2.3.2 in the decision
on the establishment of SLAs. The method that solves a provider’s decision problem is
derived along sub questions that are concerned with parts of the main research ques-
tion.
The decision on the establishment of SLAs is driven by the need of service providers
to avoid the violation of SLAs (Penna and Wandresen 2004; Spillner and Schill 2009),
as the violation of an SLA leads to a penalty. As was argued in Section 2.2, penalties
in their very nature do not have to be monetary but can be translated into a monetary
amount, that is, a payment on behalf of the service provider that consequently reduces
the achievable profit. Furthermore, the violation of an SLA affects a service provider’s
reputation negatively and perceived trustworthiness, which can lead to customers’
lower willingness to request services from that provider, and results in lower future
demand. Due penalties can be expressed in monetary terms that can be included in
the provider’s decision problem, whereas reputation is very hard to express objectively
and the resulting decrease in demand for the service provider’s services can barely be
expressed explicitly. Therefore, reputation and future demand will be excluded from
the optimization problem and the risk of SLA violation is expressed in terms of due
penalties. The expression of the risk of SLA violation is the in the focus of sub question
2.1:
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RESEARCH QUESTION 2.1 ≺MEASURING RISK. How can the risk of SLA violation be
expressed in order to reflect a service provider’s aim to avoid the violation of SLAs?
Risk in the focus of this work stems from the uncertainty of SLA violation as well as the
resulting monetary outcomes and is to be minimized in the provider’s decision prob-
lem. The expression of risk allows a provider to consider SLAs with more than one
customer, and hence meets challenges 3-5 from the beginning of this section. In order
to consider challenges 1 and 2, the expression of risk needs to be able to cope with the
number of SLAs that result from the Long Tail phenomenon. An approach that sati-
fies all of the challenges manifests in an adapatation of portfolio selection (Markowitz
1959). This approach does not consider risk-aversion as defined by von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions (Von Neumann et al. 1947) as introduced in Section 3.2.3.
However, it was shown that the methodology of porfolio selection as introduced by
Markowitz (1959) results in most cases in the same choice as maximizing a utility func-
tion of a risk-averse decision maker (Kroll et al. 1984), when the number of assets is
constrained but not necessarily low.
Besides the challenges from the beginning of this section, the provider’s technical prop-
erties and economic preferences regarding available resources and expected profit were
identified as drivers for the provider’s decision about SLA establishment in Section
2.3.2. Technical properties influence the number and quality of provided services,
which generate profit for the provider. These constraints are the topic of sub question
2.2.
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.2 ≺FORMULATING IMPACTING FACTORS AS
CONSTRAINTS. How can the factors that constrain the provider’s decision on SLA
establishment be included in a provider’s decision problem?
Service providers are limited in service provision by their resource capacities (Kwok
and Mohindra 2008). Especially in the context of Cloud computing, the assumption of
resource constraints is under constant discussion. Whereas unlimited scalability may
hold for computation, there are certain quality of service attributes like storage space
that do not scale infinitely (Armbrust et al. 2009, p. 20). Additionally, scaling up and out
of computational power is not possible instantly but takes some time for preparation
(Armbrust et al. 2009, p. 20). In order to reduce the degrees of freedom in the provider’s
decision and in order to ensure the comparability of observed service performance, the
provider’s resources are assumed to stay constant over time.
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Assumption 3 (Consistency of Provider’s Resources). Provider’s resources do not change
over time.
In case of a Web service provider, Assumption 3 ensures that for instance computa-
tional power is not increased or that storage space is not extended. Besides ensuring
the comparability of collected data, the consistency of the provider’s resources con-
strains the possibility of scaling up and hence, resources are scarce to a certain degree.
A service provider can only offer as many services as their resources allow, such as
storage space or bandwidth. The exact amount and specification of SLAs that can be
established need to be included in the service provider’s optimization problem in or-
der to exclude impossible SLA sets. Another criterium that is to be considered is the
profit that can be expected from the provision of services as agreed in an SLA portfolio.
By employing SLAs, service providers want to ensure the profitability of service pro-
visions (Berger 2005). Service providers are assumed to require a minimum expected
profit (at least a positive profit) from an SLA portfolio in order to include it in the set of
feasible solutions. The formulation of resource and profit constraints is introduced in
Section 4.1.2.
Having identified the driving factors for the provider’s decision and having given a
definition of risk in the context of this work, the last sub question of research question
2 is formulated:
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.3 ≺FORMULATION OF THE PROVIDER’S RISK-MINIMIZING
DECISION PROBLEM. How is the provider’s decision problem formulated in order to mini-
mize the risk of SLA violation and to account for the challenges on decision making (from Section
3.3) as well as the provider’s technical and economic properties?
The method that serves to solve a service provider’s decision problem is presented in
Section 4.1.3. The method is developed analogously to the method of portfolio selection
from Markowitz (1952), where the decision maker starts the identification of efficient
portfolios with the portfolio with smallest risk. Analogously, the provider’s objective
function is set to minimizing the risk of SLA violation. Likewise, the constraints on
expected profit and resources from Section 4.1.2 are taken into account. Considering the
objective function and the constraints, the service provider’s decision model is specified
as illustrated in Figure 4.2.
When receiving a request for service provision from a customer, a provider first identi-
fies which SLA portfolios possibly can be established. For each of these portfolios, the
72
4.1 Provider’s Constrained Minimization of SLA Violation Risk
FIGURE 4.2: Risk-minimizing Portfolio Selection
resource constraints are verified and only those portfolios that adhere are taken further
into consideration. Analogously, the set of SLA portfolios is adjusted after evaluating
the expected profit constraint. Finally, for each of the remaining SLA portfolios the
incurred risk is calculated and the SLA portfolios are ranked according to their risk.
In the following sections, Research Questions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 are answered in depth.
Section 4.1.1 introduces a risk measure that is applied for optimizing the provider’s
SLA portfolio.
4.1.1 Measuring the Risk of SLA Violations
A service provider monitors their own adherence to single a SLA αi in a portfolio γ of
SLAs, where γ = {αi, . . . ,αj}, and i, j are identifying indices of services and stores the
collected data. The reports that result from the monitoring data contain information
on the agreements that were active in each reporting period and information on the
provider’s adherence to each of the SLAs αi ∈ γ. The information on the provider’s
adherence is expressed in a degree of violation of each SLA λαiγ,t, where λ
αi
γ,t = 0 states
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that the SLA αi was fully adhered to in period t and λ
αi
γ,t = 1 denotes a violation of 100%
of the SLA.
Monitoring the adherence of an SLA means monitoring the KPIs that were defined in
the SLA. The analytics of this monitoring data for measuring the risk of SLA violation
is only possible if the following prerequisites are met:
Assumption 4 (Length of Monitoring Periods). Each monitoring period is assumed to have
equal length.
This is important as different lengths of monitoring periods would lead to an implicit
weighting of monitoring results (longer periods would influence the risk in exactly the
same way as shorter periods). Such a task must be controlled by the customer or an
agent that represents them.
Assumption 5 (Aggregation of Service Monitoring). Monitoring reports contain a degree
of violation of the monitored SLA, which represents an aggregated form of the degree of violation
of the SLA’s KPIs.
The degree of violation is obtained by evaluating each single KPI in the SLA against
the specified thresholds (Service Level Objectives, SLOs) and then aggregating the re-
sulting values into one degree λαiγ,t for the whole SLA. The approach presented in this
work relies on service monitoring, where each service relates to one SLA, and each SLA
is monitored individually. The methodology for aggregating KPI monitoring results
into one degree of violation for SLAs can be decided upon by the customer or the in-
termediary and is therefore not considered in this work. Nevertheless, in the following
the most intriguing requirements to the aggregation of monitoring results are briefly
introduced.
Monitoring Approach Aggregating monitoring results also needs to include a speci-
fication of the exact monitoring approach to be applied considering th SLOs to be ob-
served, the monitoring intervals, reliability of provider’s monitoring results, and many
other functions (Berger 2005).
Aggregation Function Apart from the applied monitoring approach, the aggregation
itself faces several challenges. First, there needs to be a common understanding be-
tween the provider and the customer on the meaning of a certain degree of SLA viola-
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TABLE 4.1: Extract of Service Provider’s Failure Monitoring






6 0.78 0.9 0.8
7 0.82 0.9
8 0.67 0.5
9 ? ? ?
tion and its consequences, for example by means of a penalty. Furthermore, the aggre-
gation needs to reflect the customer’s preferences for each of the KPIs, for example by
assigning weights that state relative importance of each KPI.
Preference Elicitation Elicitation of preferences can be achieved for instance with
methodologies like Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty 2005) or conjoint analy-
sis (Green and Rao 1971). The preferences have to be communicated to and agreed
upon with the provider, as the monitoring party is required to perform the aggregation.
Even in the rather unrealistic case of complete awareness of preferences, the concrete
aggregation function has to be specified. Examples could be a weighted mean or an-
other function that enables aggregation and allows for the reflection of dependencies
between KPIs. A sample of a provider’s monitoring data including the periods t, the
respective agreements αi for this period and degree of violation of an SLA λ
αi
γ,t is shown
in Table 4.1. Here, λαiγ,t corresponds to the entries in any of the cells. For instance,
the entries in the first row show that in period t = 1 two SLAs, α1 and α2 were active
(γ′ = {α1,α2}), and violated both with a degree of 0 (λα1{α1,α2},1 = 0,λ
α2
{α1,α2},1 = 0). The
empty cell for SLA α3 in period t = 1 indicates that α3 was not active in t = 1.
As was argued in Section 4.1, providers’ risk in the focus of this work stems from the
uncertainty of SLA violation and the resulting monetary consequences. The specifi-
cation of volatility of a security portfolio from Markowitz (1959), the semi-variance,
expresses risk as the deviation from a target value and takes only those deviations into
account that are worse than average. The literature review in section 3.2.1 identified the
semi-variance as the most feasible measure of SLA violation risk due to the emphasis
on higher deviations and the expression of a downside risk that considers only those
deviations that are worse than expected. Therefore Definition 4.1 is deduced:
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Definition 4.1 (SLA Portfolio Risk). The risk that a portfolio incurs on a provider is measured
by the semi-variance of the applied penalties.
The following scenario illustrates the analogy of SLA portfolios and security portfo-
lios.
Scenario. [Risk of Portfolios] Consider an owner of a portfolio of stocks. In order
to calculate the risk associated with a stock, the owner takes the past profits, given
a certain purchase price, of the stock into account and computes the average profit
of the stock in the past. Especially in stock trading, not only the average profit is
of importance but also the uncertainty of the expected profit. Uncertainty in this
context is measured by the variance of profit, that is, the average of the squared
deviations from the expected profit.
Translating to Scenario 2, the provider Amazon calculates the risk for the establish-
ment of a portfolio of SLAs. Therefore, the provider collects information on the past
performance as measured by the respective degree of SLA violation. Analogously to
the past profit of a security portfolio, Amazon calculates the average past degree of
violation and weights it by the penalties to be paid. This results in an expected value
of penalties. For a service provider, not only the expected degree of SLA violation,
but as well the uncertainty of achieving this degree of violation is a major driver for
the decision on SLA establishment. Uncertainty translates into the variance of SLA
violation and resulting penalties, that is, the variance of expected penalties, which
is calculated as the average of squared deviations from expected penalties.
Using the variance of due penalties as a measure of risk implies that a stronger
deviation from average penalties is perceived as more uncertain. This definition of
risk is refined by the concept of semi-variance as introduced by Markowitz (1959).
Only those deviations that are “worse” than average are taken into account.
This measure of risk has been employed in portfolio optimization since the beginning of
modern portfolio theory and is especially useful to account for asymmetric probabilistic
distributions and downside risk, and was identified to be the most feasible measure of
SLA violation risk in Section 3.2.1. For a service provider, this translates into taking
only those realizations of SLA violation into account, which are higher than its mean.
The calculation of the semi-variance of penalties of a certain SLA combination γ is con-
ducted in four steps:
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1. the sum of penalties µγ,t for each period is calculated,
2. the mean degree of violation λ
αi
γ for a particular SLA αi belonging to a specified
SLA configuration γ is computed,
3. the average penalty of γ is calculated based on λ
αi
γ and the penalties µαi from each
respective SLA αi ∈ γ, and finally,
4. the semi-variance is calculated as the squared deviations of actual penalties from
the mean penalties.
The sum of penalties µγ,t that a service provider would have had to pay in period t, in
case the same penalties had been agreed on then, depends on the degree of violation of
SLA αi in the portfolio of SLAs γ in this period and is given by
(4.1) µγ,t = ∑
αi∈γ









This variable serves to indicate whether the SLA αi was active (X(λ
αi
γ,t) = 1) or not
(X(λαiγ,t) = 0) in a particular period t. Equation (4.1) relates the degree of violation of
an SLA αi to the penalty µαi that was agreed upon and enables the provider to express
the amount of money that would have been due in a certain period, assuming that the
penalties would have been the same in that period.1
The average degree of violation of a particular SLA αi belonging to a specific SLA port-
folio γ is calculated by summing the observed degrees of violation and dividing by the










with X(λAγ,t) = 1∧ X(λAγc,t) = 0,




γc,t) = ∏αi∈γc X(λ
αi
γc,t), with γ describing a par-
ticular SLA portfolio and γc comprehending all SLA portfolios but γ. The indica-
tor variables X(λAγ,t) and X(λ
A
γc,t) serve to select from the observations in the service
1Calculating the average degree of failure for each period and multiplying it by the sum of penalties in
the considered portfolio would be an alternative approach. However, this would lead to an imprecise
notation of actual penalties and would rather be an approximation.
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provider’s records only the subset of observations, which pertains to a particular port-
folio of SLAs γ. Thus, |Tγ| is the number of periods in that the particular SLA combi-
nation γ appears in the records of the service provider, where Tγ is defined as the set of
periods in which the portfolio γ was active Tγ =
{
t | X(λAγ,t) = 1∧ X(λAγc,t) = 0
}
.
The average penalty, which the service provider paid in the past for the combination of
SLAs γ, is obtained by multiplying the average degree of violation of an SLA αi with
the currently valid penalty µαi and summing up for all SLAs αi ∈ γ




γ · µαi · X(λ
αi
γ,t).
The average degree of SLA violation is related to the currently valid penalty and the
average penalties for an SLA portfolio can be expressed. An alternative representation
of the average penalty would result in the calculation of the overall average degree of
violation, that is, the average of the average violations, and multiply it by the sum of
penalties. Although being a correct representation of average penalties, the impact of
the degree of violation on the resulting penalty is not reflected correctly. Therefore,
Equation 4.4 is employed for calculating the average penalty.
The semi-variance of due penalties for the portfolio of SLAs γ can be calculated. It is
the risk measure based on which the service provider chooses the risk-minimal combi-
nation of SLAs and it is defined as follows:
SE(µγ,t) =∑
t






The semi-variance of due penalties takes only those periods into account, in which
the actual penalties were higher than the expected penalties and consequently, the
provider’s performance was worse than expected. Hence, the concept of semi-variance
as introduced by Markowitz (1959) is reflected by Equation (4.5).
The selection of a security portfolio that was introduced by Markowitz (1959) and ex-
tended in Markowitz (1991) is based on the calculation of semi-variance. For a portfolio
of stocks, the semi-variance is retrieved as a function of variances of single stocks and
covariances of each pair of stocks in the portfolio. Each covariance of two stocks only
has to be calculated once and can be reused in each portfolio that the two respective
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stocks are part of. This calculation is only possible as the profit of one stock does not
impact the other stock’s profit.2
Calculating the semi-variance of SLA violation based on covariances as presented in
Markowitz (1959) would imply that the covariance of SLA violations of two SLAs are
the same, no matter which other SLAs are active at the same point in time. In practice,
however, the provider’s performance in SLAs that is reflected in the degree of SLA
violation heavily depends on the concurrently active SLAs and with them, concurrently
executed services.
Assumption 6 (Dependencies in Service Execution). The execution of services is subject to
dependencies and services affecting one another.
Dependencies in service execution are reflected in a higher degree of SLA violation for
each respective SLA in a certain SLA portfolio indicating that the service executions
of the SLA portfolio impact one another in a negative way. Dependencies in service
execution can stem from concurrent resource occupation of services, like concurrent
database or processor access, interference of respective software executions, joint de-
pendence on third party software or many other aspects3, which are very special to
service provisioning. Hence, calculating covariances of pairs of SLAs without taking
other concurrently active SLAs into account, would lead to an imprecise measure of
risk and would not reflect the dependencies between all of the service executions cor-
rectly. Therefore, this approach the semi-variance of SLA violation for each portfolio,
that is all SLAs in a combination, seperately and consequently allows for a correct rep-
resentation of dependencies among service executions.
The following section introduces the formulation of expected profit and resource con-
traints that are considered in a provider’s decision problem as illustrated in Figure
4.2.
2There might be cases, in which the return of one stock, e. g. a big car brand’s stock, has an impact on
the return of the other stock, e. g. a supplier of building parts. This will only be the case in extreme
scenarios and hence, can be omitted here.
3A very basic example is running programs on a laptop. When running a simple text-processing pro-
gram in parallel with an Internet browser in which only one tab is open, it is very unlikely that the
performance of either program is influenced. In case instead of the text-processing program a software
that renders video data is run, which is very resource intensive, the Internet browser’s performance as
well as the video rendering software’s performance might be influenced negatively.
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4.1.2 Formulating Resource and Profit Constraints
In Section 2.3.2, technical properties and economic preferences of a provider were iden-
tified as influencing factors in a provider’s decision on SLA establishment, which im-
pose constraints on a provider’s decision. Thus, besides considering the challenges
from Section 3.3 in the objective function, constraints to the decision problem are formu-
lated with respect to the available resources Lp of a provider and a minimum expected
profit requirement Πp.
Service provisioning is constrained by the resources that are available to a provider. For
instance in the case of a car repair, the maximum number of simultaneously repaired
cars equals the number of repair stations and is additionally constrained by the number
of available personnel. The provision of e-Services, Web services or Cloud services is
constrained by technical resources like available storage space, share of the CPU that
is available, bandwidth and many more. The resources that are required and agreed
on in a portfolio of SLAs may not exceed a provider’s resources. This is expressed by
summing all of the required resources in an SLA portfolio and comparing them to the
available resources of the provider in Equation (4.7).
Service providers want to achieve profit from service provisioning (Berger 2005), which
is at least non-negative. Therefore, the expected profit for each SLA in a portfolio is
calculated in order to compute the portfolio’s expected profit by adding the single SLA







where Lαi = (l
1
αi
, . . . , lMαi ) describes the set of KPIs l
m
αi
agreed upon in SLA αi. Only those
resources that can be mapped directly to the set of resources Lp = (l1p, . . . , lMp ) that are
available to the provider are considered in the resource constraint. M denotes the num-
ber of KPIs that can be mapped to resources. This mapping is especially difficult in
Cloud-based environments. One possible approach has been introduced in Kwok and
Mohindra (2008).
The minimum expected profit that the provider wants to achieve is denoted by Πp,
and is set by definition of the provider’s preferences. The expected profit from an SLA
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portfolio γ is denoted by
(4.9) E(πγ,t) = ∑
αi∈A
( fαi(sj)− c(sj))− E(µγ,t),
where fαi(sj) denotes the current price that the provider charges for the provision of
service sj in SLA αi and c(sj) denotes the provider-specific costs that arise with the
execution of service sj.
Having formulated a provider’s technological properties and economic preferences as
constraints to objective function from Section 4.1.1, the following section introduces the
risk-minimizing decision problem about SLA establishment of a provider.
4.1.3 Provider’s Risk-Minimizing Decision about SLA Establishment
Section 4.1.1 introduced a measure of risk that can express the risk of SLA violations.
This measure of risk will be applied in the objective function of a provider’s decision
problem on SLA establishment. Constraints to the decision problem were introduced in
Section 4.1.2 in order to include a provider’s technical properties and economic prefer-
ences in the decision problem. By applying the risk measure from Section 4.1.1 and the
constraints from Section 4.1.2 along with a provider’s properties the challenges from
Section 3.3 are met. In more detail, the decision problem considers the impact of the In-
ternet and related technologies as well as service composition by employing a method
that considers portfolios of SLAs, which relate to a multitude of customers. Further-
more, the risk of SLA violation is considered in the decision on SLA establishment by a













In order to illustrate the risk-minimizing decision problem, Scenario 2 is extended by
concrete SLA instantiations in order to give a hands-on example.
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Example 4.1 (Provider’s Risk-minimizing Decision Problem). Consider the example mon-
itoring data in Table 4.1 to be service provider Amazon’s data. For completeness of the numerical
example further assume that the SLAs appearing in the table are defined as follows:
α1 ∈ A :(pAWS, s1, θ1, Bw = 5, fα1(s1) = 4, µα1 = 2),
α2 ∈ A :(pAWS, s2, θ2, Bw = 10, fα2(s2) = 11, µα2 = 2),
α3 ∈ A :(pAWS, s1, θ3, Bw = 6, fα3(s1) = 4, µα3 = 3),
where pAWS represents “Amazon Web Services”, Bw denotes the bandwidth for the provision of
the service. Let the provider pAWS have a maximum bandwidth capacity of 15, which con-
stitutes the optimization constraint (4.7), as well as internal costs for service execution of
c(s1) = 2, c(s2) = 3. Further assume that pAWS seeks to attain a miminum expected profit of
5 as expected profit requirement (4.8) and that penalties can be expressed as monetary amounts
(see Section 2.2).
Following the sequence depicted in Figure 4.2, the risk-minimal SLA portfolio is identified.
Exemplarily, consider SLA portfolio γ′= {α1,α2}. It can be easily verified that this combination
of SLAs satisfies the bandwidth constraint. In the past records (Table 4.1) it appears four times
in periods t ∈ {1,2,4,7} such that qt = 14 in (4.4) and Equation (4.5). The sum of penalties that
the provider had to pay in each of these periods, µγ′,t = ∑αi∈γ′ λ
αi
γ′,t · µαi , is
µγ′,1 = 0 · 2 + 0 · 2 = 0,
µγ′,2 = 0 · 2 + 0 · 2 = 0,
µγ′,4 = 1 · 2 + 1 · 2 = 4,
µγ′,7 = 0.82 · 2 + 0.9 · 2 = 3.44.











Hence, the average penalty paid in the past for the SLA combination γ′ is
E(µγ′,t) =0.455 · 2 + 0.475 · 2 = 1.86.
Expected profit from SLA combination γ′, when substituting the above result into (4.9), is
E(πγ′,t) =4 + 11− 2− 3− 1.86 = 8.14.(4.10)
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(max{0;0− 1.86})2 + (max{0;0− 1.86})2
+(max{0;4− 1.86})2 + (max{0;3.44− 1.86})2
)
= 1.769
The same procedure is followed for each available SLA portfolio: resource and expected profit con-
straints are evaluated first and in case these constraints are met, the semi-variance is calculated.
Finally, the SLA portfolio that incures the lowest risk is selected as it solves the optimization
problem of the service provider.
In the numerical example from Table 4.1, besides the calculated SLA portfolio γ′ = {α1,α2},
there is no further SLA portfolio meeting the above criteria. Note that for the SLA portfolios
{α1}, {α2} and {α3} there are no reporting data in the extract in Table 4.1. The SLA portfolios
{α2,α3} and {α1,α2,α3}, for which data are avaibale, have a combined bandwidth of 16 and
21, respectively, whereby they do not meet the bandwidth constraint and do not need to be
considered. The SLA portfolio {α1,α3} with combined bandwidth of 11 meets the bandwidth
constraint. However, as one can verify by substituting the values into Equation (4.9), it yields
an expected profit of E(π{α1,α3},t) = 4 + 4− 2− 2− (0.67 · 2 + 0.5 · 3) = 1.16 and thus fails
the expected profit constraint.
4.1.4 Summary
This section introduced a method that allows a provider to select the portfolio of SLAs
that minimizes their risk of SLA violation and which considers a provider’s technical
properties and economic preferences as presented in Section 2.3 (Research Question 2.2)
as well as the challenges in decision making for SLA establishment that were identified
in Section 3.3. These challenges comprise of the impact of the availability of the In-
ternet on service provisioning and service composition. Furthermore, considering and
expressing the risk of SLA violations explicitly in the decision of a provider on SLA
establishment with a multitude of customers are challenges that need to be addressed.
The application of the semi-variance as a measure of risk in analogy to security port-
folio selection (Markowitz 1959) allows the expression of downside risk as introduced
in Section 3.2.1 and the consideration of the dependencies of service execution (Re-
search Question 2.1). Dependencies in service execution may arise due to concurrent
resource access, software intereference or many more aspects as argued before. Thus,
the method presented in this section formulates a provider’s decision problem by mini-
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mizing the risk of SLA violation, which considers the challenges from Section 3.3 under
the constraints of a provider’s technical properties and economic preferences (Research
Question 2.3). In this section, a method that addresses Research Question 2 was pre-
sented.
Note that, by construction, the method introduced in Section 4.1 might exclude a portfo-
lio of SLAs based on yielding insufficient expected profit, although this portfolio could
incur a very low risk and hence might have been preferred by the service provider. Al-
ternatively, if the minimum level of expected profit is set very low in order to include
such portfolios in the feasible set, the portfolio of SLAs that is the result of the optimiza-
tion might possess the desired low variance, but at the same time yield insufficiently
low profit in terms of a provider’s preferences.
Example 4.2 (Constraints in a Provider’s Risk-minimizing Decision). To see this at the nu-
merical example in Table 4.1, assume that the profit requirement in the expected profit constraint
(4.8) was Πp = 1. The SLA portfolio γ′′ = {α1,α3} would thus enter the feasible set, and, due to
SE(µ{α1,α3},t) = 0 based on the reporting data, it would be chosen instead of γ
′ = {α1,α2}. This
example stresses the importance of the chosen profit constraint. In the above case, the provider
would have to accept an extremely low profit in order to find an SLA portfolio that incurs lower
risk than γ′. However, the profit achieved by γ′′ could leave the provider unsatisfied.
In general, the method might reject portfolios of SLAs, which combine above aver-
age expected profit with only slightly higher variance. To avoid this inefficiency of
choice, a provider’s preferences should be explicitely taken into account by reflecting
the provider’s attitude towards risk by means of a trade-off between risk and expected
profit. Section 4.2 therefore introduces a method that employs a provider’s utility func-
tion and thus includes both risk and expected profit in the objective function.
4.2 Provider’s Maximization of Expected Utility
The method for solving a provider’s decision problem in SLA establishment that was
introduced in Section 4.1 enables a service provider to select the SLA portfolio γ∗ that
minimizes the risk of SLA violation, as measured by the semi-variance of due penalties,
subject to attaining at least a certain pre-specified level of expected profit and adhering
to resource constraints. The method from Section 4.1 meets the challenges on deci-
sion making for SLA establishment that were identified in Section 3.3 and considers a
provider’s technical properties and economic preferences. However, in order to solve
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the problem, a threshold for expected profit needs to be determined. SLA portfolios
that do not exceed this threshold are rejected. Hence, applying the method from Sec-
tion 4.1 does not allow for a provider’s preferences with respect to a trade-off between
risk and profit. In order to specify an approach to Research Question 2 that takes this
trade-off into account, the decision problem that was introduced in Section 4.1 needs to
be adapted. As was argued in Section 3.2.3, the formulation of a utility function allows
to solve a multi-objective decision problem. As utility functions comprise of a trade-off
between expected profit and risk by definition, this section will present a method that
applies the maximization of expected utility as the objective function of a provider’s
decision problem about SLA establishment. The first sub question of research question
2 in this section is therefore concerned with a provider’s utility-maximizing decision
problem.
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.4 ≺PROVIDER’S UTILITY MAXIMIZING DECISION
PROBLEM. How is the provider’s decision problem formulated in order to maximize the util-
ity from SLA establishment and to account for the challenges on decision making (from Section
3.3) as well as the provider’s technical properties?
In this approach, a provider is assumed to maximize their utility that results from the
establishment of SLAs. The utility function expresses a trade-off between expected
profit from service provisioning and the risk of SLA violation. As the expected profit
from service provisioning is already reflected in a provider’s utility, the only remaining
constraints consider resources that are available to a provider. Figure 4.3 illustrates the
provider’s utility-based decision process.
When receiving a request for service provision from a customer, a provider first identi-
fies which SLA portfolios can be established. For each portfolio the resource constraints
are verified and only those portfolios that meet the constraints are taken into further
consideration. Afterwards, the utility of the respective SLA portfolio is calculated and
the portfolios are ranked according to their resulting utility.
The formulation of a provider’s utility is in the focus of Sub Question 2.5:
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.5 ≺PROVIDER’S UTILITY FUNCTION. How can a provider’s
utility that results from service provisioning and the risk of SLA violation be expressed?
A provider’s utility here directly reflects a provider’s attitude towards risk by means of
85
Chapter 4 Service Provider Decisions
FIGURE 4.3: Utility-maximizing Portfolio Selection
a trade-off between marginal incurred risk and the required expected profit for bearing
the additional risk. Whereas the approach in Section 4.1 does not specify the decision
maker’s attitude towards risk explicitely, this section allows providers to express their
attitude towards risk directly and hence, focuses on risk-averse decision makers.
Assumption 7 (Risk-averse providers). Service Providers are assumed to be risk averse.
The risk-aversion of a provider defines characteristics of the provider’s utility function.
The following section determines these characteristics and specifies a provider’s utility
function.
4.2.1 Expressing a Provider’s Utility
A provider that wants to determine their utility from service provisioning needs to
employ service monitoring in order to retrieve the required information for the calcu-
lation of expected profit and risk. The reports that result from the service monitoring
are required to meet Assumptions 4 and 5 (equal lengths of all monitoring periods and
the ability to aggregate monitoring data, respectively). From the monitoring reports,
information about the degree of violation of SLAs can be extracted. Combined with
information on prices fαi(sj) and penalties µαi from SLAs, and the provider’s costs for
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service provision c(sj), the expected profit can be calculated according to Equation (4.9),
where the profit in each period is defined as:






where µγ,t denotes the actual penalties as defined in Equation (4.1).
Risk averse decision makers are assumed to possess a von Neumann-Morgenstern util-
ity function u(πγ,t), where u′(πγ,t) > 0,u′′(πγ,t) < 0 (Von Neumann et al. 1947). The
expected utility E(u(πγ,t)) can be calculated from historical data and is defined as
(4.12) E(u(πγ,t)) = ∑
t
qt · u(πγ,t),
where qt is the probability for u(πγ,t) and calculated as before (see Equation (4.6)). In
theory, it should be employed as the objective function of the service provider. The
expected utility is to be maximized under the resource constraints in Equation (4.7). In
order to obtain an explicit solution for the optimal combination of SLAs, a particular
specification of the utility function has to be applied. Common utility functions in the
economic literature are, for example, the quadratic, u(πγ,t) = aπγ,t − 12 (πγ,t)2, logarith-
mic u(πγ,t) = lnπγ,t as well as the power utility functions u(πγ,t) = (πγ,t)1−b for b ≥ 0,
b 6= 1 (Eeckhoudt et al. 2005, p. 21). For u(πγ,t) = (πγ,t)1−b, the coefficient of relative
risk aversion R(w) = − u
′′(w)
u′(w) w, where w = πγ,t, is constant and equal to b.
Even with the (rather unrealistic) assumption that the designer of the decision problem
is completely aware of the particular form of the service provider’s utility, pursuing
this approach has a major restriction: The objective function only takes the expected
degree of SLA violation into account but does not reflect the volatility of SLA violation
directly. Therefore, an alternative representation of expected utility is employed, which
holds for the general specification of the utility function u(πγ,t) and contains the first
two moments of the profit distribution. For facilitating the representation of profit as
a lottery w + z, assume that w is some certain income and z is a stochastic variable
with a mean of 0 and Variance Var(z) without any specific probability distribution.
Furthermore, assume that expected utility of the lottery is E(u(w + z)). Applying a
Taylor approximation on expected utility, one obtains (Eeckhoudt et al. 2005)
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E(w)− 12 · ARA(w) ·Var(z) denotes the certainty equivalent. The certainty equivalent’s
utility corresponds to the lottery’s expected utility E(u(w + z)) (Friedman and Savage
1948) per definition and ARA(w) = R(w)w = −
u′′(w)
u′(w) is the coefficient of absolute risk
aversion measured at w (Pratt 1964; Arrow 1971).
Setting w = E(πγ,t) and z = πγ,t − E(πγ,t), z exhibits the following properties
(4.14) E(z) = E(πγ,t − E(πγ,t)) = 0
and
Var(z) = Var(πγ,t − E(πγ,t))(4.15)
= E((πγ,t − E(πγ,t))2 − (E(πγ,t − E(πγ,t)))2) = Var(πγ,t).
w + z constitutes the lottery of expected profit that meets the above required character-
istics.
Substituting w and z into Equation (4.13) results in E(u(πγ,t)) ≈ u(E(πγ,t) − 12 ·
ARA(E(πγ,t)) · Var(πγ,t)), where the variance of profit with SLA combination γ
equals
(4.16) Var(πγ,t) = ∑
t
qt · ((πγ,t − E(πγ,t)))2.
Consequently, maximizing the expected utility of the service provider E(u(πγ,t))
is equivalent to maximizing the certainty equivalent E(πγ,t) − 12 · ARA(E(πγ,t)) ·
Var(πγ,t). The certainty equivalent represents the trade-off between risk (Var(πγ,t))
and expected profit (E(πγ,t)) that is individually weighted by the coefficient of abso-
lute risk aversion (ARA(E(πγ,t))). The value of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion
that is usually decreasing in wealth (Eeckhoudt et al. 2005, p. 21) still needs to be
identified for the practical application in decision making.
The certainty equivalent is the objective function to be employed in the utility-
maximizing decision problem that is introduced in the following section according to
Figure 4.3.
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4.2.2 Provider’s Utility-maximizing Decision Model
The previous section introduced a formulation of a provider’s utility that does not re-
quire an explicit formulation of a specific utility function for expressing a trade-off be-
tween expected profit from service provisioning and the risk of SLA violation. The
properties of a provider that were identified to affect a provider’s decision on SLA
establishment that were presented Section 2.3 need to be considered in a provider’s
utility-maximizing decision problem. Economic preferences of a provider capture the
expected profit from service provisioning and are covered in the objective function that
maximizes the utility. Technical properties relate to resources of a provider that con-
strain service provisioning, which are considered as constraints in the decision prob-
lem analogously to the constraints in the risk-minimizing decision problem in Section













By calculating the variance and profit for each portfolio, the method caters for the
challenges that arise with the availability of the Internet and the composition of ser-
vices, that is, a high number of SLAs that needs to be considered and the dependencies
among service executions as argued in Assumption 6 in Section 4.1.1. Furthermore,
the decision of SLA establishment considers a multitude of customers as potential con-
tractual partners as well as the risk of SLA violation. This way, the method that was
presented in this section meets the challenges that were raised in Section 3.3 and con-
siders a provider’s economic and technical properties. Furthermore, as an extension to
the method presented in Section 4.1, it directly allows for a provider’s attitude towards
risk by formulating a trade-off between the expected profit and SLA violation risk.
In order to illustrate the method, Example 4.1 is adapted.
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Example 4.3 (Provider’s Utility-maximizing Decision Problem). Recall that pAWS offers
the following SLAs:
α1 ∈ A :(pAWS, s1, θ1, Bw = 5, fα1(s1) = 4, µα1 = 2),
α2 ∈ A :(pAWS, s2, θ2, Bw = 10, fα2(s2) = 11, µα2 = 2),
α3 ∈ A :(pAWS, s1, θ3, Bw = 6, fα3(s1) = 4, µα3 = 3),
With costs for service execution of c(s1) = 2, c(s2) = 3, and that pAWS can provide a maximum
bandwidth of 15. As was argued in Example 4.1, the SLA combinations {α1,α2} and {α1,α3}
exhibit reporting data in Table 4.1 and meet the bandwidth constraint. Consider SLA portfolio
γ′ = {α1,α2} first.
In the past records the SLA portfolio appears four times in periods t ∈ {1,2,4,7} such that
qt = 14 in (4.9). The sum of penalties that the provider had to pay in each of these periods,
results, as stated in Example 4.1, in µγ′,1 = 0, µγ′,2 = 0, µγ′,4 = 4, and µγ′,7 = 3.44. Expected
profit from SLA combination γ′ is thus substituted into (4.9) and gives
E(πγ′,t) = ∑
α1,α2
( fαi(sj)− c(sj))− E(µγ′,t)(4.17)
= 4 + 11− 2− 3− 1.86 = 8.14.
Substituting the numerical values E(πγ′,t) = 8.14 into Equation (4.16) leads to





























Empirical studies indicating constant relative risk aversion suggest that a value of 3 for the
coefficient of relative risk aversion is reasonable (Szpiro 1988, p. 106). Since the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion ARA(w) = R(w)w can be calculated for a certain value of expected profit
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· 0.36855 · 3.4988 = 7.4953




· 2.5862 · 0 = 1.16
Based on the comparison of Equations (4.19) and (4.20), the service provider will still choose
γ′ = {α1,α2}.
4.2.3 Summary
This section introduced the decision problem that takes a risk-averse provider’s re-
source constraints into account while maximizing the provider’s utility from providing
services (Research Question 2.4). The provider’s utility expresses a trade-off between
expected profit and risk of SLA violation that is individually weighted by the coeffi-
cient of absolute risk aversion (Research Question 2.5). In this vein, the method meets
the challenges from Section 3.3 as well as a provider’s properties as was argued in Sec-
tion 4.2.2.
The proposed representation of expected utility is only an approximation, except when
the utility function is of the form u(πγ,t) = − e
−a·πγ,t
a , with constant ARA(πγ,t) = a, and
profit is normally distributed (Eeckhoudt et al. 2005, pp. 20–21). Its drawback as of
any approximation is that it is imprecise. However, in finance theory and practice this
is still the most often employed approach.
Example 4.4 (Imprecision of Expected Utility Representation). To see the magnitude of
the imprecision of representing the certainty equivalent in the proposed way, consider Example
4.3 with γ′ = {α1,α2}. Constant relative risk aversion with coefficient R(w) = 3 is satisfied
with the utility function u(πγ′,t) = (πγ′,t)1−b with b = 3. The expected utility of the provider
choosing SLA combination γ′ equals
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A comparison of the numbers in Equations (4.21) and (4.20) shows that the difference is negli-
gible.
The risk-minimizing method that was presented in Section 4.1 ignores the trade-off be-
tween risk and expected profit from a provider’s perspective. Contrarily, the utility
maximization in Section 4.2 that employs variance instead of semi-variance treats both,
negative and positive deviations of profit from its mean as equally weighted. Therefore,
the choice for an approach depends on the decision makers preferences. If the service
provider has a strong aversion towards downside risk and the distribution of penalties
is asymmetric, they should choose the procedure suggested in Section 4.1. If instead
the distribution is symmetric and the provider considers the variation of profit around
its mean as relatively small, they should resort to the procedure in Section 4.2. Another
aspect that needs to be considered in the choice of the method to be applied. Approxi-
mating the maximization of a provider’s utility by maximizing the certainty equivalent
relies on standard economic literature (Arrow 1971; Pratt 1964; Friedman and Savage
1948; Savage 1972). The certainty equivalent in its very nature is defined exclusively for
positive arguments, that is, positive values for profit and expected profit. Obviously, a
provider can incur losses from providing services, especially in cases in which a penalty
is applied that exceeds the difference between the agreed price for service provision and
a provider’s cost for service provision. In these cases, the certainty equivalent cannot
be applied for the decision about SLA establishment. Different approaches, for instance
an adaptation of the certainty equivalent that defines a piecewise defined function, are
required to close this gap. Identifying an approach that closes this gap will be subject
to future research.
4.3 Complexity Considerations and Implications
This section presents an analysis of the decision methods that were introduced in Sec-
tions 4.1 and 4.2. These methods enable a service provider to choose either a risk-
minimal SLA portfolio that satisfies a minimal profit constraint or an SLA portfolio
that maximizes expected utility expressed as a trade-off between risk and profit. In
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an environment of services that are provided electronically or even completely auto-
mated, e.g. Web services, the solution time of a method and hence its computational
tractability plays an important role. In order to determine the runtime properties of the
presented models, the complexity class that the models belong to is identified.
In order to find the risk-minimal/utility-maximizing SLA portfolio, a set of SLAs A that
is of the size |A|, where SLAs include the respective prices, penalties and KPIs Lαi that
can be matched to the provider’s resource constraints are handed over as an input to the
model. Further, input is a matrix of monitoring data Λ of T periods for the |A| SLAs (see
Table 4.1). The optimization problems have a discrete set of feasible solutions and their
goal is to find the "optimal" solution. One approach for solving the presented models is
to calculate the risk/utility for each combination of SLAs and then to search for the risk-
minimal/utility-maximizing solution. With a growing number of SLAs, exhaustive
search becomes infeasible from a computational point of view. Solution concepts that
are applied to linear optimization, e.g. the Dijkstra algorithm, cannot be applied to
the presented models as the risk-/utility-values associated with combinations are not
monotonouos in the number of SLAs.4 Hence, the model presented in this thesis can
be regarded to be in NP like many other optimization problems (Papadimitriou and
Steiglitz 1998). A more detailed analysis of the computational complexity is carried out
in the following. In order to determine the complexity in Big-o-Notation, a worst case
analysis is carried out that analyzes the runtime properties of the method that solves
a provider’s decision problem as illustrated in Algorithm 4.1. This worst case analysis
identifies the highest possible runtime and hence considers exhaustive search.
Algorithm 4.1 Identify the Risk-Minimal SLA portfolio
Require: A, Lαi and Λ
1: Γ← retrievePossibleSLAPortfolios(A)
2: for all γ ∈ Γ do
3: Lγ ← calculateRequiredResourcesForSLAs(γ, Lαi )
4: if Lγ ≤ Lp then
5: Πγ ← calculateExpectedProfit(γ, Λ)
6: if Πγ ≥Πp then
7: SE(λγ,t)← calculateRiskForPortfolios(γ, Λ)
8: ΓR← ΓR + [γ,SE(λγ,t)]
9: γ∗← argminγ∈ΓR SE(λγ,t)
10: return γ∗
For determining the computational complexity of Algorithm 4.1 based on the input
4Risk that is associated with the SLA portfolio α1,α2 might be higher than the risk of the SLA α1 alone,
whereas the risk of SLA portfolio α1,α2,α3 might be lower than the risk of α1,α2. Hence, risk can, but
does not have to be monotonous.
93
Chapter 4 Service Provider Decisions
specified above, each function is analyzed seperatly.
retrievePossibleSLAPortfolios(A) allows the provider to query storage, i. e. a repos-
itory or database, for every set of SLAs that has been established previously at least
once. As this is a simple request, the time complexity is in O(|A|).
calculateRequiredResourcesForSLAs(γ, Lαi ) computes the resource requirements for
a given SLA portfolio γ based on the agreed KPIs Lαi as stated in Equation (4.7). The
resulting required resources are then compared to those resources that are available
to the provider. The time complexity of the evaluation of the resource constraints de-
pends on the number of SLAs αi ∈ A, as well as on the number of KPIs M = |Lαi |. The
computational complexity can be specified as O(|A|) ·O(M) = O(|A| ·M).
calculateExpectedProfit(γ, Λ) specifies the computation of the expected profit con-
straint as stated in Equation (4.8). Therefore, the expected profit of an SLA portfolio γ
is calculated with respect to the provider’s monitoring data in Λ and compared to the
profit Πp that the provider expects to achieve. This computation depends on the num-
ber of SLAs |A| and on the number of observed periods T in Λ. It has a time complexity
of O(|A|) for the calculation of price minus costs for each contract and a complexity of
O((|A|) · (T)) for the calculation of the expected penalties that depends on the num-
ber of observed periods as well as on the number of monitored SLAs. Hence, a time
complexity of O(|A|) + O(|A| · T) = O(|A| · T) results.
calculateRiskForPortfolios(γ, Λ) finally determines the risk that is associated with
an SLA portfolio γ based on the provider’s monitoring data in Λ as stated in Equation
(4.5). Two factors influence its computational complexity; the first one is the number
of periods T that have been observed. The second one is the number of SLAs |A|. The
computation of the semi-variance has an exponential time complexity O(T) · (O(|A|) +
O(|A| · T)) = O(T2 · |A|).
Taking into consideration that this calculation has to be performed for each possible
SLA portfolio γ ∈ Γ, the overall complexity of the model becomes apparent. Assuming
that there are |A| SLAs α ∈ A and that each of the SLAs can be established only once,
then the power-set of A, Γ = P(A), would reflect the set of possible SLA portfolios and
would have a size of 2|A| − 1 when the empty set is excluded. Relaxing the assumption
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that each SLA can only be established once would even increase the number of possible
SLA portfolios and with it the number of calculations that have to be run. This leads to
a time complexity for determining the risk of SLA portfolios of
O(·) = O(2|A|) ·O(T2 · |A|) · [O(|A| · T) + O(|A| ·M)]
= O(2|A| · T3 · |A|2) + O(2|A| · T2 · |A|2 ·M
= O(2|A| · T3 · |A|2 ·M)
= O(2|A| · T3 ·M).
argminγ∈ΓR SE(λγ,t) identifies the SLA portfolio γ∗ that minimizes risk while adher-
ing to the provider’s constraints. An efficient search can be assumed to in O(log|ΓR|).
The overall time complexity of Algorithm 4.1 hence results in O(log|ΓR| · 2|A| ·T3 ·M).
The complexity of the model presented in Section 4.2 is determined analogously. As
the result does not differ significantly, it will be omitted here.
The computational complexity of Algorithm 4.1 is mainly influenced by the size of Γ.
Hence, the runtime properties of Algorithm 4.1 can be influenced positively by restrict-
ing the potential number of SLA portfolios. Three aspects support the feasibility of this
approach. First, the provider itself restricts the number of different SLAs, e. g. a pre-
defined number of quality classes per service, that they offer to customers in order to
make sure that enough comparable monitoring data is available for each of the SLAs.
Under the assumption that there is only one concurrent instance of each predefined
SLA, the number of SLAs |A| would be kept as small as possible that way. Relaxing
the assumption of only one concurrent instance for each predefined SLA increases the
number of SLAs |A| and hence, the size of Γ. Second, a provider is likely to special-
ize on a certain kind of services to provide and thereby restricts the number of offered
services. By restricting the number of offered services as well as the number of quality
classes per SLA, the number of possible SLA portfolios can be kept to a minimum level.
Third, the provider could refrain from solving the decision problem for all possible SLA
portfolios. The provider’s decision is triggered by customers’ requests for service pro-
vision. Hence, the service provider’s decision may be restricted to an evaluation of the
current situation as compared to the situation when accepting the request for service
provision. This approach would lead to only two calculations of semi-variance and
consequently would reduce the complexity massively.
Applying the calculation of semi-variance as presented in Markowitz (1959) would re-
sult in a lower complexity as the pairwise covariances of SLA violations could be reused
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in each SLA portfolio that the respective pair of SLAs is part of. Nevertheless, the ap-
plication of covariances as in Markowitz (1959) does not account for dependencies in
service execution. In order to account for these dependencies, covariances would have
to be calculated while considering the portfolio of SLAs. This would mean calculating
the covariances for pairs of SLAs seperately for each portfolio of SLAs, which would




“Web service providers are interconnecting their offerings in unforeseen ways, giving rise to
Web service ecosystems”
(Barros and Dumas 2006)
IN Section 2.3.2, two types of service providers were introduced: service providers(see Definition 2.7) that provide all requested functionality by themselves and ser-
vice intermediaries (see Definition 2.8) that provide a combination or composition of
services from a multitude of providers to a customer. While Chapter 4 focused on SLA
establishment decisions that are made by a service provider, in this chapter a method
for making decisions on SLA establishment by an intermediary will be presented.
In the design of the method that solves the intermediary’s decision problem, the chal-
lenges on decision making for SLA establishment that were raised in Section 3.3 need
to be considered. These challenges reflect the impact of the availability of the Inter-
net on service provisioning and composition, the presence of a multitude of customers
and the consideration and expression of SLA violation risk in the decision. Besides
these challenges, a service intermediary incorporates particular properties which limit
the provisioning of services (see Section 2.3.2) like a service provider. An intermediary
faces resource constraints in a similar manner to a service provider that limit service
provisioning and wants to make profit by providing services (Berger 2005), after the
costs of procuring services from providers are considered. Consequently, an intermedi-
ary’s decision problem resorts to the question that was raised in Section 2.3.2:
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FIGURE 5.1: Example Agreement Network - Focus on Intermediary
Which SLA(s) with customers and supplying providers should be active in the next period?
This decision is illustrated with the help of an extension of the IT outsourcing scenario
that was introduced in Section 2.3.4. In this chapter, a focus on an intermediary’s deci-
sion fosters the following adaptation of the scenario:
Scenario. [Intermediary Decisions in Agreement Networks] The provider Cisco
Systems acts as an intermediary, which buys services from other providers, e. g.
a compute instance from Amazon (see outgoing arrows in Figure 5.1). Cisco Sys-
tems offers the service that results from bundling the compute instance with Cisco
Systems’ network connection service to customers. As depicted in Figure 5.1, Cisco
Systems receives requests from multiple customers (see incoming arrows) and re-
quests services from multiple providers (see outgoing arrows). In this situation,
Cisco Systems needs to decide which requests from customers to accept and which
SLAs to request from other providers.
As argued previously, the method that solves an intermediary’s decision problem on
SLA establishment needs to consider the challenges that were raised in Section 3.3 as
well as an intermediary’s properties. In this vein, the intermediary’s decision prob-
lem exhibits parallels to the provider’s decision problem with the extension of taking
the additional procurement of services into account. Thus, in analogy to a provider’s
decision problem that was covered by Research Question 2, the intermediary’s deci-
sion problem is the focus of Research Question 3 that was formulated in Section 1.1 as
follows:
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RESEARCH QUESTION 3 ≺INTERMEDIARY’S RISK-MINIMIZING DECISION. How
can an intermediary select the SLAs with customers and supplying providers that minimize
the risk of SLA violation while taking their technical properties and economic preferences into
account?
In the following sections, solutions for Research Question 3 are presented by applying
the economic foundations from Chapter 3 and the foundations of joint service provi-
sioning and service composition from Chapter 2 with a special focus on an interme-
diary’s role according to Definition 2.8. Therefore, in a first step, an extension of the
risk-minimizing decision of a provider is presented which allows an intermediary to
select an SLA portfolio with customers and an SLA portfolio with providers of services
that minimize the risk of SLA violations. Like the method in Section 4.1, the method
applies an adaptation of portfolio selection by Markowitz (1959) and employs the semi-
variance. The semi-variance was already identified to be especially feasible for the de-
cision on SLA establishment in Section 3.2.1 and 4.1.1 as it allows the consideration of
portfolios of SLAs and the downside risk of SLA violation, which considers only devia-
tions from the expected value that are considered worse than expected. In a second step,
the approach is extended in order to allow for an intermediary’s preferences by means
of a trade-off between expected profit from service provisioning and the risk of SLA
violation. The maximization of an intermediary’s expected utility, that is the trade-off
between risk and expected profit, is discussed in detail in Section 5.2.
5.1 Intermediary’s Constrained Minimization of SLA Violation
Risk
The solution to a provider’s SLA establishment decision problem that minimizes the
risk of SLA violation was presented in Section 4.1 will be extended in this section to
capture an intermediary’s decision on customer as well as supplier SLAs.
Analogously to service providers, intermediaries seek to adhere to the SLAs that they
establish with customers in order to avoid the payment of penalties (Penna and Wan-
dresen 2004; Spillner and Schill 2009). The intermediary’s adherence to SLAs does not
only depend on their own performance as in a provider’s case, but also on the perfor-
mance of supplying providers. This implies that the method from Section 4.1 needs
to be extended to capture SLA violation risk for customer as well as provider SLAs.
As a first part of the approach to address Research Question 3, the expression of SLA
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violation risk in an intermediary’s decision problem is in the focus of Sub Question
3.1:
RESEARCH QUESTION 3.1 ≺MEASURING RISK. In an intermediary’s decision on SLA
establishment, how can the risk of SLA violation for the portfolio of SLAs that are offered to
customers be extended to also capture the risk of SLA violation of procured SLAs?
The measure of SLA violation risk that addresses Sub Question 3.1 needs to meet the
challenges that were raised in Section 3.3. Besides the consideration and expression of
risk in the decision on SLA establishment, the challenges tackle the impact of the avail-
ability of the Internet on service provisioning, the presence of more than one customer
and aspects of service composition.
Approaching Sub Question 3.1 results in the question of how to alter the expression of
SLA violation risk from Section 4.1 so that the risk of violations of SLAs with providers
is captured in the intermediary’s decision problem. The decisions for a customer SLA
portfolio and a supplied SLA portfolio are not necessarily made at the same time, as the
decision for supplying services can relate to a multitude of different offered services,
e. g. infrastructure services, where storage space may be used for different services.
Therefore, the decision on SLA establishment with customers and providers is taken
into account seperatly in the following.
In order to formulate an intermediary’s decision problem on SLA establishment, be-
sides considering the challenges from Section 3.3, an intermediary’s properties that in-
fluence the decision about SLA establishment need to be considered. In Section 2.3.2
it was identified that the technical properties of an intermediary (i.e. resources avail-
able) affect the SLA establishment decision. Nevertheless, intermediaries incorporate
the possibility of procuring services, which may result in extended resources. Con-
sequently, the intermediary needs to consider all resources that are available to them
including procured resources. In order to account for an intermediary’s expenses, the
expected profit of service provision captures both the expected profit of the SLA port-
folio to be established with customers as well as the expected costs of the procured SLA
portfolio. Including an intermediary’s technical properties and economic preferences is
in the focus of Sub Question 3.2:
RESEARCH QUESTION 3.2 ≺INFLUENCING FACTORS. How can the factors that con-
strain an intermediary’s decision on SLA establishment be included in the decision problem?
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With the identification of a suitable measure of the risk of SLA violation for customer
SLAs as well as for SLAs with providers that answers the challenges in Section 3.3 and
the specification of constraints that affect an intermediary’s choice of SLAs, the founda-
tions are laid to formulate an intermediary’s decision problem for SLA establishment.
The intermediary’s decision on SLAs with customers and providers is the focus of Sub
Question 3.3:
RESEARCH QUESTION 3.3 ≺FORMULATION OF THE INTERMEDIARY’S RISK-MINI-
MIZING DECISION PROBLEM. How is an intermediary’s decision problem formulated that
minimizes the risk of violation of SLAs with customers and providers and that meets the chal-
lenges from Section 3.3 and considers an intermediary’s technical and economic properties?
The risk of SLA violation translates into uncertainty about expected profit (Bonini 1975).
Therefore, the intermediary aims at minimizing the risk of customer SLA violation.
Consequently, the objective function minimizes the intermediary’s risk. Additionally,
constraints on expected profit and resources as well as the risk of supplying providers
violating SLAs have to be taken into account. Figure 5.2 illustrates the decision process
for SLAs with customers and supplying providers if made at the same point in time.
Customers that want to purchase a customized service send an SLA offer to the inter-
mediary. The intermediary, that offers services to customers, selects the feasible SLA
portfolios with respect to resource requirements and afterwards calculates the optimal
SLA portfolio that should be established with customers. After having decided on the
risk-minimal SLA portfolio, the intermediary looks up the suppliers from which they
can purchase the required services and checks which ones are available. Based on the
expected profit that the intermediary wants to gain, feasible provider SLA portfolios
are chosen and the corresponding risk is calculated. According to this risk, a ranked
list of the provider SLA portfolios is compiled. If there is only one option for an offered
SLA (as well as for supplied SLAs), this one is the risk-minimal one.
The intermediary sends an SLA offer to the set of service providers that incure the low-
est risk of SLA violation. Note that these offers are merely regarded as a request for pro-
posal, which the intermediary sends to the providers. This means that SLAs will only
be established if all of the providers are willing to establish an SLA and the intermedi-
ary sends a final confirmation of SLA establishment. Each provider that is requested for
service provisioning may in turn calculate the risk of establishing the SLA as introduced
in Section 4.1 and notifies the intermediary about their willingness to establish an SLA.
Concerning the intermediary’s next action, two cases have to be regarded. First, if each
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of the requested providers accepts the respective SLA offer, the intermediary notifies
the customer and the providers on the acceptance of the SLA and all of the SLAs, with
customers and providers, are established, and the services are executed and monitored.
In the second case, at least one of the requested providers denies establishment of an
SLA with the intermediary. In this case, the intermediary notifies all of the requested
providers about the cancellation of the requests and attempts to establish the next SLA
portfolio in the list. This procedure is repeated until either a feasible SLA portfolio
with supplying providers is found or an average violation threshold, that denotes the
maximum average degree of SLA violation that the intermediary is willing to accept,
is exceeded. In the case that no supplying SLA portfolio is found, the intermediary
declines the customer’s offer. Alternatively, if the intermediary makes the decisions
for SLAs with customers seperately from the decisions with supplying providers the
SLAs with customers are established in a first step, without sending offers to potential
supplying providers.
Note that the establishment of an SLA in this context may be the establishment of an ac-
tually new instance of an SLA but can as well be the establishment of a second instance
of an SLA. The methodology, which is presented afterwards can deal with both cases
as the establishment of a second instance of an already established SLA can be handled
exactly like the instantiation of a new SLA.
The following sections illustrate the building blocks of the intermediary’s decision on
SLAs. For the decision on customer SLAs, the expression of SLA violation risk from
Section 4.1 is applied. In order to capture the risk of SLA violation of procured SLAs,
an adaptation of this expression is employed, which is introduced in Section 5.1.2. The
complete decision problem that considers technical and economic properties of an in-
termediary is discussed and illustrated in Section 5.1.3.
5.1.1 Risk of Violating SLAs with Customers
Service intermediaries monitor their adherence to each customer SLA in the context of
the SLA portfolio γ. This monitoring and the resulting reports are assumed to adhere to
Assumptions 4 and 5 from Section 4.1 that are concerned with an equal length of mon-
itoring periods and the availability of an aggregration method for monitoring observa-
tions. These assumptions ensure the availability of monitoring reports that contain one
degree of SLA violation λαiγ,t for each SLA as defined in Section 4.1.
Considering the intermediary’s decision on SLA portfolios that are established with
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FIGURE 5.2: Intermediary’s Risk-minimizing Portfolio Selection
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customers, the intermediary is confronted with a situation that is similar to that of a
provider as introduced in Section 4.1. The intermediary needs to decide on the SLA
portfolio that is established with customers that minimizes the risk of SLA violation.
Hence, the risk-measure that was presented in Section 4.1.1 is applied as a proxy for the
risk of SLA violation in customer SLAs.
Consequently, the calculation of the semi-variance of penalties of a customer SLA port-
folio γ is conducted in the same four steps:
1. the sum of penalties µγ,t for each period is calculated,
2. the mean degree of SLA violation λ
αi
γ for a particular SLA αi belonging to a speci-
fied SLA portfolio γ is computed,




4. the semi-variance is calculated as the sum of squared deviations of actual penal-
ties from the mean penalties.
Analogously to Section 4.1.1, these values are calculated as
µγ,t = ∑
αi∈γ















γ · µαi ,(5.3)
SE(µγ,t) =∑
t
qt · (max{0; µγ,t − E(µγ,t)})2 ,(5.4)
where X(λAγ,t), qt, E(µγ,t), |Tγ|, and SE(µγ,t) are defined as in Section 4.1.1.
Unlike the provider’s decision from Section 4.1, the intermediary’s decision has to ac-
count for their own risk of SLA violation as well as for the risk of supplying providers
that violate established SLAs. In order to account for this risk of suppliers’ SLA viola-
tion, the intermediary monitors the supplying providers’ performance. The following
section introduces a measure of risk for SLA violation of supplied SLA portfolios.
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TABLE 5.1: Extract of ι’s partner monitoring






5.1.2 Risk of Provider SLA Violations
Having identified the risk-minimal SLA portfolio γ∗ to establish with customers, an
intermediary needs to find the risk-minimal portfolio of SLAs δ supplied by providers.
The application of the semi-variance was identified to be the most feasible expression of
risk in the context of SLA violation in Sections 3.2.2 and 4.1. In order to apply the semi-
variance as a measure of SLA violation risk, observations of providers’ performance in
SLAs from the past are required. Table 5.1 exemplifies the structure of ι’s monitoring.
For each period t, provider p’s degree of SLA violation λβiδ,t in SLA βi is reported. It is
to be read analogously to Table 4.1.
Based on this monitoring, the risk associated with a supplied SLA portfolio δ is calcu-
lated as an adaptation of the semi-variance of expected SLA violation similar to Equa-
tion (4.5). ι’s risk of violating SLAs with a customer can be measured monetarily by
means of penalties that ι is obliged to pay. Contrarily, it is the SLA violation of sup-
plying providers that mainly influences an intermediary’s performance. The penalties
that result from supplying providers that violate SLAs exist in order to compensate the
intermediary and hence, have a positive impact and do not constitute a risk in the con-
text of the semi-variance.1 Therefore, exclusively the degree of SLA violation is taken
into account.
The calculation of the semi-variance of SLA violation with respect to the SLA portfolio
δ is conducted in four steps:
1. the average degree of SLA violation λδ,t for each period is calculated,
2. the mean degree of SLA violation λ
βi
δ for a particular SLA βi that is part of SLA
portfolio δ is computed,
1Nevertheless, the supplying providers’ penalties are taken into account for the calculation of the total
expected profit that constitutes an intermediary’s profit constraint. It is introduced in Section 5.1.3 and
includes costs for service consumption and expected penalties that ι receives from contracting partners.
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3. the average degree of SLA violation of δ is calculated from all λ
βi
δ in the portfolio
and,
4. the risk of δ is calculated as the squared deviations of the actual average degree
of SLA violation from the mean degree of SLA violation, which are worse than
average.
The average degree of SLA violation λδ,t that a service intermediary experienced with
portfolio δ in period t depends on the degree of violation of SLA βi in SLA portfolio δ
in this period and is given by the sum of observed SLA violations of SLAs βi in period








where |δ| defines the number of SLAs in δ and X(λβiδ,t) serves as indicator variable for
SLA βi being active in period t as part of portfolio δ.
The mean degree of SLA violation for a particular SLA βi that is part of SLA portfolio
δ is calculated as the sum of observed SLA violations of SLA βi divided by the number









where |Tδ| is the number of periods in that the particular SLA portfolio δ appears in
the records of the service intermediary analogously to the definition of |Tγ| in Section
5.1.
For the average degree of SLA violation, which the service intermediary experienced
in the past for the portfolio of SLAs δ, one obtains






The average degree of SLA violation of portfolio δ describes the sum of average SLA
violations for each of the SLAs divided by the number of SLAs in the portfolio, thus
stating the total average of the degree of SLA violation for the portfolio. Based on this,
the risk for the portfolio δ can be calculated.
Analogously to the approach that was presented in Section 4.1, the risk of SLA violation
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is calculated as the squared deviations of the actual average violation of the SLAs in
δ from the total mean violation of the portfolio δ, which are worse than average. In
contrast to the approach in Section 4.1, the deviations are not weighted by the penalties
that are associated with the respective degree of violation. This is done in order to
reflect the fact that it is the violation of the SLA with a provider itself that induces the
risk on the intermediary, not the monetary outcome. On the contrary, considering the
penalties that the provider was to pay in case of an SLA violation would distort the
decision, as higher violations would lead to higher penalties, which in this case means
higher profit.
In contrast to Michalk and Blau (2010), where a piece-wise defined exponential function
is employed as a measure of risk, this approach uses squaring in order to weight devia-
tions from the mean degree of violation. Both approaches are suited for the expression
of risk of SLA violation in the intermediary’s decision. The exponential function facil-
itates the differentiation of different shapes for the decision maker’s attitude towards
risk, but requires to identify the risk attitude beforehand. For reasons of comparability
to the decision in the provider’s case and for avoiding the assumption of a particular
degree of risk aversion, in this work, the approach of squaring the deviations is chosen.












states the relative frequency of occurence of the portfolio δ in the monitoring observa-
tions.
The formulation in Equation (5.8) allows the expression of the idea of semi-variance
by taking only those deviations into account that are worse than average (Markowitz
1959) and accentuating larger deviations.
Having introduced a measure of risk for SLA portfolios that are established with cus-
tomers as well as a risk measure for supplied SLA portfolios, the following section
introduces the decision problem that takes total expected profit and resource contraints
of an intermediary into account, as illustrated in Figure 5.2 and considers the challenges
on decision making that were raised in Section 3.3.
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5.1.3 Intermediary’s Risk-Minimizing Decision about SLA Establishment
The previous sections introduced a risk measure for customer SLA portfolios and one
for supplied SLA portfolios. This section presents the decision problem that allows
an intermediary to first select the risk-minimal portfolio γ∗ of customer SLAs and af-
terwards to identify the risk-minimal SLA portfolio offered by providers that support
γ∗. This section illustrates the sequence of steps and calculations that are taken in an
intermediary’s decision on SLA establishment according to Figure 5.2. Furthermore a
formulation of the decision problem is provided, which is illustrated by means of a
numerical example.
In the first step of an intermediary’s decision problem for SLA establishment, an inter-
mediary evaluates if the available resources suffice for the provisioning of the requested
service. This is achieved by evaluating the intermediary’s resource constraint. There-
fore, an intermediary takes information from SLAs αi ∈ γ, especially KPIs, into account.
This information is translated to the resources that are available to the intermediary and
may include those already provided by procured SLAs. On the one hand, there are KPIs
like available bandwidth that translate directly to the intermediary’s available resources
Lι. Even that this mapping is especially difficult in Cloud-based environments, where
virtualized resources are present that make a mapping to physical resources difficult,
an approach to this mapping has been introduced in Kwok and Mohindra (2008). Ac-
cording to these KPIs, the resource constraints of all customer SLA portfolios γ are






γ,t) ≤ Lι .
KPIs that can be extended, like storage space, are not taken into account here but are
rather considered non-functional requirements for supplied services that need to be
procured from providers.
With the help of the intermediary’s resource constraints, the feasible SLA portfolios γ,
which are offered to consumers, are identified. For each of the feasible portfolios γ, the
risk is calculated according to Section 5.1.1 and the portfolio γ∗ that incurs the lowest
risk is chosen.
In the case that an intermediary’s resources or functional capabilities do not suffice
for providing γ∗ to the customer the intermediary needs to detect SLAs supplied by
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providers that are able to meet functional and quality requirements for the provision of
SLA portfolio γ∗. Therefore, a mapping from SLAs that are offered to required SLAs
with providers is needed. This mapping indicates the minimum level of quality of a
service from a provider, which needs to be procured in order to achieve a particular
level of quality in a service offered to a customer. For feasibility reasons, the existence
of a system that allows the intermediary to detect providers that are able to supply the
required services is assumed. Similar approaches can be found in the project Value-
Grids2 and in Westermann et al. (2010). Furthermore, the system is assumed to support
the mapping of provided services and quality levels to needed supplementary services
and respective quality levels. The system is required to support service description and
to enforce service composition, e.g. by means of common interfaces. Finally, the system
enables the dynamic composition of services by checking the service providers’ cur-
rent availability status for further service executions. This system ensures the detection
of technically and functionally required services. The design of a system that allows
for the detection of functionally and quality-wise feasible SLAs δ is out of the scope
of this work. Designing such a system would involve the description of services in a
functional and quality-based way. Furthermore, a database for synonyms or a semantic
annotation that enables querying of the knowledge-base is required as well as the pos-
sibility of mapping KPIs of offered SLAs to required SLAs with supplying providers.
For research in this context, the reader is referred to Agarwal et al. (2008), Bodenstaff
et al. (2008), Knapper et al. (2010) and Junghans and Agarwal (2010).
The service intermediary ι’s choice of supplied SLAs, on the one hand, is based on
functional requirements. On the other hand, the intermediary wants to achieve a par-
ticular expected profit from service provisioning taking into account the expected costs
of procuring services. In order to compute the total expected profit that results from a
portfolio of customer SLAs γ∗ and a portfolio of supplied SLAs δ, ι considers the ex-
pected profit resulting from the SLA portfolio γ∗ as well as the costs that ι has to expect
from establishing the SLA portfolio δ. If the difference between these terms exceeds ι’s
profit threshold Πι, the configuration (γ∗,δ) is included in the set of feasible solutions.
Assuming that ι is able to determine their preferences with respect to expected profit
by means of a threshold for expected profit Πι.
From the SLA portfolio γ∗ that was determined in the first step as depicted in Figure
5.2, ι calculates the expected profit as the sum of prices agreed in each αi ∈ γ∗ reduced
by the sum of ι’s incurred costs for service execution c(sj) and the expected penalties
2http://www.valuegrids.de last accessed: October 9, 2011
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(see Equation 4.9):
(5.10) E(πγ∗,t) = ∑
αi∈A
( fαi(sj)− c(sj)) · X(λ
αi
γ∗,t)− E(µγ∗,t).
After ι has detected the functionally feasible services and has chosen the respective
SLA portfolios δ that fulfill the quality requirements for the risk-minimal customer SLA
portfolio γ∗, ι is able to calculate the expected costs χ resulting from each SLA portfolio
δ. Expected costs of service procurement are computed as the sum of prices agreed in
each β ∈ δ reduced by the expected due penalties that providers p have to pay ι:
(5.11) E(χδ) = ∑
βi∈δ
( fβi(sj))− E(µδ,t),
where E(µδ,t) is calculated based on ι’s monitoring of their contracting partners’ per-
formance as the expected penalties per SLA β in a certain SLA portfolio δ. E(µδ,t) is
calculated analogously to Equation 4.4 as the product of average degree of SLA viola-
tion and agreed penalties




δ · µβi · X(λ
βi
δ,t),
where the average degree of violation of βi ∈ δ, λ
βi
δ , is computed as the sum of p’s degree
of violation of SLA βi ∈ δ, over all monitored periods t and divided by the number of









Finally, ι calculates for each possible combination of γ∗ and each δ the difference
E(πγ∗,t)− E(χδ,t) = E(π{γ∗,δ},t) and evaluates the expected profit constraint
(5.14) E(π{γ∗,δ},t) = E(πγ∗,t)− E(χδ,t) ≥Πι.
If Equation 5.14 holds, the combination ω = {γ,δ} is included in the set of acceptable
solutions Ω = {Γ,∆}.
Furthermore, ι specifies the threshold Rι of average SLA violation that the portfolios
δ under consideration may not exceed. Therefore, the average degree of violation is
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If E(λδ,t)≤ Rι, the combination ω = {γ,δ} stays in the set of acceptable solutions. Oth-
erwise, it will be removed.
Having identified the set of feasible solutions Ω, the intermediary calculates the risk
associated with each supplied SLA portfolio δ and selects the risk-minimal one δ∗. The
decision problem is then formulated in a two-step approach as follows:
I minγ SE(µγ,t) = ∑t












max{0; λδ,t − E(λδ,t)}
)2
subject to E(π{γ∗,δ},t) ≥Πι
E(λδ,t) ≤ Rι
The method that allows an intermediary to select the risk-minimal portfolio of customer
and provider SLAs is illustrated with the help of a numerical example that is based on
the scenario from the beginning of this chapter.
Example 5.1 (Intermediary’s Risk-minimizing SLA Establishment Decision). Consider
the scenario, where the intermediary Cisco Systems needs to decide on the SLAs to establish
with customers and SLAs to establish with supplying providers. Assume that the intermediary’s
monitoring of their adherance to SLAs established with customers exposes the data illustrated
in Table 4.1 and that Cisco Systems offers the following SLAs to customers:
α1 ∈ A :(ιCisco, s1, θ1, Bw = 5, fα1(s1) = 4, µα1 = 2),
α2 ∈ A :(ιCisco, s2, θ2, Bw = 10, fα2(s2) = 11, µα2 = 2),
α3 ∈ A :(ιCisco, s1, θ3, Bw = 6, fα3(s1) = 4, µα3 = 3),
The selection of the risk-minimal SLA portfolio that is offered to customers is carried out as
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argued in Section 5.1.1 according to Equation (4.5). The selection of a customer SLA portfolio
corresponds to the risk-based SLA portfolio in Example 4.1 and results in the decision for γ′ =
{α1,α2} that exposes an expected profit of E(π{α1,α2},t) = 8.14.
In order to decide on the supplied SLA portfolio, Cisco Systems monitors the supplying
providers’ adherence to established SLAs and stores the resulting monitoring reports (Table
5.1). Having identified the SLA portfolios that fulfill the functional and quality requirements,
the intermediary evaluates for each portfolio the expected profit constraint from Equation (5.14),
by subtracting the expected costs for each supplied SLA portfolio from the expected profit of the
customer SLA portfolio γ′ = {α1,α2}. In this example, the intermediary’s expected profit con-
straint is set to Πι = 5. The intermediary’s threshold value for the average degree of violation is
0.5. The providers offer the following SLAs to ι:
β1 ∈ B :(p1, s1, ιCisco, fβ1(s1) = 2, µβ1 = 2),
β2 ∈ B :(p2, s2, ιCisco, fβ2(s2) = 2, µβ2 = 2),
β3 ∈ B :(p3, s1, ιCisco, fβ3(s1) = 1, µβ3 = 1).
For calculating the expected costs of the SLA portfolios that expose monitoring data in Table 5.1,
the average degree of violation of each SLA in a portfolio is computed. Consider SLA portfolio
δ′ = {β1, β2}, first.
λ
β1 =





0.3 + 0.1 + 0.3
3
≈ 0.23(5.16)




≈ (2 + 2)− (0.46 · 2 + 0.23 · 2)
= 2.6
The expected costs for δ′′ = {β1, β3} are calculated analogously and amount to E(χ{β1,β3}) =
1.4. As E(π{α1,α2},t) = 8.14, both supplied SLA portfolios fulfill the intermediary’s profit con-
straint:
E(π{α1,α2},t)− E(χ{β1,β2}) ≈ 8.14− 2.6 = 5.54≥ 5
E(π{α1,α2},t)− E(χ{β1,β3}) ≈ 8.14− 1.4 = 6.74≥ 5
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In order to decide which SLA portfolio to establish, the intermediary calculates the risk associated
with each of the portfolios. Consider SLA portfolio δ′ = {β1, β2} for the time being. According













Following the process described in Section 5.1.1, as next steps the mean degree of SLA violation
for each SLA βi and the average degree of violation of the SLA portfolio δ are calculated. Based





Hence, δ′ meets the constraint for the average degree of failure and stays in the set of feasible
SLA portfolios.




· (max{0; 0.4− 0.35})2 + 1
3


















Consequently, δ′′ = {β1, β3} stays in the set of feasible SLA portfolios.
The risk associated with δ′′ = {β1, β3} is calculated analogously an amounts to SE(λ{β1,β3},t) =
0.01125. Consequently, the supplied SLA portfolio δ′ = (β1, β2) is requested first, as it has the
lower risk.
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5.1.4 Summary
In this section, a method that supports an intermediary’s decision about SLA estab-
lishment in order to facilitate the offering of composite services in dynamic, heteroge-
nous environments was introduced. The intermediary’s decision is separated into three
steps:
1. Choose a customer SLA portfolio γ∗
2. Search for acceptable supplied SLA portfolios δ
3. Select a supplied SLA portfolio δ∗
For pursuing these steps, this section included the factors that constrain an interme-
diary’s decision about the establishment of SLAs (see Sub Question 3.2) by means of
resource and expected profit constraints. This way, an intermediary’s properties are
taken into account in the decision on SLA establishment. The risk of violating cus-
tomer SLAs is measured by means of the semi-variance of expected penalties. This
concept is adapted for calculating the risk of supplying providers that violate SLAs
that are established with the intermediary (Sub Question 3.1). By minimizing the risk
of SLA violation as measured by the semi-variance in the objective functions of the two-
part decision problem, the challenges on decision making about SLA establishment that
were raised in Section 3.3 are met. A decision on SLAs with a multitude of customers
and providers is facilitated and the risk of SLA violation is expressed and taken into
account. Furthermore, by applying an adaptation of portfolio selection the impact of
the availability of the Internet and hence, a potentially high number of SLA portfolios
is considered.
A critical point in the presented model is the construction of total profit from providing
an SLA portfolio γ∗ while procuring services in the SLA portfolio δ. The specification of
total expected profit and with it, expected costs of procuring services reflects the mon-
etary outcome of service consumption, that is, profit from offering services decreased
by costs from procuring services. The total profit relies on the formulation of costs χδ,t
which arise with the procurement of services. The costs χδ,t decrease with an increas-
ing degree of violation by providers, as the prices for supplied services are reduced by
expected penalties, whereas penalties are designed to reimburse the intermediary for
an experienced SLA violation. From a monetary perspective, this gives the impression
that a higher degree of violation can be preffered by the intermediary due to lower ex-
pected costs, for which reason the threshold for the average degree of violation was
introduced. Furthermore, the impact of the violation of a supplied SLA to the adher-
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ence to offered SLAs is not taken into consideration in this work. In order to correctly
represent these dependencies between violations of supplied SLAs and violations of
offered SLAs, the calculation of risk would have to be done for each combination of
offered and supplied SLA portfolios seperately, which could result in a huge amount of
possible combinations and calculations. Additionally, this would require the interme-
diary to consider offered and supplied SLAs in the same point in time, which they may
not wish to do.
The proposed risk-measure enables an intermediary to select the exact SLA combina-
tion γ∗,δ∗ that imposes the lowest risk on them while considering resource, profit and
violation constraints. Similar to the approach presented in Section 4.1, the model of an
intermediary’s risk-based SLA portfolio selection might exclude SLA portfolios based
on the expected profit constraint, which might have been preferred by the intermediary
because of a very low risk associated with the SLA portfolio. A trade-off between risk
and expected profit that reflects the intermediary’s preferences can help to overcome
this inefficiency and needs to be employed as the objective function of the optimiza-
tion. The following section introduces a further extension that applies a utility func-
tion to capture the provider’s preferences towards expected profit in combination with
risk.
5.2 Intermediary’s Maximization of Expected Utility
The previous section introduced a method that solves an intermediary’s decision prob-
lem by selecting the risk-minimizing portfolio of SLAs γ∗ to offer to customers and the
portfolio δ∗ to purchase from providers, which incurs the lowest risk as measured by
the semi-variance. An intermediary monitors providers’ violation of established SLAs
and consequently perceives risk of violation of supplied SLAs. An intermediary is also
aware of the risk of violating customer SLAs and the resulting uncertainty of profit
from service provisioning. In order express an intermediary’s utility as required in Sub
Question 3.4, both types of risk and the related expected profit (from a combination of
customer and supplied SLAs) have to be taken into account. However, the decisions for
customer SLAs and SLAs with supplying providers are not necessarily made concur-
rently. The decision for SLAs with supplying providers can be ommited if the required
functionality is already covered by another SLA and resources are available. This could
be the case if storage space is a required service and the intermediary already has a rel-
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evant SLA (e. g. an Amazon S3 instance3) where enough space is available. In contrast,
if the intermediary requires more storage space, a new SLA for storage is required.
In order to reflect the possibility of seperate decisions, an intermediary’s decision prob-
lem is split into the following steps analogously to Section 5.1:
1. Choose an SLA portfolio for provided complex services.
2. Select an SLA portfolio for supplied services.
Thus, the decision on the establishment of provided and required SLA portfolios is
split in two steps. First, the risk-minimizing portfolio that is offered to customers is
chosen. Afterwards, the risk-minimizing portfolio with supplying providers is selected
taking into account the offered SLA portfolio γ∗. This method facilitates the selection
of a risk-minimal portfolio of supplied SLAs for a given, risk-minimal, portfolio of cus-
tomer SLAs. However, it minimizes risk and takes expected profit from a combination
of customer and supplied SLA portfolios into account as a constraint. Yet, an intermedi-
ary cannot express their preferences by means of a trade-off between risk and expected
profit explicitly. As was argued in Section 3.2.3, solving a multi-objective decision prob-
lem especially in the context of expected profit and related uncertainty that implies risk
can be facilitated by the application of a utility function that reflects an intermediary’s
preferences. The expression of an intermediary’s utility is in the focus of Sub Question
3.4:
RESEARCH QUESTION 3.4 ≺INTERMEDIARY’S UTILITY FUNCTION. How can an in-
termediary’s utility from providing and procuring services and the corresponding risk of SLA
violations be formulated?
An intermediary’s utility directly reflects their attitude towards risk by means of a
trade-off between marginal incurred risk and the required additional profit for bear-
ing any additional risk. The expression of utility that will be presented in Section 5.2
is an adaptation of a provider’s utility as presented in Section 4.2, which considered
exclusively the provision of services. However, it is as well an extension of the method
that allows an intermediary to select the risk-minimizing SLAs with customers as well
as providers by explicitly including an intermediary’s attitude towards risk.
An intermediary maximizes their expected utility from providing services to customers
and from purchasing services from supplying providers. The utility function is de-
3http://www.amazon.com/aws last accessed: October 9, 2011
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signed to state an intermediary’s preferences with respect to a trade-off between ex-
pected profit and risk. Consequently, there is no need for the expected profit constraint
from Equation (5.14). The formulation of an intermediary’s decision problem is covered
by Sub Question 3.5:
RESEARCH QUESTION 3.5 ≺INTERMEDIARY’S UTILITY MAXIMIZING DECISION.
How is the intermediary’s decision problem formulated in order to maximize the expected utility
from SLA establishment and to account for the challenges from Section 3.3?
Figure 5.3 illustrates an intermediary’s decision that maximizes the expected utility
from providing and procuring services. Having received a request for service pro-
vision from a customer, an intermediary first evaluates the resource constraints and
afterwards selects the SLA portfolio that maximizes the expected utility of providing
SLAs. After selecting the supplied SLA portfolios that meet functional and quality re-
quirements, the intermediary calculates the expected utility for each of the supplied
SLA portfolios. Finally, the portfolio that maximizes the utility of supplied SLAs is
chosen.
The following Sections present approaches to the Sub Questions that were raised in
order to address Research Question 3. The selection of the customer SLA portfolio is
presented in Section 5.2.1 and is carried out analogously to the utility-maximizing se-
lection of SLA portfolios from Section 4.2. Section 5.2.2 introduces the selection of sup-
plied SLA portfolios based on an indermediary’s utility from providing and procuring
services, which extends the expression of utility from Section 4.2. Based on the models
from Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, the intermediary’s utility-maximizing decision problem
is illustrated and discussed in Section 5.2.3.
5.2.1 Intermediary’s Utility from Providing Services
Consider the service intermediary that was introduced in the Scenario. In order to
decide on which SLA portfolio to establish with customers, the intermediary monitors
their own adherence to previously established SLAs α in a portfolio of SLAs γ. An
intermediary’s monitoring is assumed to exhibit information on the degree of violation
λαit of SLA αi for each monitored period. This information is retrieved from service
monitoring that meets Assumptions 4 and 5 from Section 4.1.
The decision on the establishment of SLAs with customers is treated analogously to a
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FIGURE 5.3: Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Portfolio Selection
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provider’s decision from Section 4.2. The intermediary’s selection of the customer SLA
portfolio γ is therefore based on the utility from providing services that is approximated
by a trade-off between risk and expected profit individually weighted by the coefficient
of absolute risk aversion.
As was shown in Section 4.2, maximizing the expected utility of profit E(u(πγ,t)) is
equivalent to maximizing the certainty equivalent

















qt · ((πγ,t − E(πγ,t)))2,
with R(E(πγ,t)) denoting the coefficient of relative risk aversion and µγ,t stating the
actual penalties as before.
The SLA portfolio γ∗ that maximizes the certainty equivalent is chosen. Subsequently,
as illustrated in Figure 5.3, an intermediary selects those supplied SLA portfolios that
meet functional and quality requirements. The calculation of an intermediary’s utility
of a supplied SLA portfolio δ is introduced in the following Section.
5.2.2 Intermediary’s Utility from Procuring Services
After the selection of the utility-maximizing SLA portfolio with customers γ∗, and in
the case that an intermediary’s resources or functional capabilities are insufficient, an
intermediary attempts to select the portfolio of supplied SLAs that maximizes the ex-
pected utility. An intermediary’s performance in providing services to customers is
not only influenced by their own failures but also by SLA violations from supplying
providers. This makes the choice of a portfolio of supplied SLAs crucial. Expressing an
intermediary’s utility requires considering the risk that supplied SLAs are violated and
the expected profit from procuring the SLA portfolio δ. Analogously to the approach
in Section 5.1, the method aims to select the utility-maximizing supplied SLA portfolio
for a given offered SLA portfolio.
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In order to evaluate supplied SLA portfolios, an intermediary monitors how supplying
providers perform in active SLAs in each reporting period. Monitoring reports contain
information about active SLAs and the respective degree of SLA violation in each pe-
riod. Table 5.1 showed an extract of an intermediary’s supplied SLA monitoring. Using
this monitoring data, an intermediary calculates the profit for each period as the differ-
ence between expected profit from the utility-maximizing offered SLA portfolio γ∗ and
the costs for the supplied SLA portfolio δ in the respective period
(5.19) π{γ∗,δ},t = E(πγ∗,t)− χδ,t ,
where E(πγ∗,t) denotes the expected profit from offering the utility maximizing SLA
portfolio γ∗ as before and χδ,t states costs that result from procuring SLA portfolio δ in
period t.
As a rational decision maker, the intermediary maximizes the expected utility from
profit (Von Neumann et al. 1947), where the utility function u(π{γ∗,δ},t) is assumed to
be a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, where u′(π{γ∗,δ},t) > 0, u′′(π{γ∗,δ},t) < 0. The
expected utility that is to be maximized is calculated as
(5.20) E(u(π{γ∗,δ},t)) = ∑
t
qt · u(π{γ∗,δ},t),
where qt is the probability for u(π{γ∗,δ},t) as before. In order to identify the SLA port-
folio δ∗ that maximizes the intermediary’s utility with respect to the offered SLA port-
folio γ∗, a specific utility function has to be identified. As argued in Section 4.2, there
are suitable utility functions that model risk aversion of decision maker. To apply these
functions, decision maker’s are required to be completely aware of their preferences,
which is most often not the case. Furthermore, the presented utility functions do only
include the risk of SLA violation implicitly. In order to include an explicit specification
of risk, an alternative formulation of expected utility is derived that contains the first
two moments of profit and hence, the variance of profit.
Analogously to the approach that was presented in Section 4.2, profit is represented as a
lottery w + z, where w is some certain income and z is a stochastic variable with mean 0
and Variance Var(z) without any specific probability distribution. The expected utility
of the lottery is E(u(w + z)). According to Eeckhoudt et al. (2005), applying a Taylor
approximation on expected utility results in
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E(w)− 12 · ARA(w) ·Var(z) denotes the certainty equivalent, as its utility corresponds
to the lottery’s expected utility E(u(w + z)). ARA(w) = R(w)w =−
u′′(w)
u′(w) is the coefficient
of absolute risk aversion measured at w (see Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971)).
Define
(5.22) w = E(π{γ∗,δ},t) ,
and
(5.23) z = π{γ∗,δ},t − E(π{γ∗,δ},t) ,
where
(5.24) E(π{γ∗,δ},t) = ∑
t
qt · π{γ∗,δ},t .
Then, z exhibits an expected value
(5.25) E(z) = E(π{γ∗,δ},t − E(π{γ∗,δ},t)) = 0
and a variance
Var(z) = Var(π{γ∗,δ},t − E(π{γ∗,δ},t))(5.26)
= E((π{γ∗,δ},t − E(π{γ∗,δ},t))2 − (E(π{γ∗,δ},t − E(π{γ∗,δ},t)))2)
= Var(π{γ∗,δ},t).
Consequently, w + z constitutes the lottery of expected profit that meets the above re-
quired characteristics.
Consider again Equation (5.21) and substitute w and z as defined above into the
certainty equivalent. Then, the following statement is achieved E(u(π{γ∗,δ},t)) ≈
u(E(π{γ∗,δ},t)− 12 · ARA(E(π{γ∗,δ},t)) ·Var(π{γ∗,δ},t)), where the variance of profit with




qt · ((π{γ∗,δ},t − E(π{γ∗,δ},t)))2 .
This specification of the certainty equivalent allows for expected profit as well as the
risk that is expressed by the variance of profit Var(π{γ∗,δ},t). The intermediary’s pref-
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erences towards risk and expected profit are weighted individually by the coefficient
of absolute risk aversion ARA(E(π{γ∗,δ},t)), which still needs to be identified for the
practical implementation.
Maximizing the expected utility of the intermediary E(u(π{γ∗,δ},t)) is equivalent to
maximizing the certainty equivalent




Consequently, the certainty equivalent is employed in the objective function in the
utility-maximizing decision problem that is presented in the following section. This
specification of the certainty equivalent extends the formulation from Section 4.2 by
considering the risk that procured SLAs are violated.
5.2.3 Intermediary’s Utility-Maximizing Decision on SLA Establishment
In the previous sections, the means to express the expected utility from the establish-
ment of SLAs for provided as well as procured services have been introduced. In this
section, the decision model that employs the expressions of expected utility from Sec-
tions 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 for the choice of SLA portfolios is introduced. Therefore, the steps
that are taken in the decision process are described according to the sequence illus-
trated in Figure 5.3. Additionally, a formulation of the decision problem is given and
an illustrating example concludes.
As a first step for the decision on SLA establishment, an intermediary evaluates their re-
source constraints. Therefore, an intermediary takes information from SLAs, especially
KPIs into account. This information is set into context with resources that are available
to an intermediary (Lι) and constrain the decision on SLA establishment. According
to these KPIs, the resource constraints of all customer SLA portfolios γ are evaluated





γ,t) ≤ Lι .
KPIs that translate to the intermediary’s resources in conjunction with the supplying
providers’ resources are considered requirements for the selection of procured ser-
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vices.
Having identified the feasible customer SLA portfolios, the intermediary calculates the
certainty equivalent for each of the SLA portfolios as introduced in Section 5.2.1. The
SLA portfolio γ∗ that maximizes the intermediary’s expected utility is chosen.
As a next step, an intermediary selects those SLA portfolios δ that meet functional re-
quirements and support the provision of the customer SLA portfolio γ∗ as described at
the beginning of this Section.
Having identified the feasible SLA portfolios that are offered by supplying providers,
an intermediary calculates the expected degree of SLA violation for each of the portfo-
lios and evaluates the resulting value against the threshold Rι for the average degree of
SLA violation. This threshold is the maximum average degree of violation of an SLA
portfolio that an intermediary is willing to accept. For those SLA portfolios that meet
the average violation constraint, the intermediary calculates the certainty equivalent
according to Equation (5.28). The portfolio that maximizes the expression in Equation
(5.28) is chosen as the best-suited SLA portfolio δ∗ for the given offered SLA portfolio
γ∗.

















subject to E(λδ,t) ≤ Rι
The application of the method for solving an intermediary’s decision problem that in-
cludes an intermediary’s attitude towards risk explicitly is illustrated in the following
example.
Example 5.2 (Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision). For illustration purposes, the
situation given in Example 5.1 is solved applying the utility-maximizing method that was pre-
sented throughout this chapter by first selecting the utility-maximizing customer SLA portfolio
γ∗ and afterwards choosing the utility-maximizing SLA portfolio δ∗ with supplying providers
that meets the functional, resources’ and average degree of violation constraints.
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Consider again the intermediary Cisco Systems with the same monitoring data (Table 4.1) and
the same SLAs to offer customers:
α1 ∈ A :(ιCisco, s1, θ1, Bw = 5, fα1(s1) = 4, µα1 = 2),
α2 ∈ A :(ιCisco, s2, θ2, Bw = 10, fα2(s2) = 11, µα2 = 2),
α3 ∈ A :(ιCisco, s1, θ3, Bw = 6, fα3(s1) = 4, µα3 = 3),
Analogously to Example 4.3, the utility-maximizing SLA portfolio γ∗ that is chosen by the
intermediary is γ∗ = {α1,α2} with a certainty equivalent of CEγ∗ = 7.4953 and an expected
profit of E(π{α1,α2},t) = 8.14.
For selecting the utility-maximizing supplied SLA portfolio that supports γ∗, the monitoring
reports about supplying providers’ performance as well as information from SLAs is taken into
account. Analogously to Example 5.1, the intermediary’s partner monitoring is given in Table
5.1 and the SLAs offered by supplying providers are the following:
β1 ∈ B :(p1, s1, ιCisco, fβ1(s1) = 2, µβ1 = 2),
β2 ∈ B :(p2, s2, ιCisco, fβ2(s2) = 2, µβ2 = 2),
β3 ∈ B :(p3, s1, ιCisco, fβ3(s1) = 1, µβ3 = 1).
The intermediary’s threshold value for the average degree of violation of a portfolio is again set to
0.5. This value states that the intermediary only accepts an SLA portfolio, which is violated by
at most 50% on average. The exact value for the threshold of the average degree of violation is up
to the intermediary and depends on the kind and relevance of the services that the intermediary
procures.
Assume that the intermediary conducted a mapping of properties of offered SLAs to properties
that supplied services need to provide. Furthermore, assume that the intermediary has access to
a service repository that allows for functional as well as non-functional properties and that the
SLAs resulting from a query to the repository are β1, β2,andβ3.
Having identified the feasible SLAs and consequently the portfolios, the intermediary checks for
the average degree of violation for each of the portfolios. According to the monitoring data in
Table 5.1, the average degree of violation for each SLA in portfolio δ = {β1, β2}, amounts to
λ
β1 =
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Hence, both portfolios meet the average degree of violation constraint and for both, the certainty
equivalent needs to be calculated in order to identify the best-suited one. Consider δ′ = {β1, β2}
first.
The monitoring data in Table 5.1 exhibits observations for three active periods for the portfolio,
hence qt = 13 in Equation (5.24).
The penalties that the intermediary received in each of the periods result in
µδ′,1 = 0.5 · 2 + 0.3 · 2 = 1.6,(5.32)
µδ′,3 = 0.4 · 2 + 0.1 · 2 = 1.0,(5.33)
µδ′,4 = 0.5 · 2 + 0.3 · 2 = 1.6.(5.34)
Expected profit from SLA combination {γ∗,δ′} is thus substituted into (5.11)
E(π{γ∗,δ′},t) = E(π{α1,α2},t)− ∑
β1,β2
( fβi(sj)) + E(µδ′,t)(5.35)
= 8.14− (2 + 2) + 1.4 = 5.54.
The variance of profit for {γ∗,δ′} results according to Equation 5.27 is























Analogously to Section 4.2, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is calculated based on the
coefficient of relative risk aversion that is set to 3 (see Szpiro 1988, p. 106) as follows ARA(w) =
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R(w)















· 0.5415 · 0.08 = 5.51834
Analogously, the expected profit for δ′′ = {β1, β3} is
(5.38) E(π{γ∗,δ′′},t) = 6.54,
variance of profit results in



















= 36.54 = 0.4587.







· 0.4587 · 0.2 = 6.49413
As
CE{γ∗,δ′′} > CE{γ∗,δ′},
δ′′ = {β1, β3} is chosen as the SLA portfolio supplied by providers.
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5.2.4 Summary
In this section, an intermediary’s decision problem on SLA establishment is formulated
that maximizes an intermediary’s expected utility from providing services to customers
in a first step. In a second step, an intermediary is able to identify the SLAs that are of-
fered by supplying providers that meet functional and non-functional requirements for
supporting the selected customer SLA portfolio. The presented approach allows an in-
termediary to select the supplied SLA portfolio that maximizes their utility (Research
Question 3.5). The utility of offering SLAs to customers expresses a trade-off between
expected profit from providing services and risk of intermediary’s SLA violation that is
individually weighted by the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The utility of procur-
ing services from supplying providers is specified analogously by a trade-off between
expected profit from procuring services and the risk of supplying providers’ SLA viola-
tion that is individually weighted by the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (Research
Question 3.4).
The method that was presented meets the challenges on decision making about SLA
establishment that were raised in Section 3.3. The approach includes the risk of SLA
violation in the decision, which is expressed by means of the variance of profit. The
impact of the availability of the Internet on service provisioning that results in a poten-
tially high number of requests for service provisioning and with it SLAs, is taken into
consideration by allowing for portfolios of SLAs in the decision on SLA establishment.
The composition of services is covered this way as well. The approach also allows a
multitude of customers to be considered in the decision model. Besides accounting for
the challenges from Section 3.3, an intermediary’s properties with respect to available
resources and expected profit are considered in the decision problem. This way, the pre-
sented method for solving an intermediary’s decision problem represents a solution to
Research Question 3, which considers an intermediary’s attitude towards risk explicitly
in contrast to the method from Section 5.1.
However, the representations of expected utility that are employed in this section’s ap-
proach are, just like the representation of expected utility from Section 4.2, an approxi-
mation.4 Like any approximation, it is imprecise. The approach, however, remains the
one most often employed in finance.
Furthermore, as was already argued in Section 4.2, the approximation of expected util-
4Except when the utility function is of the form u(πγ,t) = − e
−a·πγ,t
a , with constant ARA(πγ,t) = a, and
profit is normally distributed (see Eeckhoudt et al. 2005, pp. 20–21).
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ity that was employed throughout this section is only defined for positive values of
profit. As the total profit that results from service provisioning, especially when ser-
vices need to be procured in order to meet functional and quality expectations of the
provided service, profit may take negative values. In these cases, the certainty equiv-
alent cannot be applied for the decision about SLA establishment. Therefore, different
representations of expected utility need to be investigated, which is a crucial topic for
future research.
Another critical point is the formulation of expected profit in Equation (5.24). Expected
profit in this case increases with an increasing degree of SLA violation by supplying
providers. This gives the counterintuitive impression that a higher degree of SLA vi-
olation is valued higher by the intermediary, as the penalties to be paid increase with
the degree of SLA violation. Penalties are designed to reimburse the customer, that is
in this case, the intermediary, for insufficient performance. Hence, the specification of
profit reflects the monetary outcomes of service consumption correctly. Nevertheless,
the impact of SLA violation by a supplying provider on the intermediary’s performance
is not reflected in the expected profit. A higher degree of SLA violation from supplying
providers might lead to a higher probability and a higher degree of SLA violation by the
intermediary. In order to take these dependencies into account, an approach that dis-
tinguishes the monitoring data of the intermediary’s SLA violation in customer SLAs
by the respective active supplied SLAs would be required. Although this approach
would result in an exact reflection of dependencies between supplied and customer
SLAs, it would require an enormously higher amount of monitoring data as profit and







Risk-minimizing Decisions in SaaS
Provisioning
This chapter describes the application of the methods that address a service provider’s
decision problem from Chapter 4 and the methods that address an intermediary’s deci-
sion problem from Chapter 5 in the context of software as a service (SaaS) provisioning
in the research project ValueGrids. ValueGrids is part of the third term of the Ger-
man Grid initiative and is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and
Research.
In this chapter, idea and goal of the project ValueGrids are sketched in Section 6.1. The
section highlights the setting of SaaS provisioning and the decisions on SLA establish-
ment that are made. Furthermore, requirements on tools that support decision mak-
ing are derived. In Section 6.2, the particular use case of the risk-minimizing decision
method is described and the single steps that are taken for risk-minimizing decisions
are illustrated. Finally, the technical implementation is briefly explained in Section 6.3
in order to stress the feasibility of the application of the methods that were presented
throughout this work.
6.1 ValueGrids
The aim of the ValueGrids project is to support a holistic management of value chains,
which are created by the dynamic composition of service modules from heterogenous
providers of Web services, Cloud services or SaaS. These value chains emerge upon
the request for a specific service by a customer. One example for such a value chain
is depicted in Figure 6.1, where a customer requests an enterprise resource planning
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FIGURE 6.1: ValueGrids Case Study Scenarios
(ERP) service, that comprises e-learning functionality which supports the user if ques-
tions about the usage of the ERP system arise. In this scenario, the composition of a
composite ERP service and an e-learning service are provided by an SaaS integrator to
customers. The ERP service itself is contributed by an ERP provider. Additionally, an
optimization service for optimization tasks in the ERP system is included in the com-
posite ERP service. This optimzation service relies on infrastructure services, which
are procured by the optimization partner in order to fulfill the optimization tasks. This
process, however, is transparent to the end customer. The optimization partner and the
ERP integrator are intermediaries according to Definition 2.8. Partners from industry
that participate in the project ValueGrids are SAP,1 IBM, 2 and Conemis,3 which show-
cases the relevance of the project and the decision methods to industry and supports
the applicability of the approach for practical use.
1http://www.sap.com last accessed: October 9, 2011
2http://www.ibm.com last accessed: October 9, 2011
3http://www.conemis.com/ last accessed: October 9, 2011
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Each of the compositions is governed by an SLA. SLAs are indicated by arrows in Fig-
ure 6.1 and regulate the functionality and quality aspects of the provided service. Ad-
ditionally, a price for service provisioning and a penalty, which is applied in case of an
SLA violation, are stipulated (Section 2.2).
Managing value chains does not only comprise of the functional composition of ser-
vices in order to provide a particular functionality, but also of the management of qual-
ity aspects and with it service level management. For providers of services, the estab-
lishment of an SLA defines the possible monetary outcomes of service provisioning by
specifying a price for service provisioning and a penalty that is applied in case of SLA
violation. Consequently, service providers of both types (i. e. providers and intermedi-
aries) are confronted with the decision of which SLAs should be established or active
in the next period.
In the context of the ValueGrids project and in analogy to Research Questions 1 - 3, the
following questions were identified to constitute the focus of a provider’s decision:
1. Which services can be provided and in which quality categories? Which services
have to be procured from other providers in order to provide the required func-
tionality?
2. How do provided services perform in a regular setting?
3. Which service level is required from procured services in order achieve a particu-
lar provided quality?
4. What is the risk of violating a particular SLA? What impact do concurrently es-
tablished SLAs have on the executed services? How can the risk of violating an
SLA be expressed based on SLA monitoring data?
In order to find an answer to these questions, a set of tools is developed in the project
according to the architecture depicted in Figure 6.2. The tools comprise of a Service
Repository, a central storage for available services, SLAs and topologies, which can be
queried according to the current customer request (Question 1). Topologies exhibit
mappings from offered to required services and SLAs. In other words, a topology
defines, which service and respective service level needs to be procured to achieve a
certain service quality and functionality. The tools that provide the input for the map-
ping information that is saved in the Service Repository is created by the Performance
Cockpit (Westermann and Momm 2010; Westermann et al. 2010), which tests regular
behavior of services. On the basis of the regular performance of services that was iden-
tified with the help of the performance cockpit, SLA Translation contributes a matching
for SLAs between provided and procured SLAs based on the results of the Performance
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FIGURE 6.2: ValueGrids Tools
Cockpit. The Dependency Analyzer (Michalk and Caton 2010) is designed to identify
dependencies between concurrently active SLAs and service executions and with these,
the risk of an SLA violation. As was argued before, uncertainty about future events is
often approximated from past observations (Section 3.2). In the case of the Dependency
Analyzer, the risk of SLA violation is calculated from past monitoring observations,
which are provided by the Monitoring tool, and states which SLAs have been active
concurrently in the past and to which degree the respective SLAs have been violated.
The monitoring observations meet Assumptions 3 - 5 from Section 4.1. Based on this in-
formation, the decision maker is supported in their decision for which SLAs to establish
in the future.
6.2 Risk Analysis Use Case
This section describes the use case of risk analysis in the context of Web/Cloud service
and SaaS provisioning in more detail in order to showcase the application scenarios of
the Dependency Analyzer. The decision on SLA establishment can be made for differ-
ent kinds of service. In the case of ValueGrids, the selection of a scenario in the area of
Web services, Cloud services and SaaS offerings provides the benefits of existing mon-
itoring systems and the principal availability of measures for the quality of a service
that can be evaluated. The ability to measure the quality of a service and evaluate the
adherence to SLAs is a driver for the application of the decision support as presented
in this thesis. The Dependency Analyzer can be applied by each of the actors in Figure
6.1, denoted by “ValueGrids components”, i. e. the SaaS integration, the ERP integra-
tion, optimization, and resource levels. This implies that each of the participants in a
service composition scenario, i. e. each real-world service provider, that needs to make
SLA establishment decisions can use the Dependency Analyzer as a tool for decision
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support.
By employing the Dependency Analyzer, a participant in a service economy can answer
the following questions:
• Which service/SLA topologies are feasible for the provision of a service with re-
spect to profit? (see Research Question 1)
• Which service/SLA topology is the one that incurs the lowest risk? (see Research
Questions 2 and 3)
Decision support in highly flexible and dynamic real-world service economies is only
possible if certain requirements are met, which relate to the properties of on-demand
service provisioning and the availability of needed information. In the context of the
project ValueGrids, the following requirements on service level management have been
identified:
REQ 1. Service monitoring has to be possible and in action (Assumptions 4 and 5).
REQ 2. Monitoring reports have to be sent on a regular basis (Assumptions 4 and 5).
REQ 3. The length of all report periods has to be equally long (Assumption 4).
REQ 4. Reports have to include an aggregated value for all Service Level Objectives
that reflects the overall degree of violation of the SLA (Assumption 5).
REQ 5. A service/SLA repository that is able to include relationships between services
and SLAs has to be in place.
REQ 6. Each available SLA and service has to be included in the service/SLA reposi-
tory.
These requirements were considered in the implementation of the ValueGrids tools,
which are designed to solve the decision problems that were described in Sections 4.1.3,
4.2.2, 5.1.3 and 5.2.3. Figure 6.3 illustrates the steps that are taken for the decision on
SLA establishment in a service provider’s risk-minimizing decision, exemplarily. The
steps are described more generally by considering the maximization of expected utility
additionally, below.
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Report StorageDependency Analyzer Service Repository Matlab Interface
FIGURE 6.3: Dependency Analyzer Decision Making
query The decision itself is triggered by a user interface, the Framework Controller
(see Figure 6.3), which is applied whenever a request for service provision is issued
and a provider or intermediary is confronted with the decision whether to establish an
SLA and if so, in which quality level.
get topologies Based on this request, the Dependency Analyzer (DA) retrieves the
feasible SLA topologies for the requested service from the Service Repository (see REQ
6).
get reports The monitoring reports are retrieved from the DA’s internal Report Stor-
age. These have been received in the past from the monitoring tool (REQs 1 and 2) and
stored internally by the DA for later use in decision support. Monitoring reports con-
tain information about the past adherence of established SLAs, and each report com-
prises of a start and end time of the monitoring report, the ID of the monitored SLA(s)
and the degree of violation (see REQ 2 - 4).
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calculate expected profit From the reports that are stored in the ReportStorage, the
expected profit is calculated by taking prices and penalties (from SLAs), costs for ser-
vice execution as well as the expected violation as calculated from monitoring obser-
vations into account. The expected profit is calculated according to the expected profit
constraint from Sections 4.1 and 5.1.
calculate risk The decision support that is provided by the Dependency Analyzer ap-
plies the concept of semi-variance as introduced by Markowitz (1959) as presented in
Sections 4.1 and 5.1 or, according to the user’s choice, maximizing the certainty equiv-
alent of service provisioning as introduced in Sections 4.2 and 5.2. Employing one of
these approaches allows the DA to rank the retrieved topologies according to the risk of
SLA violation or the expected utility expressed by the certainty equivalent. The topolo-
gies and associated risk/certainty equivalent are returned as a sorted list to the Man-
agement Cockpit and subsequently displayed to the user, i. e. the service requester.
In the case of a service intermediary, the selection of suitable SLAs with supplying
providers would follow. As these steps are carried out analogously to the choice of risk-
minimal (utility maximizing) SLAs with customers, the description is omitted here.
6.3 Design and implementation of the Dependency Analyzer
This section covers the design of the ValueGrids Dependency Analyzer. It shows the
interplay of components and their integration as well as a brief introduction to the
Dependency Analyzer design.
Figure 6.4 depicts the Dependency Analyzer’s components as well as those it interacts
with. After being invoked, the Dependency Analyzer calls the Service Repository via
a client/server interface to retrieve available services, SLAs and the respective topolo-
gies. A query as depicted in Figure 6.3 is passed to the Dependency Analyzer Web
service, which wraps the implementation of the Dependency Analyzer. By querying
the Service Repository as described in the previous section, the feasible SLA topolo-
gies are retrieved. For these topologies, monitoring reports are extracted from the Re-
portStorage, which is included in the Dependency Analyzer implementation. Based
on the monitoring reports, profit-, risk-, or utility-calculations are carried out. This is
facilitated through the Matlab Client. Compiled instances of the Matlab4 code are dis-
4http://www.mathworks.com/ last accessed: October 9, 2011
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FIGURE 6.4: Dependency Analyzer Class UML
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tributed and run in a Grid- or Cloud-environment. More details on the implementation
of the parallel Matlab backend can be found in the Deliverables of the project Value-
Grids, which are available on request5, and in research (Caton 2009).
The results from the calculations using the MatlabClient are then passed back to the De-
pendency Analyzer, where they are ranked. The ranked list is then communicated to
the requester via the Dependency Analyzer Web service (see Figure 6.3). The functions
implemented in Matlab directly reflect the methodology, which was presented in Chap-
ters 4 and 5 in the context of SaaS, Web or Cloud service provisioning as for these types
of services, the measurability of QoS attributes of the service is given. Therefore, the
ValueGrids implementation highlights the applicability of the approaches presented in
this work, which support the decisions made by service providers in dynamic service
economies.
The ValueGrids implementation is a proof-of-concept prototypical array of software ar-
tifacts that can be used individually or collectively to support decision making about
the establishment of SLAs. However, as a proof-of-concept implementation the pro-
totype cannot be simply deployed into any business scenario without extension and
adaptation to the particular setting.
5http://www.valuegrids.de last accessed: October 9, 2011
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“Always be suspicious of data collection that goes according to plan.”
(Patton 2002)
IN Chapters 4 and 5 methods that solve a service provider’s and an intermediary’sdecision problem on SLA establishment were presented. The methods were de-
signed to consider a provider’s and an intermediary’s properties regarding available
resources and expected profit from service provisioning. Furthermore, challenges on
decision making for SLA establishment that were raised in Section 3.3 were addressed
by the decision support methods. These aspects were covered by the application of an
adaptation of portfolio selection (Markowitz 1959). Additionally, the challenges from
Section 3.3 address the consideration and expression of risk in the decision on SLA es-
tablishment. In the methods that were introduced in Chapters 4 and 5, risk is expressed
by the dispersion of expected penalties as measured by the (semi-) variance. The (semi-)
variance of expected penalties was calculated from past monitoring observations that
state the degree of SLA violation for past periods for each SLA. According to the law
of large numbers, the more monitoring observations from the past that are available, the
more precise is the risk that can be calculated from the observations. In order to se-
lect the portfolio of SLAs that incurs the lowest risk of SLA violation (or that exhibits
the highest expected utility), a high number of monitoring observations is desirable for
each SLA porfolio. The collection of monitoring observations requires that SLAs are
established for periods of a certain length and can be monitored. Thus, the more moni-
toring reports are used in the calculation of the risk of SLA violation, the more time has
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elapsed for the monitoring of SLAs. For instance, if a provider offers three SLAs and all
combinations of the three SLAs are feasible from a provider’s technical resources and
expected profit constraint, then a provider needs monitoring observations for all seven
portfolios of SLAs that result from the three SLAs. If the provider needs to collect 50
monitoring observations for each portfolio, then 7 · 50 = 350 periods of time need to
elapse before enough monitoring observations are available. Depending on the length
of the periods, 350 periods can result in hours, days, or even years of monitoring.
As long phases of exploration in which portfolios of SLAs are established just for the rea-
son of observing the degree of violation of SLAs are undesirable for decision makers,
the question arises from which amount of monitoring observations the approximation
of SLA violation risk cannot be improved any more. The approximation of SLA vio-
lation risk is the major driver of a provider’s and an intermediary’s decision on SLA
establishment. Therefore, this chapter is dedicated to the evaluation of the applicability
of the methods for solving a provider’s and an intermediary’s decision problem about
SLA establishment. The applicability of the methods is evaluated by the identification
of the amount of monitoring observations from which SLA violation risk is calculated
from which on the approximation of SLA violation risk cannot be improved any further.
This is expressed in Research Question 4:
RESEARCH QUESTION 4 ≺REQUIRED AMOUNT OF MONITORING DATA FOR DECI-
SION MAKING. How many monitoring observations are required for the calculation of SLA
violation risk in a) a provider’s and b) an intermediary’s decision on SLA establishment?
In order to address Research Question 4, the following sections present a simulation-
based evaluation. Therefore, Section 7.1 describes the evaluation methodolgy in detail.
In Section 7.2, the methods that solve a provider’s decision on SLA establishment by se-
lecting the risk-minimal SLA portfolio as introduced in Section 4.1 and by maximizing
the expected utility from service provisioning as presented in Section 4.2 are evaluated.
Section 7.3 describes the evaluation of the methods that address an intermediary’s de-
cision problem about SLA establishment with respect to risk-minimization and utility-




A straightforward approach for the evaluation of the methods would involve real SLA
monitoring observations where the degree of violation has been analyzed. The avail-
able monitoring observations could then be split up in parts of different lengths y and
from the y observations, the risk of SLA violation as measured by the (semi-) variance
could be calculated. Having calculated the risk of SLA violation for each available SLA
portfolio, the portfolio incurring the lowest risk would be chosen. The decision on
risk-minimizing (or utility-maximizing) SLA portfolios would be carried out for differ-
ent amounts y of monitoring observations. Using the complete data set would result
in the most precise approximation of the risk of SLA violation according to the law
of large numbers. This decision can be considered as the optimal decision and hence,
the benchmark. The portfolios selected based upon risk-calculations that employed
lower amounts y of monitoring observations can be compared to the benchmark. This
enables the derivation of the amount of monitoring observations to make a precise
enough risk approximation for a correct choice, i. e. to select the risk-minimizing (or
utility-maximizing) SLA portfolio. In order to substantiate the needed amount of ob-
servations and to exclude coincidentally correct selections, this method would need to
be repeated, requiring lots of monitoring data.
However, monitoring data has to meet Assumptions 3 and 5. Assumption 3 requires
constant resources over time in order to keep monitoring data comparable. Real-world
scenarios, in which services are provided and monitored, usually are not specially de-
signed to allow for the comparability of monitoring and analytics results. However,
monitoring and analytics systems are designed to react on monitoring results and no-
tifications of SLA violation, for instance by adapting the underlying infrastructure. As-
sumption 5 requires that monitoring results need to be available as one aggregated
value that specifies the degree of SLA violation. The challenges of aggregating moni-
toring results for single SLOs into one value that states the degree of violation for an
SLA have been discussed in Section 4.1.1 in depth and concern issues in the monitor-
ing approach, frequency of reports, assessing the preferences of participants of an SLA
and the aggregation method. In summary, at the moment, there are approaches for
aggregating monitoring data in theory, but few are implemented in practice. In order
to apply the methods that were presented in Chapters 4 and 5, a provider’s and an in-
termediary’s resources would have to be kept constant and a monitoring and analytics
system that facilitates the aggregation of monitoring results into one value that states
the degree of SLA violation is required. Currently, these assumptions cannot be met
in real-world scenarios and thus, there are no monitoring observations which can be
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applied for the evaluation of the methods that solve a provider’s and an intermediary’s
decision problem on SLA establishment. As was argued before, the higher the num-
ber of monitoring observations is, the better is the approximation of the distribution of
SLA violation and with it, the calculated SLA violation risk. Consequently, the most
precise representation of SLA violation is achieved if the distribution of SLA violations
is known. The evaluation of the methods that solve either a provider’s or an inter-
mediary’s decision problem is conducted on the basis of artificially created monitoring
data. Hence, the simulation-based evaluation exposes an even more precise specifica-
tion of risk than an evaluation that is based on real monitoring data. Furthermore, the
gathering of monitoring observations is more convenient by applying a simulation.
In order to be able to evaluate the methods, even without the availability of real-world
monitoring data, monitoring observations that meet Assumptions 3 to 5 have been cre-
ated artificially with the help of a numerical simulation that was implemented in Java,
of which the methodology is described below.
A pre-defined number of SLAs is created, where prices, penalties and costs are set fixed.
This approach is chosen as prices and penalties are assumed to be given exogenously
and not part of the decision. This supports the focus on the risk-minimizing (or utility-
maximizing) selection of SLAs in contrast to pricing decisions. By setting fixed prices
and penalties, the effect of varying prices can be neglected as the correctness of de-
cisions only depends on the amount of monitoring observations and the distribution
functions of SLA violations. Next, all available portfolios of SLAs are determined. As
there is no service repository in place that allows the query for available SLA portfolios,
the power-set determines all possible SLA portfolios. The power-set of SLAs reflects all
possible combinations of SLAs under the assumption that only one instance of each
SLA can be active per period.
For each SLA in each portfolio, a PDF of the degree of violation is assigned.1 The degree
of violation is measured in {0,1}, hence, a PDF with the domain {0,1} is required. The
PDF is determined randomly for each problem set. Beta distribution functions, B(d, e),
exhibit a domain in {0,1} (Pham-Gia 1989), where d and e are parameters that define
the shape of the Beta distribution function. Additionally, Beta distribution functions
can be parametrized in a way that the probability of a higher degree of SLA violations
increases with an increasing number of SLAs in a portfolio.2 Without loss of generality,
1With the PDF, the CDF is determined.
2The absolute probability of SLA violations cannot be influenced, i. e. it is not possible that for one SLA
the probability of SLA violations is higher than for another one. However, by altering d, the PDF will
exhibit a shift from a high probability for a low degree of SLA violation (d≤ e) to a high probability for
a high degree of SLA violation (d ≥ e).
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e is fixed to e = 1 in order to reduce the degrees of freedom. Setting e differently would
have no impact on the shape of the distribution function as long as the manipulation
of d was adapted proportionally. Having set e = 1, d is determined for each PDF, i. e.
for each SLA in each portfolio, as follows: d = |γ| · x, where x is a random draw from a
uniform distribution U(0,1.0) and |γ| is the number of SLAs in the portfolio. Artificial
monitoring observations for each SLA in each portfolio are created by drawing y times
randomly from the PDFs of SLA violations that were assigned to each SLA in each
portfolio. The values for y were set to 5,10,20,50,100,200,500,1000, so that the amount
of observations increases by a constant factor throughout.3
The artificial creation of random-numbers suffers from statistical errors. Therefore, the
step of creating an amount of y artificial monitoring observations and calculating semi-
variance or certainty equivalent from the observations is repeated n = 1000 times. After
a repetition of n = 1000 times, the amount y of artificial monitoring observations that is
created, is increased. To determine the amount of observations that is required to calcu-
late the risk of SLA violation precise enough to make correct decisions in a general man-
ner, the above described procedure is repeated for different distribution functions. Each
instantiation of the procedure, which is characterized by the specification of particular
PDFs for the degree of SLA violation is denoted as problem set. Thus, 150 problem sets
are created in order to identify the amount of monitoring observations needed to reli-
ably calculate semi-variance and certainty equivalent. The exact specification of input
to the creation of artificial monitoring data is given in Sections 7.2.1 for the provider’s
case and 7.3.1 for the intermediary’s case, respectively.
For the creation of artificial monitoring data, the distribution functions for the degree of
SLA violations are determined and thus known in advance. Hence, the risk of SLA vio-
lation can be calculated directly from the distribution functions and the risk-minimizing
or utility-maximizing SLA portfolio can be identified with respect to the most precise
representation of SLA violation risk. This SLA portfolio is the benchmark and denotes
the correct choice for the risk-minimizing (or utility-maximizing) SLA portfolio. The cal-
culation of the SLA violation risk from distribution functions by means of semi-variance
and certainty equivalent are illustrated in Sections 7.2.1 and 7.3.1.
For each amount y of monitoring observations, semi-variance and certainty equivalent
are calculated from the observations. The SLA portfolio that minimizes the risk of SLA
violation (or the one that maximizes the certainty equivalent) as calculated from the
observations is chosen. The SLA portfolio that is selected in this step is compared to
3The number of observations approximately doubles in each step.
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the benchmark portfolio for determining the correctness of the choice. Therefore, for
each amount of observations y, there are n = 1000 values that state the correctness of
the observation-based choice for each of the methods that solve a provider’s or an in-
termediary’s decision problem on SLA establishment. These values are employed in
the evaluation that identifies the required amount of observations, which is described
below.
7.1.1 Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
The values for correct decisions are employed that were retrieved from the comparison
of the benchmark portfolio to portfolios that were chosen with respect to semi-variance
and certainty equivalent that were calculated from artificially created monitoring ob-
servations as described before. This comparison created for each method for decision
making for each of the 150 problem sets for each amount of monitoring observations
under consideration 1000 values that state the correctness of the respective decision.
As eight different amounts of observations were considered in the artificial creation of
monitoring observations (see Table 7.1), for each problem set 8000 values for the cor-
rectness of decisions are available. From these values, for each amount of monitoring
observations the fraction of correct decisions can be determined by dividing the number
of correct decisions by 1000, the number of repetitions for this amount of observations.
This way, a proxy for the probability of making a correct decision by employing this
amount of observations in the calculation of the semi-variance or the certainty equiva-
lent is retrieved.
After determining the fraction of correct choices for each amount of observations in
each problem set, there are 150 observations for the probability of making a correct
choice for each amount of observations. By comparing the probabilities for making
correct decisions for two consecutive amounts of observations, the question if the prob-
ability of making a correct choice by increasing the number of observations can be an-
swered. The answer to this question is retrieved by applying two-sided unpaired t-tests
that evaluate the null-hypothesis of equal means of the probabilities of correct choices.
The tests are conducted for consecutive amounts of observations to test the hypothesis
that the mean difference between fractions of correct choices is equal to zero (Fay and
Proschan 2010). As long as the null-hypothesis can be rejected, there is a statistically
significant improvement in the probability of making a correct decision. For the partic-
ular amount of observations, from which on the null-hypothesis cannot be rejected any
more, the probability of making a correct decision cannot be improved significantly any
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more and hence, the amount of observations which foster correct decisions is found.
The high number of sampling repetition for each problem set and the high number of
problem sets assures the robustness of the t-test to violations of the normality assump-
tion (Bridge and Sawilowsky 1999; Ramsey 1980; Sawilowsky and Blair 1992).
7.1.2 Impact of Dispersion of Observations on the Required Amount of
Monitoring Observations
The previous section enabled the identification of the amount of monitoring observa-
tions required for the decision on SLA establishment. The evaluation considered 150
problem sets and compared the probabilities of making a correct decision for different
amounts of observations. The required amounts of monitoring observations give gen-
eral advice of how many observations need to be collected before applying the methods
that minimize the risk of SLA violation or maximize expected utility in the decisions on
SLA establishment. This section is dedicated to extend the evaluation by analyzing the
impact that dispersion of observations as measured by the variance has on the required
amount of observations.
In analogy to the evaluation from the previous section, the values for correct decisions
are applied. For each problem set 8000 values for the correctness of decisions are avail-
able.
In an approach that is similar to the evaluation from the previous section, an evalu-
ation is carried out that analyzes if the probability of making a correct decision can
be increased by the collection of more monitoring observations. In contrast to the
evaluation from the previous section, the analysis is carried out for each problem set
seperatly. Therefore, the values for correct decisions are not aggregated as before, but
considered as they are. However, by comparing the values for correct decisions for
consecutive amounts of observations for each problem set, it is possible to evaluate if
a higher amount of monitoring observations increases the probability of making a cor-
rect decision, which is approximated by the distribution of values of correctness and its
mean.
With a Wilcoxon rank sum test, the distributions of correct decisions for different
amounts of observations are compared. The null-hypothesis of equal distributions,
and hence, equal means, is evaluated in analogy to the pairwise t-tests from the pre-
vious section. The pairwise comparison of amounts of observations for which the null-
hypothesis cannot be rejected any more identifies the required amount of observations
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for a particular problem set. Thus, 150 values that describe the required amount of
monitoring observations are available.
In order to identify the impact that the dispersion of monitoring observations as mea-
sured by the variance of the corresponding PDF of the degree of violation has on the
required amount of monitoring data, an ordinal regression is carried out. In this or-
dinal regression, the required amount of monitoring data that was identified for each
problem set is set into context with the maximum variance of the degree of SLA viola-
tion from the benchmark portfolio of this problem set. The maximum variance of SLA
violation is identified by calculating the variance of SLA violation for each SLA in the
portfolio and choosing the maximum one.
In the following sections, the exact specification of the evaluation for the provider’s and
the intermediary’s case, respectively are shown along with its results.
7.2 Provider Decisions
This section is dedicated to the evaluation of the methods that solve a service provider’s
decision problem in SLA establishment (Chapter 4). In Section 4.1, a method was
introduced that facilitates a provider’s decision by minimizing the risk of SLA vio-
lation as measured by the semi-variance of expected penalties under the considera-
tion of resource and expected profit constraints. Section 4.2 presented an extension
to this method that considers a provider’s risk-aversion explicitly by employing the
maximization of expected utility from service provisioning as objective function. The
collection of monitoring data is time-consuming and implies an exploration phase to
a provider, where different SLA portfolios are established for monitoring the result-
ing degrees of violation. Therefore, the amount of monitoring data from which on the
approximation of risk is precise enough to select the actually risk-minimizing (or utility-
maximizin) SLA portfolio is the factor that allows the evaluation of applicability of the
presented methods. Thus, this section is dedicated to identifying the number of re-
quired monitoring observations for provider decisions. Below, first the specific input to
the simulation is shown and the calculation of semi-variance and certainty equivalent
from the PDFs is explained. Afterwards, the results of the evaluation are presented.
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FIGURE 7.1: Simulation Setup for Creation of Artificial Monitoring Observations
TABLE 7.1: Simulation Parameters for Evaluation of Provider’s Decision
Parameter Value
Number of SLAs 3
c(sj) c(s1) = 1, c(s2) = 1.5, c(s3) = 2
d |γ| · x
e 1
fαi(sj) fα1(s1) = 3.5, fα2(s2) = 3, fα3(s3) = 7.5




7.2.1 Simulation Specification and Selection of the Benchmark Portfolio
The number of pre-defined SLAs that are created is set to 3. Without loss of generality,
this approach serves to reduce the time complexity of choice (Section 4.3) and hence, the
computation time that is required for carrying the evaluation out. Prices and penalties
are set to fα1(s1) = 3.5, fα2(s2) = 3, and fα3(s3) = 7.5 and µα1 = 2, µα2 = 1.3, and µα5 = 5.
Provider’s costs for providing services are set to c(s1) = 1, c(s2) = 1.5, and c(s3) =
2. Prices, penalties and costs are chosen arbitrarily and are considered exogeneously
to the decision process. However, a further investigation on the impact of different
prices and penalties is considered future work. Table 7.1 summarizes the input to the
simulation.
The calculation of semi-variance and certainty equivalent from the PDFs is described
below. In a first step, the calculation of expected profit from PDFs is described. This ex-
pression is then applied in the calculation of semi-variance and certainty equivalent.
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The expected profit is calculated from the PDFs in order to be able to verify the
provider’s profit constraint by summing prices fαi(sj) agreed in SLAs, reducing it by
the sum of costs for service execution c(sj) analogously to Equation 4.9. Finally, the
expected penalties are subtracted, which amount to the sum of expected penalties for











 fαi(sj)− c(sj)− µαi · 1∫
0
λ̃αiγ · gαiγ (λ̃αiγ )dλ̃αiγ
 ,(7.2)
where the expected penalty Ê(λ̃αiγ · µαi) for one SLA is calculated as the expected value
for the degree of violations multiplied by the respective penalty. Let λ̃αiγ be the degree




γ ) the probability density function of
λ̃αiγ , and µαi the penalty in SLA αi, as before. The expected penalty for SLA αi is defined
as the expected value of λ̃αiγ · µαi :
(7.3) Ê(λ̃αiγ · µαi) =
1∫
0
λ̃αiγ · µαi · gαiγ (λ̃αiγ )dλ̃αiγ .
This expression of expected profit and expected penalties is employed in the calcula-
tion of semi-variance and certainty equivalent. The semi-variance of due penalties for
a portfolio of SLAs is calculated as follows. The sum of penalties, of which each is
multiplied by the respective degree of SLA violation λ̃αiγ , is compared to the sum of
penalties from the expected penalties ∑αi∈γ Ê(λ̃
αi
γ · µαi). This difference is squared for
those cases, which are bigger than 0 and multiplied by the common density function of
all of the degrees of violation. As the PDFs for the degree of violation are statistically






A multiple integral from 0 through 1 of the above term determines the semi-variance






























γ ) denotes the PDF of the degree of violation for SLA αi in portfolio γ. The
semi-variance is computed from the PDF by adapting the calculation of the variance of
a PDF (see Gujarati and Porter 2006) so that only those deviations that are worse than
the expected value are taken into account. According to the lowest value for ŜE(µγ,t),
the benchmark portfolio is chosen.
The certainty equivalent that serves for the decision about SLA establishment by maxi-
mizing expected utility is calculated from the PDFs as follows:
(7.5) CE(πγ) = Ê(πγ)−
1
2
· ARA(πγ) · ˆVar(πγ)
denotes the certainty equivalent for portfolio γ, where Ê(πγ) is the expected profit from
Equation (7.1), ARA(πγ) denotes the provider’s coefficient of absolute risk-aversion for
the value of the expected profit and ˆVar(πγ) denotes the variance of profit.
The variance of the portfolio γ’s profit is calculated as the variance of the sum of single
SLA profits:









Because all gαiγ (λ̃
αi
γ ) are stochastically independent, the covariances of profit are zero,
that is Cov(παi ,παj) = 0,∀i, j, i 6= j and consequently, the variance of the sum of profits
equals the sum of variances of profit.
The variance of profit for one SLA is calculated as the variance of the SLA violation
PDF is weighted by prices, costs and penalties








λ̃αiγ − E(λ̃αiγ )
)2 gαiγ (λ̃αiγ )dλ̃αiγ .(7.8)
Using the characteristics of the Beta distribution function (see Papoulis 2002), the vari-
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By applying Equation 7.10 in Equation 7.5, the certainty equivalent is obtained from the
PDFs of the degree of SLA violation and the benchmark SLA portfolio that maximizes
the certainty equivalent can be chosen.
This section provided a thorough introduction to the creation of artificial monitoring
observations and the selection of benchmark SLA portfolios, which are the first to steps
in the evaluation as depicted in Figure 7.1. As next steps, the benchmark SLA port-
folios are compared to those SLA portfolios that are chosen by minimizing the risk of
SLA violation that is calculated from artificial monitoring observations and those SLA
portfolios that are chosen by the maximization of the certainty equivalent that is com-
puted from artificial monitoring observations, the correctness of choices is determined.
The following sections describe the identification of the amount of observations that is
required for making correct choices.
7.2.2 Required Amount of Monitoring Observations for Provider’s
Decision
This section illustrates the results that are obtained from the evaluation as described in
Section 7.1.1. First, the results of the evaluation of the provider’s risk-minimizing deci-
sion are presented and discussed. Afterwards, the evaluation of the utility-maximizing
decision, which is based on the certainty equivalent, is shown.
The impact which the amount of available monitoring data has on the correctness of
the provider’s risk-minimizing decision is highlighted in Figure 7.2. With an increasing
amount of observations, which is depicted on the x-Axis, the fraction of correct choices
increases. The bars denote the mean fraction of correct choices, averaged over the 150
different problem sets. Figure 7.2 exhibits a decreasing marginal improvement of the
fraction of correct choices with a growing number of observations. Table 7.2 shows the
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FIGURE 7.2: Fraction of Correct Choices for Provider’s semi-variance -minimizing Decision
results of the pairwise t-tests.4 The results indicate that the null-hypothesis of equal
means can be rejected when comparing the amounts of observations (5,10), (10,20),
and (20,50). For higher amounts of observations, the null-hypothesis cannot be rejected
any more. This implies that the minimal amount of observations that a decision maker
should have available for each of the portfolios is 50 in order to have a high probability
of making correct decisions.
TABLE 7.2: Evaluation of provider’s risk-minimizing decision: Fraction of Correct Choices








The same procedure is applied to a provider’s decision, which is made by maximiz-
ing the certainty equivalent. Figure 7.3 shows that the marginal improvement of the
4Note, that ∗∗∗ states significance to the 0.1% level.
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FIGURE 7.3: Fraction of Correct Choices for Provider’s Certainty Equivalent-maximizing De-
cision
fraction of correct choices decreases with a growing number of observations. Analo-
gously to the results of the risk-minimizing decision, the threshold value of the amount
of observations is determined with the help of unpaired two-sided t-tests as described
before. Table 7.3 shows the results, where ∗∗∗ denotes significance to the 0.1% level.
The results show that the null-hypothesis of equal means can be rejected for the com-
parison of the amounts of observations 5 and 10. For higher amounts of observations,
there is no statistically significant improvement. This implies that the decision maker is
advised to collect at least 10 observations for each of the portfolios, as collecting more
data does not improve the fraction of correct choices significantly.
7.2.3 Impact of Dispersion of Observations on the Required Amount of
Monitoring Observations
This section presents the results that are obtained from the two-step evaluation that
was described in Section 7.1.2. In the first step, the required amount of monitoring
observations is determined seperatly for each problem set. Performing the statistical
analysis with a Wilcoxon rank-sum test as described in Section 7.1.2 evaluates the null-
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TABLE 7.3: Evaluation of provider’s utility-maximizing decision: Fraction of Correct Choices








hypothesis of equal means of the difference in ranks for different amounts of monitor-
ing observations. The results of the evaluation are for each problem set are shown in the
Appendix in Tables A.1 and A.3.5 If the null-hypothesis cannot be rejected any more,
the threshold amount of monitoring observations is found. Below, the impact of the dis-
persion of monitoring observations on the required amount of monitoring observations
is examined.
For this analysis, the maximum dispersion of monitoring observations as measured by
the variance of the degree of SLA violation of the benchmark portfolio is identified for
each problem set. Alternatively to selecting the maximum variance, the average vari-
ance of the degree of SLA violation of the benchmark portfolio could have been calcu-
lated. This approach would have smoothed the properties of a portfolio of SLAs and
treated cases with similar variances for all SLAs equal to cases with very different vari-
ances but the same mean. Arguably, selecting the maximum variance of a portfolio does
not take into account the properties of all PDFs, but it takes the property into account,
which is assumed to have the strongest impact on the required amount of monitoring
data: the variance of single PDFs of the degree of SLA violation. Having retrieved the
maximum variance for each problem set, it can be set into context with the respective
required amount of monitoring observations. This is illustrated in Table A.2 for the
risk-minimizing decision and in Table A.4 for the utility-maximizing decision. The im-
pact of the variance on the required amount of monitoring observations is evaluated
with an ordinal regression. In the following, first the results for the risk-minimizing
decision are described and afterwards, the results for the utility-maximizing decision
are presented.
An ordinal regression that analyses the impact of the independent variable variance on
5For the results, ∗∗∗ denotes significance to the 0.001 level, ∗∗ states significance to the 0.01 level, and ∗
shows significance to the 0.05 level, and hence, that the null hypothesis can be rejected to the respective
level.
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Estimate Std. Error Sig. Lower Bd. Upper Bd.
Threshold Amount = 10 -3.747 1.091 .001 -5.885 -1.608
Amount = 20 -1.691 .580 .004 -2.828 -.555
Amount = 50 1.924 .565 .001 .817 3.032
Amount = 100 2.858 .588 .000 1.706 4.010
Amount = 200 3.536 .613 .000 2.335 4.737
Amount = 500 4.660 .698 .000 3.292 6.029
Location Variance 19.710 7.281 .007 5.440 33.980
the dependent variable amount of observations reveals that the maximum variance in the
portfolio has a significant (α = 0.01) impact on the required length of history. Coef-
ficients and results can be found in Table 7.4, whereas the downmost row shows the
coefficient (19.710) for the impact of the variance on the required amount of observa-
tions with a p-value of 0.07 (column “Sig.”).
Analogoulsy, the impact of the maximum variance on the required amount observa-
tions for the utility-maximizing decision is identified by means of an ordinal regression,
where the independent variable is variance and the dependent variable is the amount of
observations. The ordinal regression reveals that the maximum variance in the portfolio
has a positive impact (last row, Estimate = 45.101), which is significant to the 0.01 level
on the required amount of observations (last row, column “Sig.”).
7.3 Intermediary Decisions
In the previous section, the amount of monitoring observations was identified that is
required for a service provider’s decision on the establishment of SLAs by minimizing
the risk of SLA violation or maximizing the expected utility from service provisioning.
In this section, the methods that solve an intermediary’s decision problem for the es-
tablishment of SLAs with customers and providers are evaluated. The methods that
solve an intermediary’s decision problem are an extension of the methods that solve a
provider’s decision problem. While in a provider’s decision problem exclusively the
establishment of SLAs with customers about the provisioning of services is considered,
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Estimate Std. Error Sig. Lower Bd. Upper Bd.
Threshold Amount = 5 -1.402 1.533 .360 -4.407 1.602
Amount = 10 1.085 1.223 .375 -1.312 3.482
Amount = 20 1.270 1.220 .298 -1.121 3.661
Amount = 50 2.195 1.220 .072 -.195 4.586
Amount = 100 3.212 1.235 .009 .791 5.633
Amount = 200 4.004 1.250 .001 1.554 6.453
Amount = 500 5.047 1.268 .000 2.563 7.532
Location Variance 45.101 14.936 .003 15.827 74.375
an intermediary’s decision concerns the establishment of both, SLAs with customers
and SLAs with service providers. In more detail, the methods that were introduced in
Chapter 5 are split up in two parts. Applying the method that minimizes an interme-
diary’s risk (Section 5.1), first the SLA portfolio with customers that minimizes the risk
of SLA violation is selected. In a second step, the portfolio of SLAs with providers that
minimizes the risk of SLA violation by providers is chosen. Analogously, by employing
the method that maximizes an intermediary’s expected utility as presented in Section
5.2, first the SLA portfolio with customers is chosen which maximizes an intermedi-
ary’s expected utility from service provisioning. In a second step, the portfolio of SLAs
with providers that supply services is chosen that maximizes the expected utility from
providing and procuring services.
The first step of the methods for decision making for an intermediary equals a
provider’s decision on SLA establishment. The methods that solve a provider’s de-
cision about SLA establishment have already been evaluated in the previous section.
The amounts of observations that are required for a provider’s decision about SLA
establishment that result from the evaluation of the risk-minimizing and the utility-
maximizing decision are applied in the evaluation of an intermediary’s decision prob-
lem. Therefore, in this section the amount of monitoring observations that is required
for an intermediary’s decision about the SLA establishment with providers is evalu-
ated. Below, the creation of artificial monitoring data for the intermediary’s case and
the selection of benchmark portfolios is described in detail followed by the results of
the evaluation.
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FIGURE 7.4: Simulation Setup for Creation of Artificial Monitoring Observations for Interme-
diary’s Decision
7.3.1 Simulation Specification and Selection of the Benchmark Portfolio
Figure 7.4 depicts the process of creating artificial monitoring data and determining
the correctness of an observation-based choice in the intermediary’s case. Its building
blocks are described in detail below.
In a first step, 100 monitoring observations for SLA violations in customer SLAs are
created artificially. This amount is chosen as the evaluation from Section 7.2 suggested
to collect 50 observations for the semi-variance-minimizing decision and to increase
the number for higher variances. The number of observations is a conservative way
to increase the probability of making a correct decision in the risk-minimizing as well
as in the utility-maximizing decision. Prices, penalties and costs are set to fα1(s1) = 8,
fα2(s2) = 7.5, and fα3(s3) = 9.5 and µα1 = 2, µα2 = 1.3, and µα3 = 5. The intermediary’s
costs for providing services are determined to be c(s1) = 1, c(s2) = 1.5, and c(s3) = 2.
The number of SLAs was 3, as before, in order to reduce the computational complexity.
From the 100 artificially created observations, semi-variance and certainty equivalent
for the decision about the establishment of customer SLAs are calculated as introduced
in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.2.1. The portfolios that minimize the semi-variance and that
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maximize the certainty equivalent are chosen and compared to the benchmark customer
SLA portfolio.6
In the second step, for the 3 procured SLAs,7 an amount y of monitoring observations
for SLA violations by providers is created artificially. Prices and penalties are set to
fβ1(s1) = 1, fβ2(s2) = 1.5, and fβ3(s3) = 2 and µβ1 = 0.5, µβ2 = 1, and µβ3 = 1.5. Ta-
ble 7.6 summarizes the input to the artificial creation of an intermediary’s monitoring
observations.
TABLE 7.6: Simulation Parameters for Evaluation of Intermediary’s Decision
Parameter Value
Number of offered SLAs 3
Number of required SLAs 3
c(sj) c(s1) = 1, c(s2) = 1.5, c(s3) = 2
d |γ| · x
e 1
fαi(sj) fα1(s1) = 8, fα2(s2) = 7.5, fα3(s3) = 9.5
fβi(sj) fβ1(s1) = 1, fβ2(s2) = 1.5, fβ3(s3) = 2
µαi µα1 = 2, µα2 = 1.3, µα3 = 5




The calculation of semi-variance and certainty equivalent from the PDFs that is required
to choose the benchmark portfolios, is described below. For a provider’s decision on
SLA establishment with customers (equal to an intermediary’s decision on SLA es-
tablishment with customers) the calculation of semi-variance and certainty equivalent
from the distribution functions have been introduced in Section 7.2.1. In order to choose
the benchmark portfolio of SLAs with providers, the calculation of the semi-variance of
the degree of SLA violation and the certainty equivalent that relate to the expressions
from Equations (5.8) and (5.28) needs to be introduced. Therefore, in a first step, the
calculation of expected profit from PDFs is explained. This expression is employed to
verify an intermediary’s expected profit constraint and used in the calculation of the
certainty equivalent of an intermediary’s utility-maximizing decision.
The expected profit is calculated from the PDFs by calculating the expected profit of
the optimal offered SLA portfolio according to Equation (7.1). From this, the sum of
6Due to the chosen amount of observations, the observation-based chosen SLA portfolio and the bench-
mark portfolio are the same.
7Again, for reasons of reducing the computational complexity.
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where Ê(λ̃βiδ · µβi) denotes the expected penalty for one required SLA and is calculated
as the expected degree of violation for an SLA multiplied by the corresponding penalty.




δ ) are defined as
before. The expected penalty for SLA βi is defined as the expected value of λ̃
βi
δ · µβi :












For the second constraint in an intermediary’s risk-based decision, the mean degree
of SLA violation of an SLA portfolio is calculated. Therefore, the average of the ex-
pected degrees of violation for all SLAs in the provider SLA portfolio δ is retrieved.




























After introducing the calculation of the expected profit and the average degree of SLA
violation constraint, the calculations of semi-variance and certainty equivalent from
PDFs may be introduced. The semi-variance of provider SLA violations is computed
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differently than the semi-variance that was introduced in Section 7.3.1. In order to
account for the deviations, which are worse than average, the calculation of the vari-
ance of a PDF (Gujarati and Porter 2006) is adapted as before, by integration over the
piece-wise defined squaring function. However, the semi-variance is not weighted by
the supplying providers’ penalties, as these would negatively influence the interme-
diary’s decision. The higher the penalties, the higher the intermediary’s utility; such
an approach would not capture the intermediary’s aversion towards providers’ SLA
violation. As a consequence, the usual approach which is applied in the calculation of
a variance, that is, squaring the deviations, would not lead to the required expression
of putting an emphasis on higher deviations. The semi-variance of the degree of SLA

































δ ) denotes the PDF of the degree of violation for SLA βi in portfolio δ and
Ê(λ̃δ) denotes the expected degree of violation of the portfolio δ.
The average degree of violation deviation is compared to the expected degree of viola-
tion. This difference is then squared, for the values greater than zero and is finally mul-
tiplied by the common density function of all of the degrees of violation. As the PDFs
for the degree of violation are statistically independent, the common density function
results in the product of the single density functions. A multiple integral from 0 through
1 of the above term determines the semi-variance of SLA violations through supplying
providers, as only those deviations that are worse than expected are taken into account.
According to the lowest value for ŜE(λδ), the benchmark portfolio is chosen.
The benchmark for the utility-maximizing decision that was presented in Section 5.2
is calculated absolutely equivalent to the benchmark in the provider’s case in Section
7.2.1 as the certainty equivalent from Equation (5.21) with respect to the PDFs for SLA
violation.
(7.15) CE(πγ∗,δ) = Ê(πγ∗,δ)−
1
2
· ARA(πγ∗,δ) · ˆVar(πγ∗,δ)
is the certainty equivalent in the case of the benchmark customer SLA portfolio γ∗,
which is combined with the provider SLA portfolio δ. In this case, the total expected
profit Ê(πγ∗,δ) is calculated according to Equation (7.11) and the intermediary’s coeffi-
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cient of absolute risk aversion is ARA(πγ∗,δ), whereas ˆVar(πγ∗,δ) denotes the variance
of the total profit.
The variance of profit from offering and procuring services amounts to the variance of
the sum of single SLA profits, that is, the profit from offering the benchmark customer
SLA portfolio γ∗ and procuring a single service with SLA βi:









As in the case of the provider’s decision, the variance of the sum of profits equals the
sum of the variances of profit due to the stochastical independence of all gβiδ (λ̃
βi
δ ). Ap-
plying the same steps as in Section 7.2.1 as well as the properties of the Beta distribution
function (see Papoulis 2002), the variance of the degree of violation for one SLA is cal-






Applying this result in the calculation of the variance of absolute profit when offering
the benchmark customer SLA portfolio γ∗ and establishing the provider SLA portfolio δ


















By applying Equation 7.18 to Equation 7.15, the certainty equivalent is obtained from
the previously specified PDFs of the degree of SLA violation. The benchmark portfolio
of provider SLAs is chosen as the portfolio that maximizes the certainty equivalent.
The benchmark portfolios are then compared to the portfolios that are chosen by the
minimization of the risk of SLA violation that is calculated from artificial monitoring
observations and those SLA portfolios that are chosen by the maximization of the cer-
tainty equivalent from artificial monitoring data (see Figure 7.4). This leads to the de-
termination of the correctness of the observation-based choices. In this vein, for each
of the 150 problem sets and each of the 8 different amounts of observations y, 1000 val-
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FIGURE 7.5: Fraction of Correct Choices for Intermediary’s semi-variance-minimizing Deci-
sion
ues for the correctness of the observation-based choices are available. These values are
employed in the evaluation that was described in Section 7.1, of which the results are
described in the following sections.
7.3.2 Required Amount of Monitoring Observations for an Intermediary’s
Decision
This section presents the results that the evaluation as described in Section 7.1.1 pro-
duced. First, the results for the risk-minimizing decision are presented and discussed.
Afterwards, the evaluation of the utility-maximizing decision, which is based on the
certainty equivalent, is shown.
The impact that the available amount of monitoring observations has on the correctness
of an intermediary’s risk-minimizing decision on SLA establishment with providers is
depicted in Figure 7.5. With an increasing amount of observations, which is shown on
the x-Axis, the fraction of the intermediary’s correct choices increases.
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Table 7.7 shows the results of the pairwise t-tests.8 The results indicate that the null-
hypothesis of equal means can be rejected when comparing the amounts of observa-
tions (5,10), (10,20), (20,50), and (50,100). For higher amounts of observations, the
null-hypothesis cannot be rejected any more. This implies that the minimal amount of
observations that a decision maker should have available for each of the portfolios is
100 in order to have a high probability of making correct decisions.
TABLE 7.7: Evaluation of intermediary’s risk-minimizing decision: Fraction of Correct Choices








The method that solves an intermediary’s decision problem on SLA establishment with
providers by maximizing the certainty equivalent is evaluated analogously. Figure 7.6
shows that the marginal improvement of the fraction of correct choices decreases with
an increasing amount of observations. Table 7.8 shows the results, where ∗∗∗ states
significance to the 0.1% level and ∗ denotes significance to the 5% level. The results
show that the null-hypothesis of equal means can be rejected for the comparison of the
amounts of observations 5 and 10, and 10 and 20. For higher amounts of observations,
there is no statistically significant improvement. This implies that the decision maker
is advised to collect at least 20 observations for each of the provider portfolios in order
to have a high probability for a correct decision.
TABLE 7.8: Evaluation of intermediary’s utility-based decision: Fraction of Correct Choices








8Note, that ∗∗∗ states significance to the 0.1% level and ∗∗ denotes significance to the 1% level.
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FIGURE 7.6: Fraction of Correct Choices for Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision
7.3.3 Impact of Dispersion of Observations on the Required Amount of
Monitoring Observations
The previous section identified the amount of monitoring observations, which is re-
quired for an intermediary’s decision on SLA establishment. The results that were re-
trieved hold for a general setting without the knowledge about particular distribution
functions of the degrees of SLA violation. This section is dedicated to investigate the
impact of dispersion of monitoring observations on the required amount of monitoring
observations. This is achieved by extending the evaluation from the previous section
as described in Section 7.1.2.
This section presents the results of the analysis of the impact of the variance of a PDF
of the degree of SLA violation on the required amount of monitoring data. The analy-
sis is carried out for the intermediary’s semi-variance minimizing decision (Section 5.1)
and their certainty equivalent maximizing decision (Section 5.2), respectively. Perform-
ing the statistical analysis with a Wilcoxon rank-sum test as described in Section 7.1.2
evaluates the null-hypothesis of equal means of the difference in ranks for different
amounts of monitoring observations. The results of the evaluation for each problem
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set are shown in the Appendix in Tables A.5 and A.7.9 If the null-hypothesis cannot
be rejected any more, the threshold amount of monitoring observations is found. In
the following, the impact of the dispersion of monitoring observations on the required
amount of monitoring observations is examined.
For this analysis, the maximum dispersion of monitoring observations as measured by
the variance of the degree of SLA violation of the benchmark provider SLA portfolio
is determined for each problem set.10 The maximum variance is then set into context
with the required amount of monitoring observations for this problem set, which was
identified in the first step. Variances and required amounts of monitoring observations
for each problem set are shown in Table A.6 for an intermediary’s risk-minimizing de-
cision and in Table A.8 for an intermediary’s utility-maximizing decision. The impact
of the variance of monitoring observations on the required amount of monitoring ob-
servations is analyzed equally to Section 7.2.3 by means of an ordinal regression. In
the following, first the results for the risk-minimizing decision of an intermediary and
then, the results for the utility-maximizing decision are presented.
An ordinal regression is executed for identifying the impact of the independent vari-
able variance on the dependent variable amount of observations for an intermediary’s
risk-minimizing decision about SLA establishment with providers. It reveals that the
maximum variance in the benchmark provider SLA portfolio has a significant (α = 0.05)
impact on the required amount of observations. Coefficients and results can be found
in Table 7.9, where the coefficient can be found in the last row, column Estimate and the
corresponding p-Value is denoted in the column Sig.
The same analysis is carried out for an intermediary’s utility-maximizing decision. The
ordinal regression, which analyses the impact of the independent variable variance on
the dependent variable amount of observations for an intermediary’s utility-maximizing
decision shows that the maximum variance of the benchmark provider portfolio has a
negative impact on the required amount of monitoring data. This result is significant
to the 0.001 level and can be found in Table 7.10.
The result of the regression implies that the higher the variance of observed degrees of
violations is for SLAs, the less data is required. This result contradicts the assumption
that the more dispersed data is, the more observations are required for a precise ap-
9For the results, ∗∗∗ denotes significance to the 0.001 level, ∗∗ states significance to the 0.01 level, and ∗
shows significance to the 0.05 level, and hence, that the null hypothesis can be rejected to the respective
level.








Estimate Std. Error Sig. Lower Bd. Upper Bd.
Threshold Amount = 10 -4.081 1.095 0 -6.227 -1.935
Amount = 20 -2.418 0.635 0 -3.664 -1.172
Amount = 50 -1.372 0.538 0.011 -2.426 -0.318
Amount = 100 -0.255 0.509 0.616 -1.253 0.743
Amount = 200 1.2 0.519 0.021 0.182 2.217
Amount = 500 2.663 0.551 0 1.583 3.744
Location Variance 13.066 6.563 0.047 0.202 25.93




Estimate Std. Error Sig. Lower Bd. Upper Bd.
Threshold Amount = 5 -3.989 0.727 0 -5.414 -2.565
Amount = 10 -2.372 0.69 0.001 -3.724 -1.019
Amount = 20 -0.736 0.657 0.263 -2.025 0.552
Amount = 50 0.42 0.695 0.546 -0.942 1.782
Amount = 100 0.874 0.742 0.239 -0.579 2.328
Amount = 200 2.364 1.12 0.035 0.168 4.56
Location Variance -37.713 8.634 0.000 -54.635 -20.791
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proximation of the distribution of the data. Therefore, the results that were retrieved
throughout the evaluation of the utility-maximizing decision of an intermediary were
thoroughly reviewed. Revisiting the benchmark portfolios that were determined for
each of the problem sets disclosed that for each problem set, the same portfolio exhib-
ited the highest expected utility in each problem sets and hence, was the benchmark
portfolio. Furthermore, the maximum variances of the benchmark portfolio in each
problem set as denoted in Table A.8 are very low (< 0.1). The interplay of the chosen
values for prices, penalties and costs for service provisioning with the low variances of
the distributions of degrees of SLA violation fosters the assumption that the degree of
SLA violation and its dispersion has a negligible impact in this configuration of prices,
penalties and costs. In order to support this statement, further evaluation runs that
test the impact of special configurations of prices, penalties and costs on the utility-
maximizing decision in conjunction with different specifications of probability distri-
butions and their variance are required. Consequently, a sensitivity analysis that inves-
tigates the impact of different configurations of prices, penalties and costs is required
in the future for the case of utility maximization in an intermediary’s decision.
7.4 Summary
Section 7.2.2 identified the amount of monitoring observations that are required for the
methods that solve provider’s decision problem about SLA establishment by minimiz-
ing the risk of SLA violation, or maximizing expected utility, respectively. The statisti-
cal analysis identified that a provider needs to collect at least 50 observations for each
portfolio in case of the semi-variance-minimizing decision on SLA establishment and
at least 10 observations for the utility-maximizing decision. Consequently, the required
amount of data is relatively low for both methods, allowing the data to be collected in a
reasonable amount of time. This of course depends on the agreed monitoring intervals.
The difference in the amount of required data could be caused by the semi-variance’s
property of only taking deviations worse than average into account. This leads to ex-
cluding some of the observations from the semi-variance calculation and hence, more
observations are required in total.
The results that are presented in Section 7.2.2 advise providers on the amount of data to
be collected for a correct decision. The amounts of observations that were determined
are retrieved based on the average of 150 different problem sets. The influence that
the dispersion of monitoring observations as measured by the variance of PDFs of the




Therefore, for each of the problem sets, the benchmark portfolio was determined by
means of semi-variance and certainty equivalent, respectively. The correctness of the
sample based decision is determined by comparison to the benchmark portfolio, which
was found based on semi-variance and certainty equivalent calculated from PDFs.
Based on the observations of correctness, the required amount of observations was
determined as the amount from which on the fraction of correct choices cannot be
improved on significantly any more. Having identified the required amount of mon-
itoring data for each of the problem sets, the impact of the dispersion of monitoring
observations was evaluated. Thus, for each of the benchmark portfolios, the maximum
variance of the degree of SLA violation for each of the SLAs in the optimal portfolio
was selected. A regression that analyzed the impact of the maximum variance on the
required amount of monitoring observations revealed that with an increasing variance,
more monitoring data is required.
Consequently, these results imply that the amount of 50 observations, which was de-
termined in Section 7.2.2 for the provider’s semi-variance minimizing decision needs
to be increased for high values of the variance and may be decreased for very low val-
ues of variance. The same applies to the previously determined 10 observations for the
utility-maximizing decision. Thus, a service provider that monitors their SLAs needs
to calculate the variance of the observed degrees of SLA violation. In case the variance
is low (close to zero), the amounts of observations that were identified in Section 7.2.2
suffice to approximate the risk of SLA violation precise enough to make correct deci-
sions. If the variance of observed degrees of SLA violation is significantly higher, more
observations need to be collected. Advice on the additionally required number of ob-
servations can be derived from the coefficients resulting from the regression analysis.
Exemplarily, the coefficient for the variance in Table 7.4 shows, that an additional unit
of variance requires 19.710 additional observations. Table 7.5 is to be read analogously.
This way, a solution to Research Question 4 concerning the provider’s decision on SLA
establishment is provided.
In Section 7.3.2, the amount of monitoring observations that is required for the meth-
ods that solve an intermediary’s decision problem on establishing SLAs with providers
was determined. The statistical analysis revealed that an intermediary is required to
collect at least 100 observations for each provider SLA portfolio if the semi-variance
-minimizing method is applied and to collect 20 observations if the utility-maximizing
method is applied. The amount of required data is slightly higher than the required
amount for the decision of entering SLAs with customers. Nevertheless, the data can
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still be collected in reasonable time, depending on the monitoring periods. By taking
the results from Section 7.2 into account, an intermediary is required to gather at least
50 observations for the risk-minimizing decision about SLAs with customers and at
least 100 observations for the risk-minimizing decision about SLAs with providers. If
the utility-maximizing method is applied to solve an intermediary’s decision problem,
10 observations for customer SLAs and 20 observations for provider SLAs have to be
collected.
Similar to the decision on SLAs with customers (Section 7.2) for the semi-variance
-minimizing decision requires to collect more monitoring observations than for the
utility-maximizing decision. This can be explained by the semi-variance ’s property of
taking only those observations that are worse than average into account, which leads
to a higher total of observations. The results from Section 7.3.2 give general advice on
the minimum amount of data that needs to be collected based on an average of the
150 created problem sets. As the distribution of observations can differ very much in
their properties, the following section investigates the impact of the PDFs’ properties,
measured by the variance, on the required amount of monitoring observations.
Section 7.3.3 explored the impact of dispersion of monitoring observations on the re-
quired amount of monitoring observations.
The evaluation results imply that the required amount of observations that were de-
termined in Section 7.3.2, that is 100 observations for the semi-variance-minimizing
approach, need to be increased for high variances. For low variances, the previously
determined number of observations is sufficient. The result for an intermediary’s deci-
sion was contradictory and requires further research.
An intermediary is required to collect monitoring observations for provider and for
customer SLA portfolios. Thus, the results that were retrieved in Section 7.2 apply
to an intermediary’s decision problem. This implies that an intermediary is required
to collect at least 50 observations for customer SLAs and at least 100 observations for
provider SLAs if the risk-minimizing method is applied and at least 10 observations for
customer SLAs and 20 observations for provider SLAs if the utility-maximizing method
is applied. The amount of observations that is required for the decision about provider
SLAs is slightly higher than the amount that is required for the decision about cus-
tomer SLAs. However, it is only the next step in the chosen amounts y of monitoring
observations that is required in addition for either approach and hence, is considered
to be due to the differences in the calculation of semi-variance and certainty equivalent
for the decision about provider SLAs. The amount of observations that an intermedi-
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ary needs to collect depends on the variance of the degrees of SLA violation that an
intermediary observes in reality. Once, an intermediary that wants to apply the risk-
minimizing decision support has collected 50 observations of each portfolio of SLAs
with customers and 100 observations for each SLA portfolio with providers, they need
to determine the variance of the observed degrees of SLA violation. If this variance is
very low, i. e. close to zero, the collected observations suffice and the risk-minimizing
decision support leads to an optimal decision. Otherwise, the intermediary is advised
to collect more monitoring observations.
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THE servicification of value creation that fosters a shift away from the traditionaltrade of goods towards an exchange of services (Vargo and Lusch 2004b) in which
goods are considered as vehicles for services was the motivating factor for this thesis.
The rise of the Internet and related technologies in recent years brought about changes
to the way in which services are provisioned. The Internet facilitates the offering and
provisioning of services to an extended circle of potential customers. While potential
customers were previously attracted by personal contacts, advertisements or in maga-
zines of which the perception is limited by coverage, the Internet does not have these
constraints. Nearly everybody can be reached by Internet advertisements, which in-
creases the number of potential customers for service providers (Anderson 2006), the
requests for service provisioning and the number of SLAs that regulate service provi-
sioning. This results in the need for cooperation among service providers in order to
meet the demand for customized services, which is facilitated by the joint provisioning
of services. This thesis has provided a method that supports decisions on the establish-
ment of SLAs.
The case of joint provisioning of Web or Cloud services is only one example, in which
the cooperation of service providers is required. An example for the joint provisioning
of a general service is the building of a house, where the cooperation of different crafts-
men is required for the completion of a variety of tasks like building the walls, tiling
floors, heating and ventilation installation. Thus, managing the cooperation of service
providers is a problem that is inherent to all of the introduced types of services (Section
2.1). The joint provisioning of services is regulated by the stipulation of SLAs, in which
the functionality and quality of provided services is determined along with a price for
service provisioning and a penalty that is applied in case of SLA violation.
Thus, providers of different types of services need to make decisions concerning the
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establishment of SLAs. However, for the establishment of SLAs for services that are
provided via the Internet, special challenges arise. These challenges were identified in
Section 3.3 and concern the impact of the availability of the Internet and related tech-
nologies, which result in an increasing number of SLAs to decide on and the technical
composition of services. Further challenges that need to be addressed concern the pres-
ence of a multitude of customers and the expression and consideration of the risk of
SLA violation in the decision. Finding a solution to this decision problem that consid-
ers these challenges was the focus of this thesis.
8.1 Contributions
This thesis is concerned with making decisions on SLA establishment. In Section 3.3,
five challenges that need to be addressed in decision support for the establishment of
SLAs have been identified. The challenges concern the impact that the availability of
the Internet has on the provisioning of services by fostering an increase in the demand
for services and a change in the type of service provisioning and composition. Further-
more, the presence of a multitude of customers was identified as having an impact on
making decisions about SLA establishment. Finally, in these decisions, uncertainty of
future SLA violations needs to be taken into account. Thus, an expression for the risk
of SLA violation was required that can be employed in the decision.
The decision on SLA establishment that considers these challenges was considered
from the viewpoint of a service provider. In Section 2.3.2, two types of service providers
were distinguished - service providers that can provide all functionality and quality by
themselves and intermediaries who cannot provide all functionality by themselves and
thus need to procure services from other providers. The first contribution of this thesis
is the answer to Research Question 2:
RESEARCH QUESTION 2 ≺PROVIDER’S RISK-MINIMIZING DECISION. How can a
provider select the SLAs that minimize the risk of SLA violation while taking their technical
properties and economic preferences into account?
A method that solves a service provider’s decision problem was introduced that applies
the semi-variance of expected penalties as a measure of risk which is minimized in
the objective function. In order to account for a provider’s available resources and
the profit that a provider wants to gain from service provisioning, constraints were
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included in the decision problem. By employing an adaptation of portfolio selection, a
decision on a multitude of SLAs with customers is possible. Consequently, a provider’s
technical and economic properties and the five challenges in decision making for SLA
establishment are met. However, this method did not include the possibility to specify
a trade-off between the risk of SLA violation and expected profit. Thus, an extension to
the risk-minimizing decision was presented that maximizes the expected utility from
service provisioning as measured by the certainty equivalent. The certainty equivalent
resembles a trade-off between expected profit and risk of SLA violation, expressed by
the variance of SLA violation, individually weighted by a service provider’s coefficient
of absolute risk-aversion. Like the risk-minimizing decision, the utility-maximizing
decision meets the challenges from Section 3.3. While the first method is suitable if the
distributions of the degrees of violation are asymmetric and if a provider’s main goal is
to avoid the violation of SLAs, for instance in case of prohibitively high penalties. The
second method is suitable for risk-averse decision makers and when the distributions
of the degree of violation are symmetric.
The second contribution focuses on an intermediary’s decision problem concerning the
establishment of SLAs with customers and providers as an extension to the decision
problem of a service provider. This was addressed by Research Question 3:
RESEARCH QUESTION 3 ≺INTERMEDIARY’S RISK-MINIMIZING DECISION. How
can an intermediary select the SLAs with customers and supplying providers that minimize
the risk of SLA violation while taking their technical properties and economic preferences into
account?
In order to solve an intermediary’s decision problem under consideration of the chal-
lenges that were described above, an intermediary’s available resources and expected
profit, the methods for a service provider’s decision were extended. A method was
presented that minimizes the risk of violating SLAs with customers and the risk of SLA
violation by providers. Similar to the risk-minimizing decision of a provider, an in-
termediary’s risk-minimizing decision with customers and providers does not account
for a trade-off between the risk of SLA violation and expected profit. Therefore, an
extension of the risk-minimizing method for decision making that maximizes an inter-
mediary’s expected utility from the service provision and consumption was expressed
by the certainty equivalent. Both of the methods that solve an intermediary’s decision
problem consider the challenges on decision making that were raised in Section 3.3 and
take an intermediary’s available resources and expected profit into account. As before,
the first method is suitable in cases of asymmetric distributions of the degrees of vi-
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olation. The second method is suitable in situations with symmetric distributions of
degree of SLA violation and risk-averse intermediaries.
However, in order to address both, Research Questions 2 and 3, several related ques-
tions had to be addressed. First, important groundwork was laid. Additionally, ques-
tions about the applicability in practice needed to be answered in order to supplement
Research Questions 2 and 3. This thesis incorporates contributions, which complement
the implementation of decision support for providers and intermediaries. The basis
for the presented approaches was laid by defining what a service is and delineating
service types that emerge with the availability of the Internet and related technologies.
After having given a clear definition of the trading object, SLAs that regulate the provi-
sion and consumption of services were described and discussed. A thorough literature
review gave an overview of the constituents of an SLA, which comprise a functional
description of the provided service and quality objectives along with a price and a
penalty. From the building parts of an SLA, technical and economic properties of a
service provider and an intermediary that constrain the decision about SLA establish-
ment were identified.
In a thorough literature review on economic principles of decision theory and the ex-
pression of risk, methods for decision making about SLA establishment that minimize
the risk of SLA violation were discussed. Finally, from related literature in the field
of SLA management and decision making about joint service provisioning, challenges
that have not been considered yet were identified. The methods that address Research
Questions 2 and 3 apply the foundations on decision making, expression of risk and
SLA establishment under the consideration of the challenges that were identified from
related work and a service provider’s or intermediary’s technical and economic prop-
erties. The aspects that drive a provider’s and an intermediary’s decision about SLA
establishment are in the focus of Research Question 1:
RESEARCH QUESTION 1 ≺STIPULATION OF SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENTS. What
do a provider and a customer of a service stipulate about service provisioning in a Service Level
Agreement and which technical properties and economic preferences of a service provider influ-
ence the decision about establishing an SLA?
The methods that address the decision problems of service providers and intermedi-
aries, respectively, as the focal contribution of this thesis were formulated in order to
account for providers’ and intermediaries’ constraints as identified in Research Ques-
tion 1. The risk of SLA violation is calculated from monitoring observations about SLA
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violations in the past. Consequently, the methods that solve the problems depend ex-
tremely on the amount of available data. Therefore, the suggested approaches were
evaluated with respect to the required amount of monitoring observations.
RESEARCH QUESTION 4 ≺REQUIRED AMOUNT OF MONITORING DATA FOR DECI-
SION MAKING. How many monitoring observations are required for the calculation of SLA
violation risk in a) a provider’s and b) an intermediary’s decision on SLA establishment?
It was shown that a provider needs to collect a relatively low amount of monitoring
observations, no matter whether the risk-minimizing method or the utility-maximizing
method are applied. For a provider’s risk-minimizing decision, an amount of 50 ob-
servations was identified, whereas the utility-maximizing approach requires only 10
observations from the past. For the identification of the required amount of monitor-
ing observations artificial monitoring observations were created as random draws from
probability distributions. The knowledge of the distribution function enabled the calcu-
lation of semi-variance and certainty equivalent directly from the distribution function
and hence, the most precise representation of semi-variance and certainty equivalent
was retrieved. The SLA portfolio that minimized the semi-variance and the portfo-
lio that maximized the certainty equivalent were chosen as the SLA portfolio that a
provider should establish and thus, the portfolios are the benchmark portfolio for ei-
ther method. By comparing the benchmark portfolios to the portfolios that were chosen
by minimizing the semi-variance that was calculated from different amounts of mon-
itoring observations, or maximizing the certainty equivalent that was computed from
different amounts of monitoring observations, the correctness of the respective choice
could be determined. The creation of a particular amount of monitoring observations
and the choice of a portfolio from these monitoring observations was repeated so that
for each amount of monitoring a fraction of correct choices could be calculated. The
fraction of correct choices is a proxy for the probability of making a correct decision. In
order to retrieve results that are independent from a particular distribution function of
the degree of SLA violation, 150 problem sets with different probability distributions
for the degree of SLA vioaltion are created.
By comparing the fraction of correct choices for different amounts of observations, it
was possible to determine if the probability of makig a correct decision increases sig-
nificantly with an increase in the amount of observations. The amount for which the
probability can not be increased significantly is the amount which is required for a
provider’s decision about SLA establishment as the representation of SLA violation
risk that is calculated from this amount of observations is as precise as it can become.
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The results were derived on the basis of an average over the distribution functions from
the 150 problem sets. Therefore, in an extended evaluation, the impact of the disper-
sion of monitoring observations as measured by the variance of the observed degrees
of SLA violation on the required amount of monitoring observations was investigated.
The results showed, that a higher variance in the observations leads to more observa-
tions that are required for a provider’s decision. This implies, that for a low variance,
50 observations are sufficient for the risk-minimizing decision and 10 observations suf-
fice for the utility-maximizing decision but that the number of observations needs to
be increased the higher the variance in the observations. The required increase in the
number of observations that depends on the increase of the variance is shown in Tables
7.4 and 7.5.
The amount of monitoring observations that is required for an intermediary’s decision
about SLA establishment was identified analogously to the evaluation of a provider’s
decision. For an intermediary’s risk-minimizing decision, an amount of 100 observa-
tions is required, whereas the utility-maximizing approach requires only 20 observa-
tions from the past. Artificial monitoring data was created and the sample-based deci-
sions were compared to the benchmark portfolios. This comparison was carried out for
customer and provider SLA portfolios and resulted in observations if the decision that
was made by taking artificial monitoring observations into account were correct. For
each of the different amounts of monitoring observations, this approach was repeated
1000 times. Consequently, for each amount of observations, a fraction of correct choices
could be determined.
By checking the fraction of correct choices for different amounts of observations against
each other, the required amount of monitoring data could be identified as the amount of
data from which on the fraction of correct choices could not be improved significantly
any more.
As in the provider’s case the impact of the variance of the observed degrees of SLA
violation on the required amount of monitoring data was investigated. As before, the
results imply that a higher variance required a higher amount of monitoring data in the
risk-minimizing decision. Consequently, for a low variance, 100 observations are suffi-
cient for the risk-minimizing decision. For high variances, this number of observations
needs be increased. The results of the intermediary’s utility maximizing decision imply
that further investigation on the impact of prices, costs and penalties is required.
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8.2 Open Research Questions and Future Work
This section critically discusses the assumptions that were raised in the work at hand
and resulting restrictions. Possible solutions to these restrictions are outlined and future
research directions are derived from the suggested solutions.
8.2.1 Existence of Monitoring Data
Each of the presented methods in this work that solve a provider’s and an intermedi-
ary’s decision problem on the establishment of SLAs, calculates the risk of SLA viola-
tion from monitoring observations from the past. First, this requires that monitoring
data is available, or in other words that the decision maker had already entered into
SLAs and monitored their adherence. Second, as it was shown in Chapter 7, relying
on monitoring data from the past requires that a certain amount of observations are
available for each portfolio of SLAs. Consequently, in order to ensure the applicability
of the presented methods, in this work it was assumed that service providers and inter-
mediaries restrict their offerings to a pre-specified set of SLAs (see Assumption 1). This
constrains the number of available SLAs and the number of possible combinations as
long as only one instance can be active in each period. Third, in order to facilitate com-
parability of monitoring results, the underlying infrastructure was assumed to remain
constant over the monitored periods (see Assumption 3).
The availability of monitoring data can be assumed for service providers and interme-
diaries, which are experienced in providing services for some time. Nevertheless, in the
case that a provider or intermediary intends to offer a new SLA for a known service,
there is no information available about the degrees of violation that can be expected.
For this case, an approach that estimates the degree of violation is required in order to
include the new SLA in decisions. This could be facilitated by determining the degree
of similarity of the new SLA to already known SLAs. Measures for similarity emerged
with the field of multivariate statistics and cluster analysis (Johnson 1988; Kaufman
et al. 1990; Steinhausen 1977). By applying similarity measures from the field of cluster
analysis, the most similar SLA can be determined and the corresponding distributions
of the degree of violation can be employed as a proxy for the new SLA’s expected de-
gree of violation.
In the case that a service provider or intermediary wants to expand their portfolio of
offered services and include the new services, information about the performance of
181
Chapter 8 Conclusions
the service needs to be retrieved. Therefore, performance testing needs to be applied in
order to retrieve an estimation of the service’s behavior. Performance testing method-
ologies have been applied in the context of infrastructure planning (Happe et al. 2010;
Kounev 2006) but can be applied for estimating service behavior as well.
Finally, if an intermediary is confronted with the case that a new service provider enters
the market, information about the provider’s adherence to SLAs needs to be retrieved
in order to include the new SLAs in the decision problem. Therefore, an intermediary
is required to spend money on information retrieval concerning the provider’s prop-
erties in adhering to SLAs. The amount of money that should be spent on gathering
information, as market analyses or profiling the new provider, can be determined by
applying transaction cost theory (Coase 1937) or the theory of the expected value of
perfect information (Felli and Hazen 1998).
Even though the assumption of a restricted number of pre-defined SLAs is realistic for
cases of incumbent service providers like Amazon or Salesforce, the assumption that
only one instance of each SLA is concurrently active is not (see Assumption 1). In order
to relax the assumptions of a pre-defined set of SLAs and the number of concurrently
active instances of one SLA, an approach that does not restrict the dynamic definition
of SLAs needs to be sought. For the case of the extension of already known SLAs,
measures of similarity and their application (Johnson 1988; Kaufman et al. 1990; Stein-
hausen 1977) require further investigation. By identifying similar portfolios, the behav-
ior of the new portfolio can be estimated. Additionally, approaches for performance
testing can be applied in cases, where no similar portfolios are available.
Assumption 3 required that the underlying infrastructure, that is, resources, does not
change over time. This assumption aimed to achieve comparability of monitoring data.
In order to apply the presented methods in settings, where the infrastructure is adapted
in the case of SLA violation, monitoring data needs to be weighted according to its
age. This way, newer monitoring data can be emphasized. Approaches that allow for
the weighting of input data include exponential smoothing (Trigg and Leach 1967).
Further assumptions served to ensure the applicability of the presented approaches,
among them the restriction to include only one service in each SLA (Assumption 2) and
equal length of monitoring periods (Assumption 4). Relaxing Assumption 2 requires
an adaptation of the presented methods that captures a multitude of services per SLA
by adapting the monitoring system. To consider monitoring periods that have different
lengths, the formulation of semi-variance and certainty equivalent need to be adapted
in order to allow a weighting of monitoring observations. Both of these extensions open
perspectives for future research.
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In summary, the existence of monitoring data and restrictions to the provider’s and in-
termediary’s freedom in specifying SLAs needs further consideration. Especially the
development of a feasible measure of similarity for SLAs as well as for portfolios of
SLAs in conjunction with the application of performance testing are considered as most
important future steps. In order to complete the process of service level management
according to ITIL1 the suggested methods that solve providers’ and intermediaries’
decision problems for SLA establishment need to be extended in order to account for
adapted infrastructure. Additionally, providers and intermediaries will include the ex-
perience from the past in their decisions on prices and penalties. This issue is discussed
in the following section.
8.2.2 Seperation of SLA Portfolio Selection From Pricing Decisions
Based on the assumption of exogenously given prices and penalties, the methods that
were introduced in Chapters 4 and 5 enable a service provider and an intermediary,
respectively, to select the SLA portfolio that incurs the lowest risk (or the highest possi-
ble expected utility). The selection of an SLA portfolio is taken into account seperately
from the decision on prices and penalties. This design decision serves to distinguish
the effect of negotiation and strategic pricing decisions from SLA portfolio optimiza-
tion. In the presented approach, the prices and penalties from the SLAs in the portfolio
currently under consideration are taken into account. The uncertainty of an SLA vio-
lation, which is calculated from past SLA violation data, is put into context with the
current specification of the SLAs, i. e. its prices and penalties.
In real-world service provisioning scenarios, there are cases in which the price (and
penalty) for service provisioning is fixed and does not change with respect to the cus-
tomer (e. g. Amazon Web Services pricing). Nevertheless, this does not mean that prices
do not change over time. In contrast, it can be assumed that experience from the past
influences pricing decisions. Consequently, taking the decision on prices and penal-
ties explicitly into account would extend the methods for making decisions for SLA
establishment, presented in this work, to allow for an endgenous and experience-based
design of prices and penalties. The question that has to be answered in this context is
in determining the most suitable pricing mechanism. This mechanism has to take into
account the impact that the availability of the Internet and related technologies has on
service provsioning and with it, for instance the specific characteristics of SaaS offers.
1http://www.itil.org/de/vomkennen/iso20000/servicedeliveryprozesse/
servicelevelmanagement.php last accessed: October 9, 2011
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Static pricing, as described in the Amazon Web services case above, can be employed
for a big variety of goods as well as for services, even if it does not lead to the highest
possible return in most cases. First degree price discrimination, which enables the set-
ting of a specific price for each customer, exhibits challenges with respect to identifying
a customer’s preferences (Shapiro and Varian 1999; Varian 1997), which implies that it
remains a merely theoretical approach. Versioning, bundling as well as amount-based
pricing have already been observed in software and service trade (Krämer 2010; Lam-
brecht and Skiera 2006; Sundararajan 2004). Therefore, second degree price discrimi-
nation exhibits features, which makes it a feasible pricing mechanism for SaaS offers.
For third degree price discrimination, challenges arise for group segmentation and the
verification of customers’ affiliation. Nevertheless, group pricing is a promising ap-
proach that can overcome problems of identifying a customer’s type and is applicable
for service pricing (Knapper et al. 2011).
Finally, dynamic pricing is considered. Services, including Web services and SaaS-
offers, are often part of joint service provisioning scenarios and hence, experience
(semi-)automatic service composition. This imposes time and complexity constraints
on the pricing mechanism. Therefore, the time-consumption of auction mechanisms
need further investigation. Dynamic pricing mechanisms can be observed in practice
(Amazon EC2 Spot Instance2) and have been discussed in theory with different ob-
jectives like incentive compatibility (Blau 2009), fairness and network-growth (Conte
2010), or revenue management (Anandasivam 2010).
Despite the variety of the pricing mechanisms in place, none of the approaches con-
siders penalties as a strategic means to incentivize the adherence to SLAs while con-
sidering past monitoring observations. First approaches in this direction have been
introduced in Filipova-Neumann et al. (2010) and Michalk and Haas (2011) but still
require further research.
8.2.3 Simulation-based Evaluation
Simulations often expose valuable results and give reasonable insights. Nevertheless,
there are limitations of simulation-based evaluations, which have to be considered. In
order to conduct a simulation-based evaluation, reality has to be abstracted from, which
simplifies the real-world scenarios. In this thesis, the decision problems of providers
and intermediaries have been constrained to small instances with only three available
2http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/spot-instances/ last accessed: October 10, 2011
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SLAs to offer (and to procure in the intermediary’s case). In real-world scenarios, the
decision maker will most-likely be confronted with a higher number of SLAs and possi-
ble combinations. Additionally, as no monitoring and analytics system that could meet
the approach’s requirements was in place, distributions for the degree of violation were
chosen randomly as a basis for a provider’s and an intermediary’s decision. The valid-
ity of the chosen distribution could not be validated due to the unavailability of real
monitoring data. In order to substantiate the approach of randomly chosen probability
distributions, the simulation was run for different instantiations of distributions and
results were deducted from a) the entirety of problem sets (see Sections 7.2.2 and 7.3.2)
and b) each problem set seperatly (see Sections 7.2.3 and 7.3.3). Furthermore, an inves-
tigation on the impact of the number of SLAs that can be established simultaneously on
the resulting decisions could shed light on the question of the optimal number of SLAs
that a service provider, or intermediary, should hold available.
Even though the data gives valuable insights to the applicability of the presented meth-
ods, the suggested simulation-based evaluation includes simplifications, which prevent
the generalization of the results in their totality. In order to allow for a more general
validity of the results, further research should take up on the validity of the simulated
probability distributions of the degrees of violation. Additionally, the implementation
of a monitoring system, which delivers monitoring observations that meet the assump-
tions on monitoring data is suggested in order to underpin the approach’s applicabil-
ity.
8.2.4 Consumer Behaviour and Long-term SLA Design
The methods that address the decision on SLA establishment focussed on a provider’s,
or intermediary’s, perspective. The impact that consumer behavior can have on the ad-
herence to an SLA has not been considered, yet. Consumer behavior may include for
instance the load that is put on a service as measured by the number of requests, the
premature cancellation of an SLA because due to discontent or the violation of agreed
terms. To include this behavior in the decision problem, the methods that address SLA
establishment decisions need to be extended. Therefore, new methodologies need to be
employed that allow to capture consumer behavior, which could be facilitated by the
application of methodologies like Markov decision processes that model load curves,
negotiation protocols that regulate bilateral agreement stipulation and their cancella-
tion as well as incentive schemes that foster the adherence to agreed terms on the
provider’s as well as on the consumer’s side. In this vein, considering consumer be-
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haviour opens a field of intriguing and most interesting research.
The decision support for SLA establishment required a fixed set of SLAs that a provider
offers to customers, in which prices and penalties are set exogenously and only once.
In settings of service outsourcing it is often the case, that long term SLAs are stipulated
and re-negotiated after certain periods of time. In this context, aspects of incentiva-
tion of providers and consumers gains an additional dimension. Besides the threat
of a penalty, future negotiations need to be considered in decisions about effort that
influences service provisioning and decisions that influence a consumer’s behaviour.
Consequently, infrastructure planning decisions (a provider’s effort to increase service
performance) may be affected. To investigate the impact of long term agreements opens
a completely new perspective on SLAs and requires to capture negotiation protocols as
well as infrastructure planning and many more. Hence, further research is required to
address these fascinating questions.
8.3 Complementary Research
This section gives an overview about research directions, which are related to the work
at hand but are not direct extensions. The topics point the reader to supplementary
aspects of decision making on SLA establishment from an economic, technical and so-
ciological viewpoint.
Intelligent Querying in Service Repositories The provisioning of services and the
composition of service modules in order to create value and to meet customers’ demand
is increasingly important in today’s business. With the fast growing market of Web and
Cloud services and their compositions, (semi-)automated methods are required to find
appropriate services. In order to facilitate service composition, especially in the context
of service marketplaces, knowledge about services that can be offered, procured, and
composed is required. As argued at the beginning of this work, service composition
and with it, the cooperation of service providers, is regulated by means of SLAs. Ad-
ditionally to the service description, qualitative attributes along with price and penalty
are stipulated. Therefore, the corresponding SLAs have to be connected to the service
desriptions.
In this context complementary research questions deal with formalisms for the descrip-
tion of functional and non-functional service properties and the corresponding quality
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of service attributes. In order to enable reusability of services in different contexts, the
pure description with standards like WSDL (Christensen et al. 2001) and SOAP does
not suffice, as these do only contain rudimentary descriptions of service functionality.
Consequently, a more elaborate description of services is required, which allows for
functional, non-functional and quality aspects. One approach that meets these require-
ments is presented in Agarwal et al. (2008). The discovery of services that match a
user’s request for functional, non-functional and quality aspects is described in Jung-
hans and Agarwal (2010).
An extension to the approaches in Agarwal et al. 2008 and Junghans and Agarwal
(2010) that allows for a specification of SLAs and that implements a ranking of SLAs
with respect to their respective level of qualities would complement the work at hand
in the stage of identifying feasible SLAs to offer (for the provider) and the combinations
of offered and required SLAs (for the intermediary).
Aggregation of Monitoring Results The previously described complementary re-
search about service discovery directly leads into the research area of service monitor-
ing and analytics. Having identified feasible services in a business-relevant scenario
of service provisioning, service level management gains momentum. Service level
management does not only include the negotiation of service functionality and qual-
ity goals, that are stipulated in SLAs. It considers the monitoring of the active service
and the communication of these to the customer (Bon 2005).
The standardized specification of SLAs and the included elements like SLOs, for spec-
ifying the stipulated quality goals as presented in Andrieux et al. (2007) lays the basis
for service level monitoring. The technical implementation of monitoring systems like
Nagios (Barth 2008) allows to observe the service performance and resulting status of
the SLA. In Andrieux et al. (2007), a service in an SLA can take the states not ready,
completed, or ready and processing or ready and idle (see Figure 8.1). If the service is pro-
cessing, each guarantee, that is, each SLO can be monitored and determined to be either
fulfilled, violated, or not determined (see Figure 8.2). In case one of the SLOs is found to
be violated, the whole SLA is determined to be violated. As an extension to this rather
strict way of judgement, in Schulz (2010) an approach is presented that allows the de-
termination of the degree of violation of an SLA. This means that the severity of the
SLA violation has an impact on the final degree of violation of an SLA and in last con-
sequence on the penalty, which has to be payed. By implementing a measure for the
degree of violation of an SLA, this research complements the work at hand by aggre-
gating the input to the decision problems in a feasible way.
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FIGURE 8.1: Service States according to WS Agreement
FIGURE 8.2: Guarantee States according to WS Agreement
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Cross-layer Aggregation of QoS Metrics When requesting a service from a service
provider or intermediary, a customer does have their requirements about functionality
and a conception on quality goals and corresponding price and penalty in mind. For the
customer, it does not matter whether the requested service is a composition of service
modules or rather a bundle provided by one single provider. For a service provider and
particularly an intermediary, it is of major importance if services need to be requested
from other providers. However, besides the technical aspects of provisioning a certain
functionality to the customer, the question of delivering the specified quality becomes
more complicated. For an intermediary the question arises, how QoS attributes from
supplied service modules relate to quality goals that will be stipulated in an SLA with
a customer.
Similar considerations arise in the context of business processes, where the interplay of
services and different patterns for the sequence of execution along with the aggrega-
tion of QoS attributes play an important role. More specifically, service attributes are
subject to a different aggregation logic depending on the underlying process pattern.
This implies that the intermediary has to be aware of the process pattern, that is, the
exact sequence of service execution, in order to apply the correct aggregation of QoS
attributes.
Approaches that map business process description and the aggregation of QoS at-
tributes have been discussed in literature. van Der Aalst et al. (2003) introduced a
small set of universally valid patterns to which every workflow can be reduced. Based
on these workflow patterns, research in the area of aggregation of QoS attributes has
tackled, besides others, the classification of attributes, automated aggregation with the
help of ontologies (Blake and Cummings 2007; Unger et al. 2008; Knapper et al. 2010).
Non-monetary Penalties in Social Environments Apart from the increasing impor-
tance that service trading gained in recent years, another development could be ob-
served. Especially the emergence and rapid growth social network platforms like Face-
book3, Xing4, and LinkedIn5 was detected. Social network platforms allow for the ex-
tension of usual Web technologies by a social context, which connects providers and
consumers of information, goods and services.
Social aspects of online collaboration exhibit challenges for consumers, providers, and
3https://www.facebook.com last accessed: October 10, 2011
4http://www.xing.com last accessed: October 10, 2011
5http://www.linkedin.com last accessed: October 10, 2011
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intermediating parties. The application of SLAs, which serve to stipulate service func-
tionality, non-functional attributes, and quality goals is common in business relevant
service provisioning scenarios. In this context, the adherence to SLAs is incentivized
by specifying penalties by means of a monetary amount or sanctions that can be trans-
lated to a monetary amount on behalf of the provider. With the background of social
networks, penalties need to be considered differently in order to take social rather than
monetary aspects into consideration.
Standard economic assumptions state the maximization of expected utility as the main
aim of an individual. However, even that there is no perceived utility gain from partici-
pating in systems like Peer-to-Peer networks or the community portal Wikipedia, vivid
participation in these systems can be observed, because some users behave unselfishly
to some degree (Hughes et al. 2005). Principles from the field of sociology or social eco-
nomics that are subsumed by the term “Social Preferences” include concepts of altruism,
reputation and reciprocation. These concepts enable the explicit investigation under
which settings people have incentives to engage in certain types of interactions even if
it would be optimal for rational individuals not to engage in the interactions (Berg et al.
1995; Charness and Rabin 2002; Trivers 1971). An adaptation of established ways to
setting incentives in economic settings by including concepts from sociology will help
to consider a social environment in the formulation of penalties and the establishment




A.1 Evaluation for Provider’s Decision Methods
A.1.1 Minimization of Semi-Variance
TABLE A.1: Evaluation of Provider’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Mean Difference in Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 1 272∗∗∗ 290∗∗∗ 147∗∗∗ 15∗∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 2 228∗∗∗ 124∗∗∗ 59∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 3 -18 -62∗∗ 71∗∗∗ 73∗∗∗ 74∗∗∗ 53∗∗∗ 33∗∗∗
Problem Set 4 229∗∗∗ 101∗∗∗ 41∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 5 215∗∗∗ 117∗∗∗ 59∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 6 248∗∗∗ 105∗∗∗ 13∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 7 301∗∗∗ 124∗∗∗ 51∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 8 264∗∗∗ 124∗∗∗ 23∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 9 192∗∗∗ 79∗∗∗ 35∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 10 18∗∗ 10∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 11 203∗∗∗ 67∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 12 217∗∗∗ 150∗∗∗ 129∗∗∗ 48∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 13 155∗∗∗ 173∗∗∗ 138∗∗∗ 40∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0
Problem Set 14 228∗∗∗ 159∗∗∗ 28∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 15 239∗∗∗ 217∗∗∗ 83∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 16 145∗∗∗ 58∗∗∗ 43∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 17 223∗∗∗ 103∗∗∗ 18∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 18 242∗∗∗ 249∗∗∗ 193∗∗∗ 49∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 19 -30 -41∗ 52∗∗ 76∗∗∗ 76∗∗∗ 52∗∗∗ 20∗∗∗
Problem Set 20 170∗∗∗ 190∗∗∗ 213∗∗∗ 81∗∗∗ 51∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0
Problem Set 21 208∗∗∗ 128∗∗∗ 187∗∗∗ 55∗∗∗ 25∗∗∗ 4∗ 0
Problem Set 22 83∗∗∗ 63∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 23 176∗∗∗ 140∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 24 62∗∗∗ 110∗∗∗ 43∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0
Problem Set 25 181∗∗∗ 158∗∗∗ 35∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 26 135∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 65∗∗∗ 3 1 0 0
I
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TABLE A.1: Evaluation of Provider’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Mean Difference in Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 27 191∗∗∗ 116∗∗∗ 36∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 28 94∗∗∗ 72∗∗∗ 21∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 29 233∗∗∗ 112∗∗∗ 63∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 30 154∗∗∗ 101∗∗∗ 25∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 31 242∗∗∗ 124∗∗∗ 28∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 32 148∗∗∗ 172∗∗∗ 130∗∗∗ 30∗∗∗ 1 0 0
Problem Set 33 133∗∗∗ 121∗∗∗ 25∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 34 350∗∗∗ 159∗∗∗ 43∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 35 139∗∗∗ -133∗∗∗ -5 5 -6∗ 0 0
Problem Set 36 100∗∗∗ 112∗∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 37 121∗∗∗ 179∗∗∗ 210∗∗∗ 97∗∗∗ 91∗∗∗ 43∗∗∗ 5∗
Problem Set 38 233∗∗∗ 153∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 39 197∗∗∗ 161∗∗∗ 48∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 40 211∗∗∗ 120∗∗∗ 33∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 41 166∗∗∗ 114∗∗∗ 47∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 42 303∗∗∗ 168∗∗∗ 21∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 43 212∗∗∗ 95∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 44 -106∗∗∗ -10 -16 83∗∗∗ 57∗∗ 97∗∗∗ 67∗∗∗
Problem Set 45 120∗∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 46 46∗ 81∗∗∗ 115∗∗∗ 68∗∗ 57∗ 38 97∗∗∗
Problem Set 47 104∗∗∗ 229∗∗∗ 277∗∗∗ 155∗∗∗ 81∗∗∗ 46∗∗∗ 2
Problem Set 48 217∗∗∗ 71∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 49 156∗∗∗ 115∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 50 142∗∗∗ 107∗∗∗ 74∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 51 213∗∗∗ 123∗∗∗ 15∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 52 148∗∗∗ 107∗∗∗ 89∗∗∗ 108∗∗∗ 33∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 1
Problem Set 53 204∗∗∗ 125∗∗∗ 57∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 54 147∗∗∗ 301∗∗∗ 314∗∗∗ 61∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 55 214∗∗∗ 120∗∗∗ 33∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 56 247∗∗∗ 174∗∗∗ 33∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 57 243∗∗∗ 232∗∗∗ 101∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0
Problem Set 58 22∗ 43∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 59 264∗∗∗ 170∗∗∗ 44∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0
Problem Set 60 111∗∗∗ 72∗∗∗ 25∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 61 67∗∗ 254∗∗∗ 215∗∗∗ 79∗∗∗ 17∗∗∗ 2 0
Problem Set 62 217∗∗∗ 193∗∗∗ 136∗∗∗ 104∗∗∗ 43∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0
Problem Set 63 305∗∗∗ 108∗∗∗ 22∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 64 159∗∗∗ 99∗∗∗ 18∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 65 133∗∗∗ 141∗∗∗ 60∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 66 109∗∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 44∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 67 198∗∗∗ 127∗∗∗ 21∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 68 138∗∗∗ 93∗∗∗ 15∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 69 137∗∗∗ 131∗∗∗ 73∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 70 -23 -17 56∗∗∗ 67∗∗∗ 30∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0
Problem Set 71 97∗∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 94∗∗∗ 5 12 -10 -32
Problem Set 72 190∗∗∗ 263∗∗∗ 277∗∗∗ 106∗∗∗ 27∗∗∗ 6∗ 0
Problem Set 73 39∗ 91∗∗∗ 37∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0
Problem Set 74 249∗∗∗ 108∗∗∗ 23∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 75 159∗∗∗ 128∗∗∗ 36∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 76 252∗∗∗ 112∗∗∗ 28∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
II
A.1 Evaluation for Provider’s Decision Methods
TABLE A.1: Evaluation of Provider’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Mean Difference in Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 77 201∗∗∗ 94∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 78 206∗∗∗ 129∗∗∗ 63∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 79 242∗∗∗ 259∗∗∗ 154∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 1 0 0
Problem Set 80 260∗∗∗ 129∗∗∗ 30∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 81 226∗∗∗ 110∗∗∗ 17∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 82 132∗∗∗ 78∗∗∗ 65∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0
Problem Set 83 162∗∗∗ 116∗∗∗ 34∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 84 222∗∗∗ 128∗∗∗ 37∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 85 177∗∗∗ 133∗∗∗ 38∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 86 209∗∗∗ 183∗∗∗ 130∗∗∗ 35∗∗∗ 2 0 0
Problem Set 87 204∗∗∗ 119∗∗∗ 24∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 88 168∗∗∗ 147∗∗∗ 170∗∗∗ 61∗∗∗ 93∗∗∗ 32∗∗∗ 2
Problem Set 89 107∗∗∗ 80∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 90 319∗∗∗ 305∗∗∗ 72∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 91 192∗∗∗ 176∗∗∗ 103∗∗∗ 4 1 0 0
Problem Set 92 235∗∗∗ 76∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 93 138∗∗∗ 225∗∗∗ 312∗∗∗ 208∗∗∗ 54∗∗∗ 13∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 94 127∗∗∗ 132∗∗∗ 151∗∗∗ 93∗∗∗ 79∗∗∗ 77∗∗∗ 8∗∗
Problem Set 95 97∗∗∗ 138∗∗∗ 65∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 96 90∗∗∗ 86∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 97 280∗∗∗ 188∗∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 0 2 0 0
Problem Set 98 190∗∗∗ 135∗∗∗ 50∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 99 104∗∗∗ 179∗∗∗ 218∗∗∗ 138∗∗∗ 101∗∗∗ 65∗∗∗ 11∗∗
Problem Set 100 155∗∗∗ 141∗∗∗ 148∗∗∗ 70∗∗∗ 16∗∗ 10∗∗ 0
Problem Set 101 144∗∗∗ 109∗∗∗ 117∗∗∗ 35∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0
Problem Set 102 263∗∗∗ 228∗∗∗ 134∗∗∗ 14∗∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 103 205∗∗∗ 70∗∗∗ 12∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 104 -99∗∗∗ -51∗ -3 70∗∗ 65∗∗ 121∗∗∗ 50∗∗∗
Problem Set 105 203∗∗∗ 169∗∗∗ 105∗∗∗ 9∗ 2 0 0
Problem Set 106 224∗∗∗ 89∗∗∗ 38∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 107 215∗∗∗ 245∗∗∗ 239∗∗∗ 59∗∗∗ 12∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 108 189∗∗∗ 100∗∗∗ 21∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 109 274∗∗∗ 106∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 110 261∗∗∗ 320∗∗∗ 121∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 111 194∗∗∗ 121∗∗∗ 37∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 112 28∗∗∗ 13∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 113 268∗∗∗ 196∗∗∗ 173∗∗∗ 41∗∗∗ 15∗∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 114 207∗∗∗ 122∗∗∗ 18∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 115 156∗∗∗ 125∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0
Problem Set 116 238∗∗∗ 105∗∗∗ 41∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 117 201∗∗∗ 95∗∗∗ 17∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 118 238∗∗∗ 130∗∗∗ 55∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 119 254∗∗∗ 156∗∗∗ 78∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 120 253∗∗∗ 246∗∗∗ 110∗∗∗ 25∗∗∗ 1 0 0
Problem Set 121 238∗∗∗ 125∗∗∗ 27∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 122 51∗∗ 84∗∗∗ 66∗∗∗ 27∗∗∗ 2 0 0
Problem Set 123 101∗∗∗ 74∗∗∗ 66∗∗∗ 6∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 124 231∗∗∗ 259∗∗∗ 253∗∗∗ 71∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 125 298∗∗∗ 274∗∗∗ 106∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 126 224∗∗∗ 101∗∗∗ 49∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
III
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TABLE A.1: Evaluation of Provider’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Mean Difference in Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 127 -63∗∗∗ -41∗ 20 88∗∗∗ 68∗∗∗ 45∗∗∗ 6∗
Problem Set 128 208∗∗∗ 115∗∗∗ 111∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 2 0 0
Problem Set 129 206∗∗∗ 121∗∗∗ 84∗∗∗ 18∗∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 130 243∗∗∗ 135∗∗∗ 86∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 1 0 0
Problem Set 131 222∗∗∗ 103∗∗∗ 37∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 132 110∗∗∗ 146∗∗∗ 91∗∗∗ 49∗ 68∗∗ 103∗∗∗ 74∗∗∗
Problem Set 133 156∗∗∗ 98∗∗∗ 39∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 134 124∗∗∗ 97∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 135 204∗∗∗ 103∗∗∗ 28∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 136 280∗∗∗ 179∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 137 60∗∗∗ 38∗∗∗ 18∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 138 113∗∗∗ 106∗∗∗ 36∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 139 195∗∗∗ 197∗∗∗ 120∗∗∗ 26∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 140 168∗∗∗ 250∗∗∗ 241∗∗∗ 60∗∗∗ 12∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 141 217∗∗∗ 173∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 32∗∗∗ 3 0 0
Problem Set 142 272∗∗∗ 118∗∗∗ 18∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 143 89∗∗∗ 37∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 144 248∗∗∗ 143∗∗∗ 41∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 145 207∗∗∗ 83∗∗∗ 31∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 146 170∗∗∗ 165∗∗∗ 161∗∗∗ 46∗∗∗ 22∗∗∗ 2 0
Problem Set 147 168∗∗∗ 160∗∗∗ 146∗∗∗ 117∗∗∗ 45∗∗∗ 14∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 148 167∗∗∗ 128∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 149 175∗∗∗ 127∗∗∗ 31∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0
Problem Set 150 312∗∗∗ 114∗∗∗ 25∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
TABLE A.2: Evaluation of Provider’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Maximum Variance in Port-
folio and Required Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 1 0.09015 100
Problem Set 2 0.08995 50
Problem Set 3 0.01771 1000
Problem Set 4 0.09013 50
Problem Set 5 0.08855 100
Problem Set 6 0.08634 50
Problem Set 7 0.08552 50
Problem Set 8 0.08718 50
Problem Set 9 0.07197 50
Problem Set 10 0.00596 20
Problem Set 11 0.08461 50
Problem Set 12 0.08679 200
Problem Set 13 0.07081 200
Problem Set 14 0.08405 100
Problem Set 15 0.06730 50
Problem Set 16 0.01351 100
Problem Set 17 0.08475 50
Problem Set 18 0.08992 200
IV
A.1 Evaluation for Provider’s Decision Methods
TABLE A.2: Evaluation of Provider’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Maximum Variance in Port-
folio and Required Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 19 0.01666 1000
Problem Set 20 0.08965 500
Problem Set 21 0.09017 500
Problem Set 22 0.02855 50
Problem Set 23 0.07607 50
Problem Set 24 0.04100 50
Problem Set 25 0.06530 100
Problem Set 26 0.04025 50
Problem Set 27 0.08371 50
Problem Set 28 0.03600 50
Problem Set 29 0.08672 50
Problem Set 30 0.05791 50
Problem Set 31 0.08917 50
Problem Set 32 0.06847 100
Problem Set 33 0.06269 50
Problem Set 34 0.08401 50
Problem Set 35 0.02896 20
Problem Set 36 0.04775 100
Problem Set 37 0.08540 1000
Problem Set 38 0.08948 50
Problem Set 39 0.05675 100
Problem Set 40 0.08993 50
Problem Set 41 0.07616 100
Problem Set 42 0.08959 50
Problem Set 43 0.08979 50
Problem Set 44 0.01700 10
Problem Set 45 0.04781 50
Problem Set 46 0.07936 200
Problem Set 47 0.08567 500
Problem Set 48 0.08396 50
Problem Set 49 0.07198 50
Problem Set 50 0.06149 100
Problem Set 51 0.09016 50
Problem Set 52 0.08795 500
Problem Set 53 0.08931 50
Problem Set 54 0.08946 200
Problem Set 55 0.08884 50
Problem Set 56 0.09017 50
Problem Set 57 0.08852 50
Problem Set 58 0.01467 50
Problem Set 59 0.08011 50
Problem Set 60 0.01640 50
Problem Set 61 0.04401 200
Problem Set 62 0.08741 500
Problem Set 63 0.08779 50
Problem Set 64 0.06829 50
Problem Set 65 0.07262 100
Problem Set 66 0.04295 50
Problem Set 67 0.06775 50
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TABLE A.2: Evaluation of Provider’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Maximum Variance in Port-
folio and Required Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 68 0.05871 50
Problem Set 69 0.06864 100
Problem Set 70 0.01041 500
Problem Set 71 0.08551 50
Problem Set 72 0.08883 500
Problem Set 73 0.03148 50
Problem Set 74 0.08920 50
Problem Set 75 0.06103 50
Problem Set 76 0.08933 50
Problem Set 77 0.08396 50
Problem Set 78 0.07759 100
Problem Set 79 0.08522 100
Problem Set 80 0.08696 50
Problem Set 81 0.08765 50
Problem Set 82 0.05383 50
Problem Set 83 0.06370 50
Problem Set 84 0.08611 50
Problem Set 85 0.08756 100
Problem Set 86 0.08881 100
Problem Set 87 0.08862 50
Problem Set 88 0.08898 500
Problem Set 89 0.04998 50
Problem Set 90 0.08372 50
Problem Set 91 0.08199 50
Problem Set 92 0.08647 50
Problem Set 93 0.08469 500
Problem Set 94 0.07732 1000
Problem Set 95 0.04257 50
Problem Set 96 0.03969 50
Problem Set 97 0.09015 50
Problem Set 98 0.08898 50
Problem Set 99 0.08475 1000
Problem Set 100 0.06081 500
Problem Set 101 0.01886 200
Problem Set 102 0.06553 100
Problem Set 103 0.08634 50
Problem Set 104 0.01838 20
Problem Set 105 0.07489 100
Problem Set 106 0.05989 50
Problem Set 107 0.07278 200
Problem Set 108 0.08989 50
Problem Set 109 0.08729 50
Problem Set 110 0.09013 100
Problem Set 111 0.08549 50
Problem Set 112 0.00920 20
Problem Set 113 0.08933 200
Problem Set 114 0.09017 50
Problem Set 115 0.07653 50
Problem Set 116 0.08443 50
VI
A.1 Evaluation for Provider’s Decision Methods
TABLE A.2: Evaluation of Provider’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Maximum Variance in Port-
folio and Required Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 117 0.08530 50
Problem Set 118 0.08924 50
Problem Set 119 0.08992 100
Problem Set 120 0.08985 100
Problem Set 121 0.08393 50
Problem Set 122 0.03794 100
Problem Set 123 0.01506 100
Problem Set 124 0.08944 200
Problem Set 125 0.08857 100
Problem Set 126 0.08796 50
Problem Set 127 0.01068 20
Problem Set 128 0.08706 100
Problem Set 129 0.08625 100
Problem Set 130 0.07635 100
Problem Set 131 0.08749 50
Problem Set 132 0.08238 1000
Problem Set 133 0.05142 50
Problem Set 134 0.04994 50
Problem Set 135 0.08302 50
Problem Set 136 0.08450 50
Problem Set 137 0.00881 50
Problem Set 138 0.05312 50
Problem Set 139 0.06742 200
Problem Set 140 0.07246 200
Problem Set 141 0.08649 100
Problem Set 142 0.08812 50
Problem Set 143 0.02400 20
Problem Set 144 0.07842 50
Problem Set 145 0.07767 50
Problem Set 146 0.08956 200
Problem Set 147 0.08299 500
Problem Set 148 0.06526 50
Problem Set 149 0.07832 50
Problem Set 150 0.08943 50
A.1.2 Maximization of Expected Utility
TABLE A.3: Evaluation of Provider’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Mean Difference in Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 1 94∗∗∗ 108∗∗∗ 87∗∗∗ 73∗∗∗ 32∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0
Problem Set 2 77∗∗∗ 119∗∗∗ 123∗∗∗ 66∗∗∗ 22∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0
Problem Set 3 36 69∗∗ 137∗∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 76∗∗∗ 41∗∗∗ 6∗
Problem Set 4 -30 87∗∗∗ 27 117∗∗∗ 70∗∗ 157∗∗∗ 119∗∗∗
Problem Set 5 146∗∗∗ 117∗∗∗ 68∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 0 0 0
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TABLE A.3: Evaluation of Provider’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Mean Difference in Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 6 82∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 100∗∗∗ 82∗∗∗ 51∗∗∗ 4∗ 0
Problem Set 7 144∗∗∗ 128∗∗∗ 93∗∗∗ 32∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0
Problem Set 8 140∗∗∗ 65∗∗ 128∗∗∗ 136∗∗∗ 69∗∗∗ 70∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 9 181∗∗∗ 151∗∗∗ 135∗∗∗ 25∗∗∗ 2 0 0
Problem Set 10 154∗∗∗ 115∗∗∗ 90∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 11 56∗ 54∗ 60∗∗ 6 39 59∗∗ 91∗∗∗
Problem Set 12 135∗∗∗ 88∗∗∗ 52∗∗∗ 6∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 13 36 65∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 101∗∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 54∗∗∗ 6∗
Problem Set 14 69∗∗ 65∗∗ 125∗∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 49∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0
Problem Set 15 99∗∗∗ 104∗∗∗ 111∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 16 90∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 161∗∗∗ 100∗∗∗ 64∗∗∗ 26∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 17 89∗∗∗ 94∗∗∗ 220∗∗∗ 55∗∗∗ 21∗∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 18 25 61∗∗ 19 38 39 116∗∗∗ 91∗∗∗
Problem Set 19 99∗∗∗ 95∗∗∗ 36∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 20 59∗∗ 27 73∗∗ 37 69∗∗ 101∗∗∗ 74∗∗∗
Problem Set 21 48∗ 95∗∗∗ 111∗∗∗ 115∗∗∗ 58∗∗∗ 76∗∗∗ 11∗∗
Problem Set 22 36 31 47∗ 16 -3 65∗∗ -8
Problem Set 23 85∗∗∗ 58∗∗ 41∗ 86∗∗∗ 90∗∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 29∗∗∗
Problem Set 24 136∗∗∗ 109∗∗∗ 29∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 25 77∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 89∗∗∗ 88∗∗∗ 65∗∗∗ 36∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 26 129∗∗∗ 89∗∗∗ 49∗∗∗ 6∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 27 81∗∗∗ 107∗∗∗ 144∗∗∗ 80∗∗∗ 27∗∗∗ 2 0
Problem Set 28 72∗∗ 99∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 103∗∗∗ 47∗∗∗ 22∗∗∗ 2
Problem Set 29 31 87∗∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 74∗∗∗ 81∗∗∗ 123∗∗∗ 63∗∗∗
Problem Set 30 43 19 100∗∗∗ 5 26 76∗∗∗ 105∗∗∗
Problem Set 31 79∗∗∗ 90∗∗∗ 132∗∗∗ 99∗∗∗ 72∗∗∗ 38∗∗∗ 2
Problem Set 32 25 112∗∗∗ 86∗∗∗ 92∗∗∗ 66∗∗∗ 67∗∗∗ 16∗∗
Problem Set 33 151∗∗∗ 130∗∗∗ 52∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 34 71∗∗ 93∗∗∗ 168∗∗∗ 63∗∗∗ 34∗∗∗ 2 0
Problem Set 35 44∗∗∗ 25∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 36 129∗∗∗ 94∗∗∗ 94∗∗∗ 7∗ 2 0 0
Problem Set 37 74∗∗ 140∗∗∗ 119∗∗∗ 58∗∗∗ 25∗∗ 20∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 38 56∗ 85∗∗∗ 75∗∗ 149∗∗∗ 68∗∗∗ 96∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗
Problem Set 39 116∗∗∗ 57∗∗ 97∗∗∗ 48∗∗∗ 12∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 40 69∗∗ 59∗∗ 93∗∗∗ 82∗∗∗ 122∗∗∗ 145∗∗∗ 100∗∗∗
Problem Set 41 134∗∗∗ 115∗∗∗ 62∗∗∗ 13∗∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 42 21 35 55∗ 34 69∗∗ 111∗∗∗ 57∗∗∗
Problem Set 43 51∗ 2 6 4 -2 26 23
Problem Set 44 113∗∗∗ 73∗∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 8∗ 3 0 0
Problem Set 45 65∗∗ 75∗∗ 137∗∗∗ 100∗∗∗ 61∗∗ 114∗∗∗ 37∗∗∗
Problem Set 46 22 60∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 69∗∗∗ 78∗∗∗ 77∗∗∗ 17∗∗∗
Problem Set 47 30 39 162∗∗∗ 51∗∗ 77∗∗∗ 33∗∗∗ 3
Problem Set 48 66∗∗ 107∗∗∗ 108∗∗∗ 87∗∗∗ 71∗∗∗ 54∗∗∗ 9∗∗
Problem Set 49 116∗∗∗ 115∗∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 2 0 0
Problem Set 50 80∗∗∗ 111∗∗∗ 145∗∗∗ 137∗∗∗ 101∗∗∗ 51∗∗∗ 3
Problem Set 51 105∗∗∗ 138∗∗∗ 122∗∗∗ 37∗∗∗ 6∗ 0 0
Problem Set 52 102∗∗∗ 136∗∗∗ 106∗∗∗ 31∗∗∗ 6∗ 0 0
Problem Set 53 147∗∗∗ 144∗∗∗ 113∗∗∗ 18∗∗∗ 1 0 0
Problem Set 54 -46∗ -5 -2 6 57∗ -10 -10
Problem Set 55 94∗∗∗ 121∗∗∗ 99∗∗∗ 80∗∗∗ 32∗∗ 31∗∗∗ 1
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TABLE A.3: Evaluation of Provider’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Mean Difference in Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 56 120∗∗∗ 116∗∗∗ 90∗∗∗ 20∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0
Problem Set 57 88∗∗∗ -8 109∗∗∗ 37 77∗∗∗ 86∗∗∗ 72∗∗∗
Problem Set 58 81∗∗∗ 58∗∗ 97∗∗∗ 87∗∗∗ 39∗ 110∗∗∗ 25∗∗∗
Problem Set 59 120∗∗∗ 113∗∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 60 97∗∗∗ 116∗∗∗ 97∗∗∗ 58∗∗∗ 31∗∗∗ 3 0
Problem Set 61 54∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 84∗∗∗ 27∗∗∗ 15∗∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 62 127∗∗∗ 87∗∗∗ 81∗∗∗ 8∗ 1 0 0
Problem Set 63 119∗∗∗ 125∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 14∗∗∗ 1 0 0
Problem Set 64 87∗∗∗ 87∗∗∗ 163∗∗∗ 92∗∗∗ 63∗∗∗ 6∗ 0
Problem Set 65 98∗∗∗ 104∗∗∗ 136∗∗∗ 87∗∗∗ 70∗∗∗ 30∗∗∗ 1
Problem Set 66 148∗∗∗ 109∗∗∗ 81∗∗∗ 12∗∗ 1 0 0
Problem Set 67 112∗∗∗ 47∗ 156∗∗∗ 108∗∗∗ 106∗∗∗ 61∗∗∗ 1
Problem Set 68 78∗∗∗ 55∗ 54∗ 78∗∗∗ 35 59∗∗ 60∗∗
Problem Set 69 135∗∗∗ 99∗∗∗ 105∗∗∗ 53∗∗∗ 14∗∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 70 97∗∗∗ 71∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 71 109∗∗∗ 73∗∗∗ 96∗∗∗ 58∗∗∗ 12∗∗ 3 0
Problem Set 72 -17 24 5 10 -11 21 23
Problem Set 73 101∗∗∗ 109∗∗∗ 167∗∗∗ 60∗∗∗ 22∗∗∗ 4∗ 0
Problem Set 74 153∗∗∗ 40 166∗∗∗ 59∗∗∗ 50∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0
Problem Set 75 95∗∗∗ -12 7 -6 24 -13 22
Problem Set 76 86∗∗∗ 146∗∗∗ 150∗∗∗ 69∗∗∗ 37∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0
Problem Set 77 117∗∗∗ 108∗∗∗ 144∗∗∗ 101∗∗∗ 41∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0
Problem Set 78 42 84∗∗∗ 159∗∗∗ 129∗∗∗ 103∗∗∗ 59∗∗∗ 3
Problem Set 79 123∗∗∗ 44∗ 129∗∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 76∗∗∗ 45∗∗∗ 4∗
Problem Set 80 128∗∗∗ 125∗∗∗ 50∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 81 8 69∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 48∗ 35 148∗∗∗ 114∗∗∗
Problem Set 82 24 103∗∗∗ 124∗∗∗ 95∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 78∗∗∗ 23∗∗∗
Problem Set 83 135∗∗∗ 105∗∗∗ 175∗∗∗ 91∗∗∗ 37∗∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 84 76∗∗ 108∗∗∗ 123∗∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 41∗∗∗ 12∗∗ 1
Problem Set 85 101∗∗∗ 58∗∗ 110∗∗∗ 89∗∗∗ 78∗∗∗ 86∗∗∗ 13∗∗∗
Problem Set 86 60∗∗ 6 77∗∗∗ 64∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 95∗∗∗ 54∗∗∗
Problem Set 87 58∗∗ 32 139∗∗∗ 99∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 126∗∗∗ 73∗∗∗
Problem Set 88 84∗∗∗ 79∗∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 20∗∗∗ 2 0 0
Problem Set 89 103∗∗∗ 126∗∗∗ 161∗∗∗ 95∗∗∗ 52∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 90 66∗∗ 128∗∗∗ 134∗∗∗ 39∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 2 0
Problem Set 91 63∗∗ 91∗∗∗ 71∗∗ 201∗∗∗ 108∗∗∗ 96∗∗∗ 11∗∗
Problem Set 92 102∗∗∗ 147∗∗∗ 147∗∗∗ 68∗∗∗ 23∗∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 93 -3 39 55∗ 63∗∗ 29 133∗∗∗ 60∗∗∗
Problem Set 94 80∗∗∗ 45∗∗∗ 6∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 95 107∗∗∗ 131∗∗∗ 156∗∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 30∗∗∗ 4∗ 0
Problem Set 96 70∗∗ 125∗∗∗ 131∗∗∗ 57∗∗∗ 53∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 1
Problem Set 97 42 62∗∗ 91∗∗∗ 45∗ 82∗∗∗ 107∗∗∗ 44∗∗∗
Problem Set 98 86∗∗∗ 134∗∗∗ 127∗∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 21∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0
Problem Set 99 98∗∗∗ 81∗∗∗ 51∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 100 21 -37 49∗ -21 21 -40 -44∗
Problem Set 101 40 92∗∗∗ 86∗∗∗ 77∗∗∗ 99∗∗∗ 80∗∗∗ 37∗∗∗
Problem Set 102 11 81∗∗∗ 109∗∗∗ 55∗∗ 91∗∗∗ 54∗∗∗ 6∗
Problem Set 103 86∗∗∗ 134∗∗∗ 105∗∗∗ 89∗∗∗ 41∗∗∗ 26∗∗∗ 1
Problem Set 104 46∗ 40 22 71∗∗ 72∗∗ 106∗∗∗ 89∗∗∗
Problem Set 105 107∗∗∗ 121∗∗∗ 99∗∗∗ 41∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 0 0
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TABLE A.3: Evaluation of Provider’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Mean Difference in Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 106 70∗∗ 52∗ 139∗∗∗ 70∗∗ 120∗∗∗ 97∗∗∗ 29∗∗∗
Problem Set 107 7 88∗∗∗ 13 64∗∗ 52∗∗ 126∗∗∗ 58∗∗∗
Problem Set 108 92∗∗∗ 67∗∗ 202∗∗∗ 162∗∗∗ 98∗∗∗ 23∗∗∗ 2
Problem Set 109 41 115∗∗∗ 124∗∗∗ 86∗∗∗ 65∗∗∗ 40∗∗∗ 4∗
Problem Set 110 87∗∗∗ 77∗∗∗ 134∗∗∗ 52∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 2 0
Problem Set 111 126∗∗∗ 109∗∗∗ 133∗∗∗ 79∗∗∗ 29∗∗∗ 3 0
Problem Set 112 104∗∗∗ 95∗∗∗ 12∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 113 68∗∗ 62∗∗ 93∗∗∗ 82∗∗∗ 52∗∗∗ 25∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 114 52∗ 56∗ 45∗ 28 83∗∗∗ 60∗∗ 89∗∗∗
Problem Set 115 121∗∗∗ 57∗ 215∗∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 91∗∗∗ 15∗∗∗ 1
Problem Set 116 100∗∗∗ 99∗∗∗ 165∗∗∗ 101∗∗∗ 86∗∗∗ 36∗∗∗ 4∗
Problem Set 117 152∗∗∗ 106∗∗∗ 74∗∗∗ 21∗∗∗ 3 0 0
Problem Set 118 89∗∗∗ 24 56∗ 74∗∗ 69∗∗ 93∗∗∗ 91∗∗∗
Problem Set 119 34 55∗ 56∗ 59∗∗ 60∗∗ 106∗∗∗ 78∗∗∗
Problem Set 120 84∗∗∗ 62∗∗ 121∗∗∗ 92∗∗∗ 54∗∗∗ 62∗∗∗ 11∗∗
Problem Set 121 78∗∗∗ 95∗∗∗ 178∗∗∗ 141∗∗∗ 95∗∗∗ 60∗∗∗ 4
Problem Set 122 123∗∗∗ 86∗∗∗ 44∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0
Problem Set 123 113∗∗∗ 73∗∗∗ 46∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 124 36 36 126∗∗∗ 54∗∗ 30 146∗∗∗ 53∗∗∗
Problem Set 125 20 72∗∗ 134∗∗∗ 114∗∗∗ 77∗∗∗ 44∗∗∗ 3
Problem Set 126 66∗∗ 27 28 58∗∗ 29 37 59∗∗
Problem Set 127 133∗∗∗ 81∗∗∗ 73∗∗∗ 15∗∗∗ 1 0 0
Problem Set 128 101∗∗∗ 124∗∗∗ 133∗∗∗ 66∗∗∗ 34∗∗∗ 3 0
Problem Set 129 126∗∗∗ 119∗∗∗ 59∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 130 85∗∗∗ 66∗∗ 94∗∗∗ 106∗∗∗ 58∗∗∗ 53∗∗∗ 6∗
Problem Set 131 109∗∗∗ 110∗∗∗ 132∗∗∗ 19∗∗∗ 3 0 0
Problem Set 132 40 57∗ 19 80∗∗∗ 37 110∗∗∗ 83∗∗∗
Problem Set 133 8 24 35 60∗∗ 53∗ 114∗∗∗ 126∗∗∗
Problem Set 134 159∗∗∗ 130∗∗∗ 54∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 135 100∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 113∗∗∗ 59∗∗∗ 21∗∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 136 53∗ 123∗∗∗ 115∗∗∗ 68∗∗∗ 19∗∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 137 175∗∗∗ 64∗∗ 149∗∗∗ 88∗∗∗ 19∗ 19∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 138 138∗∗∗ 158∗∗∗ 135∗∗∗ 35∗∗∗ 3 0 0
Problem Set 139 110∗∗∗ 76∗∗∗ 99∗∗∗ 73∗∗∗ 52∗∗∗ 17∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 140 61∗∗∗ 107∗∗∗ 44∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0
Problem Set 141 88∗∗∗ 87∗∗∗ 96∗∗∗ 27∗∗∗ 7∗ 1 0
Problem Set 142 110∗∗∗ 126∗∗∗ 153∗∗∗ 86∗∗∗ 19∗∗∗ 2 0
Problem Set 143 62∗∗ 73∗∗ 104∗∗∗ 83∗∗∗ 90∗∗∗ 56∗∗∗ 14∗∗∗
Problem Set 144 19 11 45∗ 66∗∗ 11 89∗∗∗ 62∗∗
Problem Set 145 119∗∗∗ 140∗∗∗ 112∗∗∗ 29∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 146 120∗∗∗ 105∗∗∗ 129∗∗∗ 60∗∗∗ 21∗∗∗ 3 0
Problem Set 147 124∗∗∗ 88∗∗∗ 93∗∗∗ 52∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 148 159∗∗∗ 82∗∗∗ 106∗∗∗ 17∗∗ 5∗ 0 0
Problem Set 149 151∗∗∗ 93∗∗∗ 45∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0
Problem Set 150 -2 28 12 25 13 34 69∗∗
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TABLE A.4: Evaluation of Provider’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Variance and Required
Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 1 0.07243 500
Problem Set 2 0.08900 500
Problem Set 3 0.08873 1000
Problem Set 4 0.08611 1000
Problem Set 5 0.07048 100
Problem Set 6 0.09014 500
Problem Set 7 0.08807 200
Problem Set 8 0.09017 500
Problem Set 9 0.08991 200
Problem Set 10 0.08008 100
Problem Set 11 0.07580 1000
Problem Set 12 0.08314 100
Problem Set 13 0.08964 1000
Problem Set 14 0.08582 500
Problem Set 15 0.08905 100
Problem Set 16 0.08765 500
Problem Set 17 0.08249 200
Problem Set 18 0.07184 1000
Problem Set 19 0.06392 100
Problem Set 20 0.08121 1000
Problem Set 21 0.08411 1000
Problem Set 22 0.06554 500
Problem Set 23 0.09003 1000
Problem Set 24 0.07589 50
Problem Set 25 0.08828 500
Problem Set 26 0.08755 100
Problem Set 27 0.08883 200
Problem Set 28 0.08830 500
Problem Set 29 0.08563 1000
Problem Set 30 0.09001 1000
Problem Set 31 0.09007 500
Problem Set 32 0.08974 1000
Problem Set 33 0.08904 100
Problem Set 34 0.08898 200
Problem Set 35 0.03801 50
Problem Set 36 0.07555 100
Problem Set 37 0.06842 500
Problem Set 38 0.08996 1000
Problem Set 39 0.09003 200
Problem Set 40 0.06100 1000
Problem Set 41 0.08937 100
Problem Set 42 0.07233 1000
Problem Set 43 0.07692 10
Problem Set 44 0.08955 100
Problem Set 45 0.08813 1000
Problem Set 46 0.08001 1000
Problem Set 47 0.08423 500
Problem Set 48 0.07761 1000
Problem Set 49 0.08860 100
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TABLE A.4: Evaluation of Provider’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Variance and Required
Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 50 0.08737 500
Problem Set 51 0.08893 200
Problem Set 52 0.08940 200
Problem Set 53 0.08103 100
Problem Set 54 0.05387 200
Problem Set 55 0.09005 500
Problem Set 56 0.08898 200
Problem Set 57 0.06765 1000
Problem Set 58 0.07560 1000
Problem Set 59 0.08978 100
Problem Set 60 0.09010 200
Problem Set 61 0.08942 200
Problem Set 62 0.07854 100
Problem Set 63 0.08273 100
Problem Set 64 0.09005 500
Problem Set 65 0.08947 500
Problem Set 66 0.07392 100
Problem Set 67 0.08975 500
Problem Set 68 0.09016 1000
Problem Set 69 0.08380 200
Problem Set 70 0.08372 50
Problem Set 71 0.08407 200
Problem Set 72 0.07045 5
Problem Set 73 0.08046 500
Problem Set 74 0.08470 500
Problem Set 75 0.08987 10
Problem Set 76 0.08641 500
Problem Set 77 0.07637 500
Problem Set 78 0.09004 500
Problem Set 79 0.08869 1000
Problem Set 80 0.08996 100
Problem Set 81 0.09017 1000
Problem Set 82 0.08776 1000
Problem Set 83 0.08909 200
Problem Set 84 0.08541 500
Problem Set 85 0.07212 1000
Problem Set 86 0.07445 1000
Problem Set 87 0.07052 1000
Problem Set 88 0.06718 100
Problem Set 89 0.08999 500
Problem Set 90 0.07462 200
Problem Set 91 0.08974 1000
Problem Set 92 0.08685 200
Problem Set 93 0.08448 1000
Problem Set 94 0.08982 50
Problem Set 95 0.09014 500
Problem Set 96 0.08368 500
Problem Set 97 0.08960 1000
Problem Set 98 0.08615 500
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TABLE A.4: Evaluation of Provider’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Variance and Required
Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 99 0.07495 100
Problem Set 100 0.08808 1000
Problem Set 101 0.08864 1000
Problem Set 102 0.08976 1000
Problem Set 103 0.08044 500
Problem Set 104 0.08186 1000
Problem Set 105 0.08018 200
Problem Set 106 0.09014 1000
Problem Set 107 0.09015 1000
Problem Set 108 0.06814 500
Problem Set 109 0.07022 1000
Problem Set 110 0.05238 200
Problem Set 111 0.08989 200
Problem Set 112 0.05876 50
Problem Set 113 0.07894 500
Problem Set 114 0.07699 1000
Problem Set 115 0.08969 500
Problem Set 116 0.05210 1000
Problem Set 117 0.08898 100
Problem Set 118 0.08974 1000
Problem Set 119 0.08997 1000
Problem Set 120 0.08769 1000
Problem Set 121 0.05139 500
Problem Set 122 0.06379 50
Problem Set 123 0.08994 100
Problem Set 124 0.08031 1000
Problem Set 125 0.06565 500
Problem Set 126 0.08765 1000
Problem Set 127 0.08294 100
Problem Set 128 0.07362 200
Problem Set 129 0.06901 100
Problem Set 130 0.08981 1000
Problem Set 131 0.07137 100
Problem Set 132 0.08733 1000
Problem Set 133 0.08902 1000
Problem Set 134 0.07320 100
Problem Set 135 0.08890 200
Problem Set 136 0.07880 200
Problem Set 137 0.09016 500
Problem Set 138 0.09013 100
Problem Set 139 0.09012 500
Problem Set 140 0.09012 50
Problem Set 141 0.08522 200
Problem Set 142 0.09017 200
Problem Set 143 0.07429 1000
Problem Set 144 0.08779 1000
Problem Set 145 0.08979 200
Problem Set 146 0.08289 200
Problem Set 147 0.08973 200
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TABLE A.4: Evaluation of Provider’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Variance and Required
Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 148 0.08975 200
Problem Set 149 0.08761 50
Problem Set 150 0.08990 1000
A.2 Evaluation of Intermediary’s Decision Methods
A.2.1 Minimization of Semi-Variance
TABLE A.5: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Mean Difference in
Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 1 207∗∗∗ 266∗∗∗ 163∗∗∗ 21∗∗∗ -65 0 0
Problem Set 2 142∗∗∗ 109∗∗∗ 185∗∗∗ 76∗∗∗ 33∗∗∗ 104∗∗∗ 69∗∗∗
Problem Set 3 181∗∗∗ 180∗∗∗ 249∗∗∗ 69∗∗∗ -106∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 4 173∗∗∗ 190∗∗∗ 260∗∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 2∗∗∗ 2 0
Problem Set 5 206∗∗∗ 275∗∗∗ 199∗∗∗ 34∗∗∗ 37 1 0
Problem Set 6 162∗∗∗ 187∗∗∗ 214∗∗∗ 109∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 7 195∗∗∗ 239∗∗∗ 205∗∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 18∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 8 89∗∗∗ 125∗∗∗ 194∗∗∗ 158∗∗∗ -147∗∗∗ 93∗∗∗ 56∗∗∗
Problem Set 9 158∗∗∗ 166∗∗∗ 207∗∗∗ 122∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0
Problem Set 10 147∗∗∗ 142∗∗∗ 225∗∗∗ 77∗∗∗ -127∗∗∗ 3 0
Problem Set 11 149∗∗∗ 214∗∗∗ 166∗∗∗ 64∗∗∗ 98∗∗∗ 19∗∗∗ 2
Problem Set 12 27 -13 -96∗∗∗ -36∗∗∗ -86∗∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 13 133∗∗∗ 166∗∗∗ 204∗∗∗ 94∗∗∗ 88∗∗∗ 23∗∗∗ 2
Problem Set 14 170∗∗∗ 111∗∗∗ 169∗∗∗ 56∗∗ -40∗∗∗ 45∗∗∗ 1
Problem Set 15 151∗∗∗ 170∗∗∗ 183∗∗∗ 106∗∗∗ -161∗∗∗ 4 1
Problem Set 16 164∗∗∗ 135∗∗∗ 217∗∗∗ 107∗∗∗ -49∗∗∗ 50∗∗∗ 2
Problem Set 17 206∗∗∗ 146∗∗∗ 207∗∗∗ 101∗∗∗ -244∗∗∗ 3 0
Problem Set 18 212∗∗∗ 181∗∗∗ 200∗∗∗ 61∗∗∗ 71∗∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 19 189∗∗∗ 155∗∗∗ 191∗∗∗ 86∗∗∗ -61∗∗∗ 2 0
Problem Set 20 207∗∗∗ 217∗∗∗ 208∗∗∗ 33∗∗∗ 76∗ 0 0
Problem Set 21 167∗∗∗ 198∗∗∗ 244∗∗∗ 127∗∗∗ 104∗∗∗ 5∗ 0
Problem Set 22 221∗∗∗ 185∗∗∗ 193∗∗∗ 58∗∗∗ -41∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 23 74∗∗∗ 207∗∗∗ 251∗∗∗ 204∗∗∗ 105∗∗∗ 50∗∗∗ 4∗
Problem Set 24 269∗∗∗ 260∗∗∗ 144∗∗∗ 27∗∗∗ 42 0 0
Problem Set 25 126∗∗∗ 156∗∗∗ 254∗∗∗ 179∗∗∗ 171∗∗∗ 30∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 26 168∗∗∗ 151∗∗∗ 299∗∗∗ 107∗∗∗ 40∗∗∗ 3 0
Problem Set 27 193∗∗∗ 240∗∗∗ 148∗∗∗ 38∗∗∗ 6∗ 1 0
Problem Set 28 138∗∗∗ 184∗∗∗ 180∗∗∗ 128∗∗∗ 62∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 0
Problem Set 29 11 50∗∗∗ 9 6 -40∗∗ -30∗∗ -23∗∗∗
Problem Set 30 65∗∗∗ 62∗∗∗ 165∗∗∗ 81∗∗∗ 103∗∗∗ 162∗∗∗ 73∗∗∗
Problem Set 31 89∗∗∗ 206∗∗∗ 216∗∗∗ 146∗∗∗ 87∗∗∗ 24∗∗∗ 1
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TABLE A.5: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Mean Difference in
Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 32 187∗∗∗ 216∗∗∗ 231∗∗∗ 43∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0
Problem Set 33 175∗∗∗ 229∗∗∗ 213∗∗∗ 64∗∗∗ 9∗ 2 0
Problem Set 34 198∗∗∗ 195∗∗∗ 226∗∗∗ 66∗∗∗ 26∗∗∗ 6∗ 0
Problem Set 35 112∗∗∗ 148∗∗∗ 155∗∗∗ 124∗∗∗ 74∗∗∗ 32∗∗∗ 1
Problem Set 36 203∗∗∗ 133∗∗∗ 133∗∗∗ 91∗∗∗ 43∗∗∗ 27∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 37 88∗∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 164∗∗∗ 6 36 -7 2
Problem Set 38 176∗∗∗ 184∗∗∗ 211∗∗∗ 106∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 2 0
Problem Set 39 112∗∗∗ 165∗∗∗ 322∗∗∗ 109∗∗∗ 53∗∗∗ 14∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 40 186∗∗∗ 233∗∗∗ 178∗∗∗ 56∗∗∗ 12∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 41 146∗∗∗ 212∗∗∗ 206∗∗∗ 81∗∗∗ 31∗∗∗ 5∗ 0
Problem Set 42 56∗∗∗ 64∗∗∗ 89∗∗∗ 28 44∗ 21 11
Problem Set 43 231∗∗∗ 204∗∗∗ 164∗∗∗ 16∗∗ 4∗ 0 0
Problem Set 44 70∗∗∗ 65∗∗∗ 134∗∗∗ 87∗∗∗ 159∗∗∗ 150∗∗∗ 145∗∗∗
Problem Set 45 87∗∗∗ 47∗ 37 -14 -77∗∗∗ -98∗∗∗ -99∗∗∗
Problem Set 46 172∗∗∗ 230∗∗∗ 209∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗ 3 1 0
Problem Set 47 123∗∗∗ 105∗∗∗ 110∗∗∗ 42 93∗∗∗ 85∗∗∗ 69∗∗∗
Problem Set 48 183∗∗∗ 196∗∗∗ 222∗∗∗ 118∗∗∗ 52∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0
Problem Set 49 289∗∗∗ 229∗∗∗ 127∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 50 45∗∗ 54∗∗ 118∗∗∗ 47∗ 118∗∗∗ 140∗∗∗ 92∗∗∗
Problem Set 51 162∗∗∗ 220∗∗∗ 199∗∗∗ 62∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 52 183∗∗∗ 188∗∗∗ 273∗∗∗ 108∗∗∗ 26∗∗∗ 4∗ 0
Problem Set 53 254∗∗∗ 236∗∗∗ 118∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 54 167∗∗∗ 140∗∗∗ 212∗∗∗ 136∗∗∗ 77∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 1
Problem Set 55 200∗∗∗ 163∗∗∗ 204∗∗∗ 76∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0
Problem Set 56 139∗∗∗ 182∗∗∗ 264∗∗∗ 154∗∗∗ 94∗∗∗ 17∗∗∗ 1
Problem Set 57 141∗∗∗ 153∗∗∗ 198∗∗∗ 84∗∗∗ 27∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 1
Problem Set 58 193∗∗∗ 171∗∗∗ 289∗∗∗ 109∗∗∗ 32∗∗∗ 4∗ 0
Problem Set 59 269∗∗∗ 188∗∗∗ 155∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 60 78∗∗∗ 72∗∗∗ 163∗∗∗ 131∗∗∗ 81∗∗∗ 115∗∗∗ 94∗∗∗
Problem Set 61 57∗∗∗ 68∗∗∗ 167∗∗∗ 111∗∗∗ 114∗∗∗ 126∗∗∗ 127∗∗∗
Problem Set 62 161∗∗∗ 224∗∗∗ 233∗∗∗ 49∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0
Problem Set 63 99∗∗∗ 212∗∗∗ 214∗∗∗ 124∗∗∗ 83∗∗∗ 39∗∗∗ 3
Problem Set 64 181∗∗∗ 199∗∗∗ 215∗∗∗ 82∗∗∗ 17∗∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 65 140∗∗∗ 149∗∗∗ 293∗∗∗ 143∗∗∗ 31∗∗∗ 6∗ 0
Problem Set 66 203∗∗∗ 204∗∗∗ 160∗∗∗ 9∗ 3 0 0
Problem Set 67 131∗∗∗ 138∗∗∗ 155∗∗∗ 159∗∗∗ 88∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 68 236∗∗∗ 209∗∗∗ 153∗∗∗ 25∗∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 69 193∗∗∗ 223∗∗∗ 243∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗ 7∗ 1 0
Problem Set 70 79∗∗∗ 112∗∗∗ 235∗∗∗ 186∗∗∗ 128∗∗∗ 116∗∗∗ 12∗∗
Problem Set 71 121∗∗∗ 103∗∗∗ 184∗∗∗ 50∗ 96∗∗∗ 108∗∗∗ 31∗∗∗
Problem Set 72 167∗∗∗ 179∗∗∗ 224∗∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 14∗∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 73 116∗∗∗ 154∗∗∗ 275∗∗∗ 186∗∗∗ 58∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0
Problem Set 74 287∗∗∗ 226∗∗∗ 146∗∗∗ 20∗∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 75 124∗∗∗ 51∗ -51∗ -63∗∗ -86∗∗∗ -80∗∗∗ -72∗∗∗
Problem Set 76 186∗∗∗ 181∗∗∗ 187∗∗∗ 38∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 77 230∗∗∗ 223∗∗∗ 170∗∗∗ 23∗∗∗ 1 0 0
Problem Set 78 24∗∗∗ 23∗∗ 26∗ -34∗∗ -40∗∗∗ -4∗ 0
Problem Set 79 163∗∗∗ 166∗∗∗ 247∗∗∗ 81∗∗∗ 62∗∗∗ 12∗∗ 0
Problem Set 80 177∗∗∗ 129∗∗∗ 203∗∗∗ 93∗∗∗ 26∗∗∗ 4∗ 0
XV
Appendix A Simulation Results
TABLE A.5: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Mean Difference in
Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 81 219∗∗∗ 193∗∗∗ 217∗∗∗ 43∗∗∗ 14∗∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 82 249∗∗∗ 233∗∗∗ 142∗∗∗ 14∗∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 83 121∗∗∗ 208∗∗∗ 246∗∗∗ 71∗∗∗ 13∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 84 173∗∗∗ 118∗∗∗ 178∗∗∗ 108∗∗∗ 60∗∗∗ 25∗∗∗ 4∗
Problem Set 85 160∗∗∗ 184∗∗∗ 218∗∗∗ 72∗∗∗ 35∗∗∗ 2 0
Problem Set 86 271∗∗∗ 237∗∗∗ 141∗∗∗ 19∗∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 87 101∗∗∗ 164∗∗∗ 219∗∗∗ 160∗∗∗ 114∗∗∗ 62∗∗∗ 3
Problem Set 88 6 20∗∗ 18 -6 -38∗∗∗ -12∗∗ -1
Problem Set 89 171∗∗∗ 196∗∗∗ 247∗∗∗ 60∗∗∗ 14∗∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 90 130∗∗∗ 164∗∗∗ 180∗∗∗ 113∗∗∗ 57∗∗∗ 30∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 91 -25 -36∗∗ -39∗∗∗ -3 0 0 0
Problem Set 92 2 -35∗ -81∗∗∗ -39∗∗∗ -24∗∗∗ -4∗ 0
Problem Set 93 110∗∗∗ 134∗∗∗ 246∗∗∗ 184∗∗∗ 146∗∗∗ 53∗∗∗ 5∗
Problem Set 94 223∗∗∗ 225∗∗∗ 198∗∗∗ 19∗∗∗ 2 0 0
Problem Set 95 271∗∗∗ 197∗∗∗ 154∗∗∗ 23∗∗∗ 1 0 0
Problem Set 96 204∗∗∗ 227∗∗∗ 188∗∗∗ 34∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0
Problem Set 97 179∗∗∗ 169∗∗∗ 177∗∗∗ 58∗∗∗ 65∗∗∗ 53∗∗∗ 10∗∗
Problem Set 98 267∗∗∗ 218∗∗∗ 157∗∗∗ 26∗∗∗ 1 0 0
Problem Set 99 -11 1 -30∗ -34∗∗∗ -21∗∗ -9∗∗ 0
Problem Set 100 113∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 169∗∗∗ 157∗∗∗ 135∗∗∗ 88∗∗∗ 10∗∗
Problem Set 101 137∗∗∗ 121∗∗∗ 220∗∗∗ 90∗∗∗ 92∗∗∗ 76∗∗∗ 4∗
Problem Set 102 185∗∗∗ 222∗∗∗ 207∗∗∗ 73∗∗∗ 12∗∗ 2 0
Problem Set 103 113∗∗∗ 145∗∗∗ 179∗∗∗ 121∗∗∗ 86∗∗∗ 58∗∗∗ 5
Problem Set 104 125∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 257∗∗∗ 163∗∗∗ 141∗∗∗ 80∗∗∗ 2
Problem Set 105 136∗∗∗ 186∗∗∗ 226∗∗∗ 106∗∗∗ 53∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0
Problem Set 106 215∗∗∗ 193∗∗∗ 230∗∗∗ 59∗∗∗ 8∗ 1 0
Problem Set 107 160∗∗∗ 180∗∗∗ 275∗∗∗ 91∗∗∗ 26∗∗∗ 4∗ 0
Problem Set 108 206∗∗∗ 228∗∗∗ 213∗∗∗ 61∗∗∗ 7∗ 1 0
Problem Set 109 145∗∗∗ 144∗∗∗ 200∗∗∗ 130∗∗∗ 140∗∗∗ 84∗∗∗ 36∗∗∗
Problem Set 110 238∗∗∗ 229∗∗∗ 160∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0
Problem Set 111 199∗∗∗ 262∗∗∗ 202∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 112 110∗∗∗ 149∗∗∗ 296∗∗∗ 183∗∗∗ 69∗∗∗ 18∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 113 178∗∗∗ 253∗∗∗ 130∗∗∗ 22∗∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 114 88∗∗∗ 80∗∗∗ 155∗∗∗ 168∗∗∗ 92∗∗∗ 149∗∗∗ 84∗∗∗
Problem Set 115 182∗∗∗ 222∗∗∗ 190∗∗∗ 57∗∗∗ 8∗ 1 0
Problem Set 116 119∗∗∗ 214∗∗∗ 286∗∗∗ 167∗∗∗ 59∗∗∗ 24∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 117 96∗∗∗ 15 -26 -61∗∗ -73∗∗∗ -109∗∗∗ -27∗∗∗
Problem Set 118 174∗∗∗ 236∗∗∗ 194∗∗∗ 54∗∗∗ 9∗ 3 0
Problem Set 119 136∗∗∗ 144∗∗∗ 265∗∗∗ 186∗∗∗ 100∗∗∗ 33∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 120 137∗∗∗ 214∗∗∗ 242∗∗∗ 59∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 121 124∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ 154∗∗∗ 176∗∗∗ 107∗∗∗ 83∗∗∗ 14∗∗∗
Problem Set 122 112∗∗∗ 158∗∗∗ 244∗∗∗ 127∗∗∗ 116∗∗∗ 46∗∗∗ 8∗∗
Problem Set 123 126∗∗∗ 160∗∗∗ 279∗∗∗ 174∗∗∗ 111∗∗∗ 20∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 124 128∗∗∗ 176∗∗∗ 276∗∗∗ 158∗∗∗ 110∗∗∗ 22∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 125 237∗∗∗ 276∗∗∗ 122∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 126 176∗∗∗ 226∗∗∗ 183∗∗∗ 67∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 127 184∗∗∗ 178∗∗∗ 230∗∗∗ 105∗∗∗ 19∗∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 128 244∗∗∗ 195∗∗∗ 171∗∗∗ 41∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0
Problem Set 129 31∗∗∗ 81∗∗∗ 115∗∗∗ 31 127∗∗∗ 70∗∗ 56∗
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TABLE A.5: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Mean Difference in
Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 130 35 -27 -67∗∗ 37 9 73∗∗ 67∗∗
Problem Set 131 155∗∗∗ 155∗∗∗ 293∗∗∗ 104∗∗∗ 56∗∗∗ 8∗ 1
Problem Set 132 162∗∗∗ 225∗∗∗ 202∗∗∗ 56∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 133 136∗∗∗ 153∗∗∗ 115∗∗∗ 26 -2 32 46∗
Problem Set 134 193∗∗∗ 244∗∗∗ 187∗∗∗ 50∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 135 95∗∗∗ 128∗∗∗ 110∗∗∗ 91∗∗∗ 53∗∗ 116∗∗∗ 68∗∗∗
Problem Set 136 122∗∗∗ 174∗∗∗ 194∗∗∗ 42∗∗ 54∗∗∗ 19∗∗∗ 0
Problem Set 137 177∗∗∗ 200∗∗∗ 174∗∗∗ 72∗∗∗ 19∗∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 138 194∗∗∗ 267∗∗∗ 190∗∗∗ 52∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0
Problem Set 139 156∗∗∗ 223∗∗∗ 219∗∗∗ 59∗∗∗ 6∗ 0 0
Problem Set 140 176∗∗∗ 168∗∗∗ 224∗∗∗ 120∗∗∗ 28∗∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 141 117∗∗∗ 223∗∗∗ 215∗∗∗ 152∗∗∗ 57∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0
Problem Set 142 65∗∗∗ 119∗∗∗ 247∗∗∗ 219∗∗∗ 145∗∗∗ 114∗∗∗ 28∗∗∗
Problem Set 143 166∗∗∗ 128∗∗∗ 195∗∗∗ 151∗∗∗ 67∗∗∗ 63∗∗∗ 10∗∗
Problem Set 144 212∗∗∗ 246∗∗∗ 180∗∗∗ 27∗∗∗ 3 0 0
Problem Set 145 161∗∗∗ 172∗∗∗ 128∗∗∗ 78∗∗∗ 24∗ 38∗∗∗ 7∗∗
Problem Set 146 216∗∗∗ 226∗∗∗ 192∗∗∗ 34∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0
Problem Set 147 158∗∗∗ 179∗∗∗ 221∗∗∗ 52∗∗∗ 23∗∗∗ 3 0
Problem Set 148 70∗∗ 64∗∗ 19 -37 -43∗ -79∗∗∗ -85∗∗∗
Problem Set 149 152∗∗∗ 162∗∗∗ 211∗∗∗ 135∗∗∗ 90∗∗∗ 57∗∗∗ 2
Problem Set 150 193∗∗∗ 188∗∗∗ 189∗∗∗ 75∗∗∗ 38∗∗∗ 3 0
TABLE A.6: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Maximum Variance in
Portfolio and required Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 1 0.09013 100
Problem Set 2 0.05887 1000
Problem Set 3 0.08835 200
Problem Set 4 0.07133 200
Problem Set 5 0.09007 100
Problem Set 6 0.08546 200
Problem Set 7 0.08985 200
Problem Set 8 0.08970 1000
Problem Set 9 0.08982 500
Problem Set 10 0.07263 200
Problem Set 11 0.05876 500
Problem Set 12 0.00000 200
Problem Set 13 0.07125 500
Problem Set 14 0.09015 500
Problem Set 15 0.08932 200
Problem Set 16 0.09008 500
Problem Set 17 0.08451 200
Problem Set 18 0.08868 200
Problem Set 19 0.08921 200
Problem Set 20 0.08275 200
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TABLE A.6: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Maximum Variance in
Portfolio and required Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 21 0.08523 500
Problem Set 22 0.08817 200
Problem Set 23 0.08938 1000
Problem Set 24 0.07671 100
Problem Set 25 0.06457 500
Problem Set 26 0.08826 200
Problem Set 27 0.06697 200
Problem Set 28 0.08771 500
Problem Set 29 0.00000 20
Problem Set 30 0.09015 1000
Problem Set 31 0.08399 500
Problem Set 32 0.06798 200
Problem Set 33 0.08744 200
Problem Set 34 0.08986 500
Problem Set 35 0.08362 500
Problem Set 36 0.08295 500
Problem Set 37 0.08807 50
Problem Set 38 0.06986 200
Problem Set 39 0.05466 500
Problem Set 40 0.07930 200
Problem Set 41 0.07543 500
Problem Set 42 0.05160 50
Problem Set 43 0.08510 200
Problem Set 44 0.09016 1000
Problem Set 45 0.06312 20
Problem Set 46 0.07380 100
Problem Set 47 0.06845 50
Problem Set 48 0.09006 500
Problem Set 49 0.07299 100
Problem Set 50 0.03277 1000
Problem Set 51 0.07295 200
Problem Set 52 0.04579 500
Problem Set 53 0.08032 100
Problem Set 54 0.09014 500
Problem Set 55 0.08176 200
Problem Set 56 0.08956 500
Problem Set 57 0.07493 500
Problem Set 58 0.09017 500
Problem Set 59 0.08822 100
Problem Set 60 0.06055 1000
Problem Set 61 0.05083 1000
Problem Set 62 0.08565 200
Problem Set 63 0.07313 500
Problem Set 64 0.08509 200
Problem Set 65 0.07423 500
Problem Set 66 0.08711 100
Problem Set 67 0.08788 500
Problem Set 68 0.06813 100
Problem Set 69 0.08295 200
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A.2 Evaluation of Intermediary’s Decision Methods
TABLE A.6: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Maximum Variance in
Portfolio and required Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 70 0.08797 1000
Problem Set 71 0.09015 1000
Problem Set 72 0.08873 200
Problem Set 73 0.08724 500
Problem Set 74 0.07829 100
Problem Set 75 0.00000 1000
Problem Set 76 0.08906 200
Problem Set 77 0.07219 100
Problem Set 78 0.00000 500
Problem Set 79 0.08981 500
Problem Set 80 0.08480 500
Problem Set 81 0.08096 200
Problem Set 82 0.08182 100
Problem Set 83 0.06280 200
Problem Set 84 0.08724 1000
Problem Set 85 0.07926 200
Problem Set 86 0.07265 100
Problem Set 87 0.04699 500
Problem Set 88 0.00000 20
Problem Set 89 0.06483 200
Problem Set 90 0.08109 500
Problem Set 91 0.00000 50
Problem Set 92 0.00000 500
Problem Set 93 0.08301 1000
Problem Set 94 0.07289 100
Problem Set 95 0.08777 100
Problem Set 96 0.08497 200
Problem Set 97 0.08894 1000
Problem Set 98 0.07685 100
Problem Set 99 0.00000 500
Problem Set 100 0.09015 1000
Problem Set 101 0.09005 1000
Problem Set 102 0.08836 200
Problem Set 103 0.06302 500
Problem Set 104 0.07566 500
Problem Set 105 0.08948 500
Problem Set 106 0.08071 200
Problem Set 107 0.08033 500
Problem Set 108 0.08941 200
Problem Set 109 0.06156 1000
Problem Set 110 0.08471 50
Problem Set 111 0.08322 100
Problem Set 112 0.07882 500
Problem Set 113 0.08731 100
Problem Set 114 0.07920 1000
Problem Set 115 0.09012 200
Problem Set 116 0.07249 500
Problem Set 117 0.00000 10
Problem Set 118 0.08668 200
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TABLE A.6: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Risk-minimizing Decision: Maximum Variance in
Portfolio and required Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 119 0.07067 500
Problem Set 120 0.06442 200
Problem Set 121 0.07842 1000
Problem Set 122 0.08809 1000
Problem Set 123 0.09008 500
Problem Set 124 0.08201 500
Problem Set 125 0.06498 100
Problem Set 126 0.08939 200
Problem Set 127 0.08533 200
Problem Set 128 0.08725 200
Problem Set 129 0.04688 50
Problem Set 130 0.00930 50
Problem Set 131 0.09015 500
Problem Set 132 0.08726 200
Problem Set 133 0.08384 50
Problem Set 134 0.08314 200
Problem Set 135 0.06093 1000
Problem Set 136 0.08099 500
Problem Set 137 0.07959 200
Problem Set 138 0.08975 200
Problem Set 139 0.08308 200
Problem Set 140 0.08799 200
Problem Set 141 0.07434 500
Problem Set 142 0.07583 1000
Problem Set 143 0.07061 1000
Problem Set 144 0.07611 100
Problem Set 145 0.07084 1000
Problem Set 146 0.08158 200
Problem Set 147 0.08736 200
Problem Set 148 0.06668 20
Problem Set 149 0.08915 500
Problem Set 150 0.08632 200
A.2.2 Maximization of Expected Utility
TABLE A.7: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Mean Difference in
Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 1 60∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 3 21∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 4 9∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 6 7∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
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TABLE A.7: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Mean Difference in
Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 7 55∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 8 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 9 9∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 10 6∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 11 119∗∗∗ 105∗∗∗ 39∗∗∗ 14∗∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 12 18∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 13 35∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 14 71∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 15 8∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 16 6 2 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 17 21∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 19 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 20 24∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 21 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 22 27∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 23 11∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 24 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 26 57∗∗∗ 26∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 27 23∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 28 23∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 29 52∗∗∗ 11∗∗ 3 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 31 4∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 32 62∗∗∗ 24∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 33 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 34 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 35 27∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 36 94∗∗∗ 46∗∗∗ 6∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 37 9∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 38 19∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 39 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 40 5∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 41 35∗∗∗ 15∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 43 20∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 45 44∗∗∗ 17∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 46 27∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 47 47∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 48 79∗∗∗ 15∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 49 65∗∗∗ 15∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 50 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 51 8∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 52 102∗∗∗ 98∗∗∗ 76∗∗∗ 42∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 0 0
Problem Set 53 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 54 36∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 55 9∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
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TABLE A.7: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Mean Difference in
Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 57 62∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 58 6∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 60 7∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 61 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 62 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 63 46∗∗∗ 6∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 64 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 66 5∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 67 49∗∗∗ 6∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 68 8∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 69 92∗∗∗ 64∗∗∗ 21∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 70 10∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 71 23∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 72 25∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 73 11∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 74 21∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 75 30∗∗∗ 13∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 76 30∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 77 54∗∗∗ 33∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 78 4∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 79 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 80 17∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 81 67∗∗∗ 22∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 82 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 83 7∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 84 20∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 85 6 2 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 86 36∗∗∗ 6∗ 1 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 87 6∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 89 24∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 90 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 91 78∗∗∗ 28∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 92 31∗∗∗ 4 1 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 93 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 94 4∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 95 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 96 87∗∗∗ 32∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 97 26∗∗∗ 6∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 98 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 99 48∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 100 34∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 101 29∗∗∗ 4∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 102 37∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 103 44∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 104 16∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0 0 0
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TABLE A.7: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Mean Difference in
Ranks
Observations 5,10 10,20 20,50 50,100 100,200 200,500 500,1000
Problem Set 105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 106 36∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 107 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 108 99∗∗∗ 46∗∗∗ 23∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 109 103∗∗∗ 45∗ 116∗∗∗ 82∗∗∗ 21∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0
Problem Set 110 43∗∗∗ 27∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 111 5∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 112 45∗∗∗ 16∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 113 37∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 114 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 115 52∗∗∗ 7∗ 1 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 117 94∗∗∗ 74∗∗∗ 20∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0
Problem Set 118 19∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 119 77∗∗∗ 67∗∗∗ 9∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 120 91∗∗∗ 129∗∗∗ 78∗∗∗ 53∗∗∗ 18∗∗∗ 1 0
Problem Set 121 14∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 122 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 123 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 124 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 125 15∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 126 13∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 127 22∗∗∗ 8∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 128 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 129 57∗∗∗ 15∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 130 57∗∗∗ 9∗ 4∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 131 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 132 4 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 133 95∗∗∗ 89∗∗∗ 86∗∗∗ 17∗∗∗ 5∗ 0 0
Problem Set 134 106∗∗∗ 62∗∗∗ 41∗∗∗ 7∗∗ 0 0 0
Problem Set 135 21∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 136 11∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 137 13∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 138 15∗∗∗ 2 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 139 5 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 140 19∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 141 97∗∗∗ 37∗∗∗ 3 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 143 4∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 144 16∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 145 18∗∗∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 146 9∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 147 107∗∗∗ 45∗∗∗ 27∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 148 18∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 149 89∗∗∗ 47∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 0 0 0 0
Problem Set 150 54∗∗∗ 11∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
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TABLE A.8: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Maximum Variance
in Portfolio and Required Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 1 0.08834 20
Problem Set 2 0.08902 0
Problem Set 3 0.09009 10
Problem Set 4 0.09000 10
Problem Set 5 0.08986 0
Problem Set 6 0.06808 10
Problem Set 7 0.06146 20
Problem Set 8 0.03250 0
Problem Set 9 0.06808 10
Problem Set 10 0.09001 10
Problem Set 11 0.04153 100
Problem Set 12 0.08831 10
Problem Set 13 0.08803 20
Problem Set 14 0.07928 20
Problem Set 15 0.09015 10
Problem Set 16 0.08969 0
Problem Set 17 0.09013 10
Problem Set 18 0.09016 0
Problem Set 19 0.09011 0
Problem Set 20 0.08954 10
Problem Set 21 0.08967 0
Problem Set 22 0.07954 10
Problem Set 23 0.04835 10
Problem Set 24 0.08994 0
Problem Set 25 0.08928 0
Problem Set 26 0.08772 20
Problem Set 27 0.08691 10
Problem Set 28 0.08280 10
Problem Set 29 0.08262 20
Problem Set 30 0.04423 0
Problem Set 31 0.08902 10
Problem Set 32 0.09008 20
Problem Set 33 0.08482 0
Problem Set 34 0.08758 0
Problem Set 35 0.08876 10
Problem Set 36 0.08394 50
Problem Set 37 0.08627 10
Problem Set 38 0.09012 10
Problem Set 39 0.08804 0
Problem Set 40 0.08570 10
Problem Set 41 0.08960 20
Problem Set 42 0.08771 0
Problem Set 43 0.08617 10
Problem Set 44 0.05736 0
Problem Set 45 0.08870 20
Problem Set 46 0.08468 20
Problem Set 47 0.09016 20
Problem Set 48 0.05429 20
Problem Set 49 0.08291 20
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TABLE A.8: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Maximum Variance
in Portfolio and Required Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 50 0.03176 0
Problem Set 51 0.08946 10
Problem Set 52 0.02418 200
Problem Set 53 0.08744 0
Problem Set 54 0.08950 20
Problem Set 55 0.08403 10
Problem Set 56 0.07165 0
Problem Set 57 0.08953 20
Problem Set 58 0.06582 10
Problem Set 59 0.08685 0
Problem Set 60 0.08997 10
Problem Set 61 0.08653 0
Problem Set 62 0.08972 0
Problem Set 63 0.03620 20
Problem Set 64 0.08708 0
Problem Set 65 0.08399 0
Problem Set 66 0.08982 10
Problem Set 67 0.06857 20
Problem Set 68 0.08991 10
Problem Set 69 0.06937 50
Problem Set 70 0.08499 10
Problem Set 71 0.08589 20
Problem Set 72 0.07549 10
Problem Set 73 0.08990 10
Problem Set 74 0.08791 10
Problem Set 75 0.08941 20
Problem Set 76 0.08813 20
Problem Set 77 0.08656 20
Problem Set 78 0.00241 10
Problem Set 79 0.08429 0
Problem Set 80 0.09016 10
Problem Set 81 0.08950 50
Problem Set 82 0.08835 0
Problem Set 83 0.08969 10
Problem Set 84 0.08770 10
Problem Set 85 0.08384 0
Problem Set 86 0.08251 20
Problem Set 87 0.09008 10
Problem Set 88 0.08159 0
Problem Set 89 0.09000 10
Problem Set 90 0.08618 0
Problem Set 91 0.08980 50
Problem Set 92 0.08667 10
Problem Set 93 0.05692 0
Problem Set 94 0.08695 10
Problem Set 95 0.08695 0
Problem Set 96 0.05504 20
Problem Set 97 0.08808 20
Problem Set 98 0.08758 0
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TABLE A.8: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Maximum Variance
in Portfolio and Required Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 99 0.08820 20
Problem Set 100 0.06492 10
Problem Set 101 0.07461 20
Problem Set 102 0.07461 10
Problem Set 103 0.08961 20
Problem Set 104 0.08883 10
Problem Set 105 0.08957 0
Problem Set 106 0.05822 10
Problem Set 107 0.08879 0
Problem Set 108 0.06210 50
Problem Set 109 0.01196 500
Problem Set 110 0.08854 20
Problem Set 111 0.08985 10
Problem Set 112 0.08823 20
Problem Set 113 0.08897 20
Problem Set 114 0.08595 0
Problem Set 115 0.07828 20
Problem Set 116 0.08506 0
Problem Set 117 0.08131 50
Problem Set 118 0.06597 20
Problem Set 119 0.02075 50
Problem Set 120 0.04012 200
Problem Set 121 0.08715 10
Problem Set 122 0.08964 0
Problem Set 123 0.05596 0
Problem Set 124 0.05596 0
Problem Set 125 0.08971 10
Problem Set 126 0.08189 10
Problem Set 127 0.09008 20
Problem Set 128 0.08819 0
Problem Set 129 0.02994 20
Problem Set 130 0.02994 50
Problem Set 131 0.08890 0
Problem Set 132 0.08943 0
Problem Set 133 0.05158 200
Problem Set 134 0.06748 100
Problem Set 135 0.08937 10
Problem Set 136 0.08669 10
Problem Set 137 0.09015 10
Problem Set 138 0.06627 10
Problem Set 139 0.08669 0
Problem Set 140 0.07046 10
Problem Set 141 0.04484 20
Problem Set 142 0.08417 0
Problem Set 143 0.08992 10
Problem Set 144 0.09014 10
Problem Set 145 0.08507 10
Problem Set 146 0.07759 10
Problem Set 147 0.07137 50
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TABLE A.8: Evaluation of Intermediary’s Utility-maximizing Decision: Maximum Variance
in Portfolio and Required Amount of Observations
Max Variance in Portfolio Required Amount of Monitoring Observations
Problem Set 148 0.08677 10
Problem Set 149 0.06027 50
Problem Set 150 0.06277 20
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Appendix B List of Symbols and Abbreviations
B.1 List of Symbols
A Set of all offered SLAs
|A| Number of SLAs in A
αi Offered SLA
ARA(w) Coefficient of absolute risk aversion
βi Supplied SLA
CEγ Provider’s certainty equivalent for SLA portfolio γ
c(sj) Provider specific costs of service execution for service sj
χδ,t Actual costs from procuring services in portfolio δ in period t
d adaptation factor in Beta Distribution Function
δ Supplied SLA portfolio
|δ| Number of SLAs in δ
δ∗ Risk-minimal supplied SLA portfolio
e adaptation factor in Beta Distribution Function
E(χδ) Expected costs of portfolio δ
E(λδ,t) Average degree of SLA violation of SLA portfolio δ
E(µγ,t) Average penalty for SLA portfolio γ
E(µγ∗,t) Average penalty for risk-minimal portfolio γ∗
E(πγ,t) Expected profit of SLA portfolio γ
E(πγ∗,t) Expected profit of risk-minimal offered portfolio γ∗
E(π{γ∗,δ},t) Intermediary’s expected profit from combination of γ∗ and δ
E(u(πγ,t)) Expected utility of profit of SLA portfolio γ
E(u(π{γ∗,δ},t)) Expected utility of profit of SLA portfolio γ∗ together with SLA portfolio δ
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